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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Subject of the research 
  
The subject matter of this research are the States’ obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) to protect human rights through criminal law, with 
a focus on the procedural limb of such protection, namely the States’ duty to carry out 
effective criminal investigations into the most serious human rights offences. While the 
European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has developed a large body of case law in the 
field of the positive obligations to investigate, the concept and its application have not 
received sufficient scholarly attention in order to define their precise scope and implications 
on national criminal procedures. 
Furthermore, this study will adopt also an integrated approach and discuss the interplay 
between the duty to conduct effective criminal investigations under the ECHR and the EU 
legal framework, by analysing the most relevant EU instruments of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters in view of assessing whether it actually implements the instances of 
effectiveness of criminal proceedings into human rights offences flowing from the ECHR 
and whether it offers a stronger protection of such rights. 
 
This introductory chapter will first give a general introduction on the development of the 
doctrine of the procedural obligations to investigate into serious human rights violations by 
the Court. Secondly, a working definition of certain concepts used in the study will be 
proposed. Finally, after giving an overview of the state of the art of the literature in this field 
and explaining how the scope of this study relates to this broader literature, the research 
questions will be discussed, as well as the methodology and structure adopted. 
 
 
2. The procedural obligation to investigate into serious human rights offences in the 
ECHR: origins and rationale 
 
The duty to carry out effective criminal investigations into human rights violations 
constitutes a form of positive obligation weighing on States. Positive obligations can be 
defined as ones «whereby a State must take action to secure human rights», as opposed 
	 5	
to negative obligations which are those «by which a State is required to abstain from 
interference with, and thereby respect, human rights»1. 
Admittedly, despite the traditional conception of human rights as limits to the powers of an 
intrusive State, imposing primarily negative obligations on States to refrain from directly 
interfering with those rights and freedoms, it has long been accepted that such rights may 
at the same time give rise to positive obligations, requiring States to take active steps and 
adopt all the reasonable measures to secure individuals the effective enjoyment of their 
human rights2. Behind this doctrine of positive obligations, indeed, stands the 
acknowledgment that a human right can be harmed not only by an action by the State, but 
also by its failure to act, for which the State should also be held responsible.  
Since the 1979 Marckx v. Belgium case3, when for the first time the door was opened to a 
more positive reading of ECHR rights, the Court has found positive obligations to arise 
under basically every Convention right, thanks to the general obligation of Article 1 ECHR, 
which requires the States to «secure» the enjoyment of Convention rights to everyone 
within their jurisdiction4.  
The primary rationale cited by the Court to justify the development of such positive 
obligations is the principle of effectiveness, according to which the Convention is intended 
to guarantee rights that are practical and effective, not merely theoretical and illusory5. Such 
a dynamic and creative interpretation has clearly brought about an extension and 
redefinition of the obligations imposed on States by the ECHR, that go far beyond what 
was originally foreseen. One very significant implication of positive obligations, in this 
connection, is that they also lead to a “horizontal effect” of Convention rights, inasmuch as 
the State is expected to adopt measures to secure the enjoyment of those rights even in 
the sphere of the relationships among individuals, in order to prevent and protect from 
infringements of those rights by other private individuals6. 
																																																						
1 HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p. ??. 
2 See, L. LAVRYSEN, Human Rights in a Positive State. Rethinking the relationship between positive 
and negative obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, Intersentia, 2016, p. 3. 
3 Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, § 31, concerning the discrimination of “illegitimate” 
children in affiliation and inheritance rights, the Court found that «the object of [Article 8] is 
‘essentially’ that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities 
(…). Nevertheless it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition 
to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective 
‘respect’ for family life». 
4 In this sense, F. SUDRE, Droit Européen et International de droits de l’homme, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2012, p. ??; R. CHENAL, Obblighi di criminalizzazione tra sistema penale 
italiano e Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in Legislazione Penale, 2006, 1, p. 178. 
5 See, Airey v. Ireland, no. 6289/73, 9 October 1979, § 24. In this sense see, A. MOWBRAY, The 
creativity of the European Court of Human Rights, in Human Rights Law Review, 2005, 5, p. 57. 
6 In these cases the infringement of a human right by a private individual is linked to a failure of the State 
to comply with a positive obligation, see L. LAVRYSEN, Human Rights in a Positive State., cit., p. 79. 
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Among the wide range of positive obligations existing under the various Convention’s 
provisions, having the most diverse content and nature7, the first and most basic one, which 
represents the prerequisite for discharging any of the other types of positive obligations 
and is defined by the Court itself as a «primary duty8», is the State’s duty to put into place 
an adequate legal framework which provides effective protection for the rights at stake9. In 
other words, under this obligation States are required to adopt legal rules to ensure that 
individuals may effectively enjoy their rights. As a consequence, a State could be held 
internationally responsible if its legislation is not appropriate as it allows for the infringement 
of a protected right by other private individuals. 
 
It is precisely in this connection that the role of criminal law as instrument for the protection 
of human rights comes into play, as the most effective tool available for the State to 
guarantee an effective enjoyment of the rights.  
While normally States dispose of a margin of appreciation in choosing how to discharge 
the obligation to provide for an adequate legal framework, the importance of the right at 
issue and the severity of the threat to it, however, influence the strength of the required 
legislative response and thus may restrict the appropriate options10. In certain cases, in 
relation to the most important Convention rights and to the most serious infringements 
thereof, the Court has indeed found that only criminal law is able to ensure effective 
protection of those rights. Therefore the provision of a criminal law remedy is mandated in 
order to fulfil this positive obligation11.  
The case M.C. v. Bulgaria can be taken as a very significant example in order to understand 
this reasoning of the Court, for in that occasion it has been made clear that «while the 
choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against 
acts of individuals is in principle within the State's margin of appreciation, effective 
																																																						
7 For an extensive analysis of positive obligations under the ECHR see L. LAVRYSEN, Human Rights in a 
Positive State, cit., who distinguishes positive obligations between substantive or procedural, preventive 
or remedial, and as requiring to put into place a legal framework or to take ad hoc measures. Such 
categories are not mutually exclusive, but have rather a cross-cutting nature. See also, F. SUDRE, 
Obligations positives dans la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l’homme, in Revue Trimestrielle 
des Droits de l’Homme, 1995, p. … 
8 See, Osman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 23452/94, 28 October 1998, § 115. 
9 In this sense, A. MOWBRAY, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 225; D. XENOS, The 
Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention on Human Rights, Routledge, 2012, p. 
107; L. LAVRYSEN, Human Rights in a Positive State, cit., p. 113. 
10 See, X and Y v. the Netherlands, no. 8978/80, 26 March 1985, § 24. See also, R. CHENAL, Obblighi di 
criminalizzazione tra sistema penale italiano e Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, cit., p. 180. 
11 See infra … for an overview of the scope of the positive obligations of criminal law protection under 
the different ECHR rights. 
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deterrence against grave acts such as rape, where fundamental values and essential 
aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions12». 
 
With respect to certain fundamental human rights, therefore, a positive obligation of 
protection of human rights through criminal law arises, which is based on the assumption 
that only criminal law provisions are able to ensure a sufficient deterrent effect against 
infringements of those rights, thanks also to its prominent expressive and symbolic value13. 
In the first case in which an obligation of criminal law protection was found, indeed, the 
Court stressed that «effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be 
achieved only by criminal-law provisions14».  
The development of these obligations of criminal law protection discloses the «paradoxical» 
nature of the relationship between human rights and criminal law: the formers, at once, 
represent a limit on the punitive power of the States but also, on the other hand, require its 
intervention in order to guarantee their effective enjoyment15. In this sense, it has been said 
that human rights have both a «defensive and offensive role, a role of both neutralizing and 
triggering the criminal law16», in that they are indeed a source of positive obligations to 
criminalise. 
 
The obligation to protect certain human rights through criminal law, however, is not 
confined to requiring the mere criminalisation of particular offences, but embraces also the 
effective enforcement of those criminal law provisions and covers therefore the whole 
criminal justice system and all its actors. In relation to Article 2, for instance, the Court 
stated that «the State’s obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure 
the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission 
																																																						
12 M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, 4 December 2003, § 150. 
13 See, S. MANACORDA, «Dovere di punire»? Gli obblighi di tutela penale nell’era della 
internazionalizzazione del diritto, in Riv. ita. dir. proc. pen., 2012, 4, p. 1364. The symbolic and expressive 
value of criminal law relates its ability to reaffirm the importance society attaches to the infringed rights 
and, more generally, the authority of law, see J. C. OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice 
Proceedings for Serious Human Rights Violations, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p. 60. Such value 
is also related to its element of public censure, which is a central feature of criminal liability, see A. 
ASHWORTH, Positive obligations in criminal law, Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 11. 
14 X and Y v. the Netherlands, cit., § 27. 
15 According to F. VIGANÒ, L’arbitrio del non punire. Sugli obblighi di tutela penale dei diritti fondamentali, 
in Studi in onore di Mario Romano, Jovene, vol. IV, 2011, p. 2654, this represents a reversal of the 
traditional relationship between human rights and criminal law. 
16 F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights, in Journal of 
International Criminal Law, 2011, 9. p. 579. On such double role of human rights see also, A.M. MAUGERI, 
Fundamental rights in the European legal order, both as limit on punitive power and as a source of 
positive obligations to criminalise, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 2013, 4, p. 374; R. BARTOLI, 
“Chiaro e oscuro” dei diritti umani alla luce del processo di internazionalizzazione del diritto, in Riv. ita. 
dir. proc. pen., 2012, p. 794. 
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of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions17».  
Accordingly, on top of the substantive positive obligation to criminalise, which is an aspect 
of the general positive obligation of adopting an effective regulatory framework18 and has 
a preventive nature, the Court has introduced also a procedural obligation of remedial 
nature that comes into play ex post facto once the infringement of the right has allegedly 
taken place: the duty to carry out effective criminal investigation into that offence19.  
Such procedural obligation was established for the first time in McCann and others v. the 
United Kingdom [GC], where the Court concluded that: 
 
«The obligation to protect the right to life (…), read in conjunction with the State’s 
general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to "secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention", requires by 
implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when 
individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents 
of the State20». 
 
The criminal investigation, in particular, must be able to establish the facts and to identify 
and, where warranted, also prosecute and effectively punish those responsible. In other 
words, it is an obligation that touches upon the whole life of a criminal proceedings. As a 
consequence, distinguishing between which aspects of criminal law enforcement fall under 
the substantive obligation to criminalize and which, to the contrary, should be assessed 
under the procedural duty to investigate and punish, is not always so straightforward. To 
the contrary, since the two obligations are clearly interlinked, they also tend to overlap and 
																																																						
17 Osman v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 115. 
18 See A. ASHWORTH, Positive obligations in criminal law, cit., p. 196-211. 
19 According to E. DUBOUT, La procéduralisation des obligations relatives au droits fondamentaux 
substantiels par la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, in Revue Trimestrelle des Droits de 
l’Homme, 2007, n. 70, p. 472, the Court has in this way has operated a «redoublement» of the protected 
right, where now a substantive limb can be distinguished from a procedural one.  
20 McCann and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 18984/91, 27 September 1995, § 161. Such 
judgement which has been felicitously described as the equivalent of an additional Protocol to the 
Convention by J. LARKIN, Dialogue at cross purposes: the Northern Ireland inquest and Art. 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in L. EARLY, A. AUSTIN, C. OVEY, O. CHERNISHOVA (eds.) The Right 
to Life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Twenty Years of Legal 
Developments since McCann v. the United Kingdom. In Honour of Michael O’Boyle, Wolf Legal 
Publisher, 2016, p. 161. The procedural obligation to investigate, indeed, is not an unambiguous and 
explicit requirement of the Convention, but rather an implied duty, as reminded by R. ARIAV, National 
Investigations of Human Rights Between National and International Law, in Goettingen Journal of 
International Law, 2012, 4, p. 860; and, J. CHEVALIER-WATTS, Effective Investigations under Art. 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Securing the Right to Life or an Onerous Burden on a State?, 
in European Journal of International Law, 2010, 3, p. 701. 
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it seems that the procedural one encompasses much more than one would initially think21. 
This seems to be rooted in the fact that the scope of a criminal investigation and 
proceedings is inevitably determined by the existence of substantive criminal law 
provisions criminalizing specific conducts. In the words of the Court, «an indispensable 
prerequisite for the discharge of this [procedural] obligation in individual cases is the 
concomitant obligation (…) for States to have criminal law provisions appropriately 
penalising acts contrary to that Article22». As a consequence, a too narrow definition of a 
criminal offence could lead to certain acts being left outside the scope of the proceedings 
and therefore unpunished. It is thus apparent that defects in substantive criminal law might 
inevitably determine an impossibility to fulfil the procedural obligation to investigate and 
punish. In many cases, admittedly, the Court has found a violation of the procedural 
obligation on account of such kind of substantive problems23. 
 
Whilst the scope, definition and requirements inherent in such procedural obligation will be 
discussed in detail subsequently as the object of the first part of this study, it suffices here 
to highlight that the rationale justifying the existence of this procedural obligation is, once 
again, the need to ensure an effective protection of the human right at issue through the 
proper enforcement of the national criminal provisions protecting such right24. Without an 
effective enforcement, indeed, the deterrent effect of criminal law provision would remain 
only illusory. But why are criminal proceedings regarded as the best and only possible 
means of enforcement to ensure such effective protection of human rights? 
The first reason relates to the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions that has just been 
discussed. However, it appears that another rationale underpinning such assumption lies 
in the specific peculiarities of criminal proceedings, and in particular in their ability to 
establish the facts. In certain cases, indeed, it is only through the coercive investigative 
measures available in criminal proceedings and thanks to the independence of the 
authorities in charge of criminal justice that it is possible to come to the ascertainment of 
the facts, lacking which no other form of redress would be possible. 
																																																						
21 In this sense also, L. LAVRYSEN, Human Rights in a Positive State, cit., p. 53. 
22 Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884/11, 7 April 2015, § 209; Gafgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, 1 June 
2010, § 117; Myumyum v. Bulgaria, no. 67258/13, 3 November 2015, § 68; Siliadin v. France, no. 
73316/01, 26 July 2005, § 142; C.N. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4239/08, 13 November 2012, § 73. 
On this issue see also, V. STOYANOVA, Art. 4 of the ECHR and the obligation of criminalizing slavery, 
servitude, forced labour and human trafficking, in Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 2014, 3, p. 407, who argues that thereby also quality requirments on the definition of criminal 
offences are imposed. 
23 See, M.C. v. Bulgaria, cit., § 166; Myumyun v. Bulgaria, cit., § 73-74 and 77; Cestaro v. Italy, cit., § 
225. 
24 See, Kelly and others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, 4 May 2001, § 94, where it is state that 
«the essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic 
laws which protect the right to life». 
	 10	
  
Finally, it should be noted that the State’s duty to investigate into serious human right 
offences, although meant primarily to ensure the effectiveness of the underlying right, 
brings about at the same time a significant strengthening of the position of victims of crime 
within criminal proceedings in terms of their becoming thereby entitled to many rights, even 
of participatory nature.  
If looked at from the other side of the coin, indeed, this procedural obligation can be 
regarded as the individual right of victims of serious human rights violations to an effective 
criminal investigation, who may indeed bring a complaint before Strasbourg for a failure of 
the State to adequately investigate into the offence they have suffered. In this sense, the 
positive obligation of effective enforcement of criminal law acknowledges a new dimension 
of criminal justice: criminal proceedings are conceived not anymore just as a guarantee for 
the rights of the accused, but also and at the same time as an instrument of redress latu 
sensu to safeguard the rights of victims of crime25. Indeed, without the establishment of the 
facts to which criminal investigations and proceedings aim, any other judicial remedy 
offered to the victims would remain ineffective. 
 
 
3. Conceptual framework 
 
While concepts such as “investigation”, “prosecution”, “victim”, and “serious human right 
violation” have been for a long time part of the human right vocabulary, they refer at the 
same time to very specific and technical notions of a criminal procedure and their meaning 
therefore is strictly dependent on the national criminal justice system taken into 
consideration with its specificities. In view of this inevitable lack of uniformity on the precise 
meaning of such notions, which varies significantly from one State to another, it is important 
to provide a working definition thereof that is universally applicable, irrespective of the 
specific national system concerned. Such a uniform definition, though being inevitably 
approximate from a purely national perspective, is needed when having to assess different 
national criminal justice systems in the light of the same principles, just like it is done at the 
ECHR and EU level. The definitions adopted in this work, therefore, are in essence those 
that can be found in the case-law of the Court or in the EU legal order, which they often 
share. 
 
Firstly, the notion of “serious human rights violation or offence”, which recurs throughout 
this work, refers to those infringements of certain rights that are considered by the Court 
																																																						
25 In this sense also, F. VIGANÒ, L’arbitrio del non punire. Sugli obblighi di tutela penale dei diritti 
fondamentali, cit., p. 2659. 
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as being so essential to the human person and dignity that they have a higher rank in the 
hierarchy of rights and deserve a criminal law protection26. Accordingly, such concept refers 
to the violation of a certain category of human rights and not, by contrast, as it sometimes 
is the case in international law, to the massive scale or nature of the violation, resulting for 
instance from a systematic practice. Indeed, also an individual violation of those 
preeminent rights amounts to a serious human right offence. A list of what, according to 
the ECHR case-law, constitutes as serious human right offence is provided hereinafter 
when discussing the scope of the duty to effectively investigate and punish27. 
 
Secondly, for the notion of “victim of crime” this work relies on the definition given by 
Directive 2012/29/EU on the rights of victims of crime28, which encompasses both the direct 
victim of a crime, defined as «a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, 
mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by a criminal 
offence», as well as indirect victims, that is «family members of a person whose death was 
directly caused by a criminal offence and who have suffered harm as a result of that 
person's death29». Accordingly, in order for a person to become a victim it is sufficient that 
an alleged criminal offence is identified, but the identification of an alleged offender is not 
necessary30. 
Such definition may indeed be used also for the purposes of the ECHR because in the 
Court’s case-law on the procedural obligations to investigate and punish serious human 
rights offences, in the same way as in the abovementioned Directive, both the direct victims 
of the crime and the relatives of the deceased victim are placed on the same level as far as 
their participatory rights in criminal proceedings are concerned31, and the existence of a 
causal link between the offence committed against the victim and an accused is not 
required before involving the victim in the criminal proceedings32. 
 
As to the notion of «investigations» in the case-law of the Court, and therefore also for the 
purposes of this study, such term refers specifically to the preliminary investigations, 
																																																						
26 See, J. C. OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings for Serious Human Rights 
Violations, cit., p. 23. 
27 See infra… 
28 Directive 29/2012/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. 
29 See Article 2 (1)(a) of Directive 29/2012/EU. Familiy members are also defined as «the spouse, the 
person who is living with the victim in a committed intimate relationship, in a joint household and on a 
stable and continuous basis, the relatives in direct line, the siblings and the dependants of the victim». 
30 In this sense, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, 3rd edition, Intersentia, 2016, p. 332. 
31 See, inter alia, Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, 17 
September 2014, § 324, where it is expressely stated that the next of kin of the victim must be involved 
in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests. Equally, with regard 
to Article 3 of the Convention, the victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation». 
32 See Anusca v. Moldova, no. 24034/07, § 44, 18 May 2010. 
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namely that first stage of criminal proceedings which takes place before a case is sent to 
trial and is normally designed to collect evidentiary elements in order to decide whether to 
prosecute or not, irrespective of whether it is carried out under the supervision of a public 
prosecutor or of an investigating judge or whether such elements are admissible at trial or 
not. The investigation phase, thus, normally starts from the moment when the authorities 
become aware of the facts allegedly constituting a criminal offence and ends when a 
decision to commit for trial or, in the opposite case, a decision not to prosecute is taken.  
In this connection, it is therefore necessary to define also the notion of «prosecution», which 
is intended in the case-law of the Court as the power to approve the indictment and refer 
the case to a court for trial following the preliminary investigation stage, regardless of 
whether it is exercised by a public prosecutor or an investigating judge. Correspondingly, 
a «decision not to prosecute» is any decision ending criminal proceedings before the case 
is sent to trial or, in other words, concluding the preliminary investigation stage by not 
bringing any charges before the courts, as for instance a decision to withdraw the charges, 
to drop the case, to dismiss a complaint, or to discontinue the proceedings and stop 
investigating. The same notion is adopted by Directive 2012/29/EU, which refers to a 
decision taken either by a prosecutor, investigating judge or other law enforcement 
authorities such as police officers, but not by a court, which ends the criminal proceedings 
and includes decision to withdraw the charges or to dismiss the case33. 
Finally, there is one last caveat to keep in mind when discussing the notion of 
«investigations». The definition just provided, limited to the preliminary investigation stage, 
could actually be misleading for one may therefore tend to understand the procedural 
obligation of States to investigate serious human rights violations under the ECHR as being 
limited to that particular stage and capable of being exhaustively discharged at the moment 
the preliminary investigations are concluded. This is however not the case since, as it will 
be discussed hereinafter, it is undisputed that where the case is sent to trial, such 
procedural obligation extends also to the following stages, and the criminal proceedings 
as a whole, from their initiation until the execution of the sentence, are taken into 
consideration by the Court in order to assess compliance with such duty34. Therefore, 
although the procedural obligation object of this study is called by the Court itself duty to 
investigate, it is in fact confined to the strict investigation phase only where a decision not 
to prosecute is taken and proceedings are ended at that preliminary stage and should be 
better defined as “duty to effectively investigate and punish”. 
 
A last concept which should also be defined is that of «judicial review» which is relevant in 
this study in relation to the possibility of submitting a decision not to prosecute to some 
																																																						
33 See Recitals 43 and 44 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
34 See infra… 
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form of control. Such term is intended here, in line with the interpretation given by the 
Court35, as a synonym of judicial remedy. It thus refers to an intervention by a judicial 
authority, being it a judge or a court, which enjoys the guarantees of an independent 
tribunal for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR. It does not, conversely, concern the specific 
standards of review used by that authority, in the sense of judicial review as opposed to an 
appeal, being limited to the mere legality of the decision and not to its merits. 
A similar definition is consistent also with the one provided in Directive 2012/29/EU on the 
rights of victims of crime under Article 11 which lays down the «right to a review» of a 
decision not to prosecute. Such provision, indeed, does not use the term «judicial» 
precisely because it allows also for a possibility of hierarchical review of the decision 
dismissing the proceedings within the prosecution service, which would to the contrary not 
fall within the notion of «judicial review» used by the Court36. 
 
4. Structure and methodology 
 
The present work intends to assess how effective protection against gross violations of 
human rights should be ensured through the enforcement of criminal law at European level 
in accordance with standards set by the European Court of Human Rights (the Court). 
Given that the issue of the substantive duties of criminalisation of human rights has been 
already extensively discussed in literature37, this work will not discuss their legitimacy, but 
it will rather take their existence as a starting point and focus instead on the procedural 
aspect of the duties of criminal law protection and on the possible reflections of such 
requirements on the EU legal framework, in the view of achieving a more effective 
implementation of such State obligations.  
To that end, the study will be divided into two sections. Chapter II discusses the procedural 
obligation to investigate and punish human rights violations under the ECHR. Through an 
																																																						
35 See, Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, § 278; Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc 
v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, 14 April 2015, § 232; Gürtekin and others and two other applications v. 
Cyprus (dec.), 11 March 2014, § 28. 
36 See infra… 
37 See, inter alia, R. CHENAL, Obblighi di criminalizzazione tra sistema penale italiano e Corte europea dei 
diritti dell’uomo, cit., p. 178; F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human 
Rights, in Journal of International Criminal Law, cit., p. 577; S. MANACORDA, «Dovere di punire»? Gli 
obblighi di tutela penale nell’era della internazionalizzazione del diritto, cit., p. 1364; J. ALIX, Les 
obligations positives de pénalisation et de punition des atteintes à la vie imposées par la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme au titre de l’article 2 de la Convention, in S. MANACORDA, J. TRICOT 
(eds.) «Devoir de punir»? Le système penal et a protection internationale du droit à la vie, Société des 
legislation comparé, 2013, p. 223; F. VIGANÒ, Obblighi convenzionali di tutela penale, in V. MANES, V. 
ZAGREBELSKY, La Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo nell’ordinamento penale italiano, Giuffrè, 
2011, p. 243; F. VIGANÒ, L’arbitrio del non punire. Sugli obblighi di tutela penale dei diritti fondamentali, 
cit., p. 2645; F. BESTAGNO, Diritti umani e impunità. Obblighi positivi degli Stati in materia penale, Vita e 
Pensiero, 2003; C. PAONESSA, Gli obblighi di tutela penale. La discrezionalità legislativa nella cornice dei 
vincoli costituzionali e comunitari, Edizioni ETS, 2009. 
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analysis of the large body of case-law, it will establish in detail its scope and what 
characteristics should criminal investigations, and more generally criminal proceedings, 
have to be regarded as effective and in compliance with such obligation. It will also assess 
how these requirements of effectiveness relate to the defence’s fair trial rights ensured by 
Article 6 ECHR. Indeed, although from the two different perspectives of the defendant and 
of the victim, there is a certain degree of interplay between the criminal fair trial guarantees 
of Article 6 and the procedural requirements of the obligation to investigate and punish, on 
account of the fact that, as it will be mentioned hereinafter, they both apply both to the 
criminal investigations stage and trial. Some issues on which, indeed, both provisions have 
a bearing are, just to mention a few, the independence of the authorities, the examination 
of witnesses, the right of access to the case file, the reasoning of judicial decisions and the 
reasonable length of the proceedings. Finally, the impact that compliance, or rather non-
compliance, with the duty to investigate has on other rights of the defence, such as the 
right not to be tried or punished twice under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, will also be 
addressed. The perspective adopted in this work, therefore, is to assess whether a fair 
balance has been achieved between the sought for efficiency and the guarantees of the 
defence. 
Building upon such acquis, Chapter III shifts the look to the EU legal framework, in order to 
discuss the extent to which to date the EU normative body in criminal matters reflects and 
contributes to implement such requirements of effectiveness of the investigations and 
criminal proceedings, in certain cases also offering higher standards of protection. In 
particular, the existence of positive duties to investigate and effectively punish human rights 
offences flowing directly from the EU legislation and how the effectiveness of criminal 
proceedings is thereby ensured will firstly be discussed. Secondly, attention will be paid to 
specific procedural aspects relating to the effectiveness of criminal proceedings, such as 
the rights of involvement of victims of crime on account of the fact that such profile 
represents one of the key requirements of effectiveness of criminal investigations under the 
ECHR. The argument, finally, is that the EU instruments of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters are a valuable tool to implement in a more efficient way the duties of effective 
investigations implied in the ECHR. 
 
The methodology of this work is mainly analytical. Through an interpretation of the ECHR 
and the judgments and decisions delivered by the Court in the field of the procedural 
obligations to investigate and punish serious human rights offences, the study seeks 
indeed to answer analytical questions such as «how legal concepts are defined and fit 
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together and the extent to which any general principles can be extracted by legal reasoning 
that can guide future decisions38». 
To that end, the study adopts however an integrated approach, focusing on the same 
issues of the effectiveness of criminal proceedings into serious human rights violations and 
discussing how these are developed both at the ECHR and EU level. Such perspective is 
actually lacking in the existing literature discussing the ECtHR procedural obligations39. 
Academic research to date, indeed, has not analysed what influence can the Court’s case-
law concerning effective investigations have on the development of EU standards for 
criminal proceedings. Neither has research focused on, on the other hand, whether the EU 
instruments of judicial cooperation could be a valuable tool to implement in a more efficient 
way the duties of effective investigations imposed by the Court. 
 
 
 
	 	
																																																						
38 J. BELL, Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law, in M. VAN HOECKE (ed.), 
Methodologies of Legal Research, Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 155. 
39 A. MOWBRAY, Duties of investigation under the European Convention on Human rights, in International 
Criminal Law Quarterly, 2002, 51, p. 437; O. CAHN, Obligations positives procédurales et droit à la vie, in 
S. MANACORDA, J. TRICOT (eds.) «Devoir de punir»?, cit., p. 235; J. CHEVALIER-WATTS, Effective 
Investigations under Art. 2 of the European Convention in Human Rights: Securing the Right to Life or 
an Onerous Burden on a State?, cit., p. 701; B. BELDA, Les droits de l’homme des persone privées de 
liberté, Bruylant, 2010, p. 586; K. ALTERMANN, Ermittlungspflichten der Staaten aus der Europäischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention, Nomos, 2006; L. LAVRYSEN, Human Rights in a Positive State, cit., p. 61-66; 
M. MONTAGNA, Necessità della completezza delle indagini, in A. GAITO (ed.), I princìpi europei del 
processo penale, Dike, 2016, p. 345. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO SERIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS OFFENCES UNDER THE ECHR 
 
 
SECTION I: DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS  
 
3. The notion of “effective investigations” 
 
B) Definition 
Originally, the procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation, firstly created in 
McCann v. the United Kingdom40 under Article 2 of the Convention and then extended also 
to several other rights41, was not precisely defined and the Court refrained from deciding 
on the form and conditions that should be involved. It merely stated that «the obligation to 
protect the right to life (…) requires by implication that there should be some form of 
effective official investigation», without providing any indication on what form such an 
investigation should take42.  
A more exact definition of the notion of effective investigation is now to be found in the 
case-law. In the judgment Janowiec v. Russia, the Court has specified that «the procedural 
obligation under Article 2 covers acts undertaken in the framework of criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings which are capable of leading to the identification 
and punishment of those responsible or to an award of compensation to the injured party» 
and that «this definition operates to the exclusion of other types of inquiries that may be 
carried out for other purposes, such as establishing historical truth»43.  
It is thus clearer now that the procedural obligation discovered in Article 2 and other 
Convention rights relates to an investigation with a view to prosecution and punishment, or 
(in cases where recourse to criminal law is not mandated, infra §…) to an award of 
compensation44. 
																																																						
40 McCann v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 161. 
41 See infra, §… 
42 Mc. Cann v. the United Kingdom, cit., §161-162; Yasa v. Turkey, no. 22495/93, 2 September 
1998, § 98, see also J. LARKIN, Dialogue at cross purposes, cit., p. 161. 
43 Janowiec and others v. Russia [GC], nos. 55508/07, 29520/09, 21 October 2013, § 143. See also, 
Kavaklioglu and others v. Turkey, no. 15397/02, 30 May 2017, where parliamentary inquiries are 
exluded from the investigations capable of discharging the procedural obligations under Articles 2 
and 3. 
44 See also J. LARKIN, Dialogue at cross purposes, cit., p. x, who therefore excludes that the peculiar 
structure of inquests existing in Northern Ireland have the necessary features to satisfy this 
procedural obligation. 
	 17	
 
Therefore, in situations where the substantive obligations of protection of Convention rights 
impose the recourse to criminal law, the nature of the investigation required to satisfy the 
procedural obligations is also, in principle, criminal45. In these cases, indeed, States have 
the duty to «put in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of 
offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, 
suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions»46. The essential purpose of 
the investigation thus is to secure the effective implementation of domestic laws which 
protect the right to life or the other relevant Convention rights and to ensure the 
accountability of the perpetrators47. 
Accordingly, inasmuch as a criminal law is mandated by the substantive facet of the 
Convention right, civil proceedings undertaken on the initiative of the victims, not of the 
authorities, and which do not involve the identification and punishment of those 
responsible, but merely an award of damages, cannot discharge this procedural 
obligation48. As indicated by the Court itself, this is so because if authorities could confine 
their reaction to an infringement of those Convention rights to the mere payment of 
compensation, while not doing enough in the prosecution and punishment of those 
responsible, it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State (but not only) to 
abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity, and the general legal 
prohibitions of killing and torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, despite their 
fundamental importance, would remain ineffective in practice49. 
 
Nonetheless, the obligation to carry out an effective criminal investigation does not go as 
far as to impose one single model of investigation. The States’ freedom in organizing their 
prosecutorial and criminal justice system is not put into question, as the Court made it clear 
that «a variety of State prosecution systems and divergent procedural rules for conducting 
criminal investigations may be compatible with the Convention, which does not 
contemplate any particular model in this respect»50. The same holds true for the parallel 
																																																						
45 See also, F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights, 
cit., p. 577, who states that «criminal proceedings would appear to to constitute par excellence the 
most appropriate remedy for satisfying the procedural requirements of Art. 2»; HARRIS, O’BOYLE, 
WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 215. 
46 Mutafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 171. See infra, §… for the situations in which 
this duty to resort to criminal law arises. 
47 Margus v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455/10, 27 May 2014, § 125. 
48 Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, § 165; Petrovic v. 
Serbia, no. 40485/08, 15 July 2014, § 80. 
49 Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 80. 
50 Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108/02, 5 November 2009, § 208. Also, Armani da Silva v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], cit., § 259; Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 145. On this 
issue see A. MOWBRAY, Duties of investigation under the European Convention on Human rights, 
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procedural obligation under Article 3, as «the choice of the means to secure compliance 
with Article 3 in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle 
a matter that falls within the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation, provided that 
criminal-law mechanisms are available to the victim»51.  
The essence and the essential purpose of the procedural obligation, which is in any case 
to be attained, is that «the investigation must be capable of establishing the facts and, 
where appropriate, identifying and punishing those responsible»52. In this sense, «in the 
normal course of events a criminal trial with an adversarial procedure before an 
independent and impartial judge must be regarded as furnishing the strongest safeguards 
of an effective procedure for the finding of fact and the attribution of criminal 
responsibility»53. 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the States’ discretion in organizing their own criminal justice 
system, there could be situations of institutional deficiencies which may breach the 
procedural obligation in so far as the national rules for the investigations preclude the 
attainment of their essential purpose, but these remain rather exceptional. This is the case, 
for example, for the «pre-investigation inquiries» in Russia and Ukraine, when not followed 
by the opening of a criminal case and of full-scale preliminary investigations. Such legal 
framework has not been considered capable of establishing the facts of the case and of 
leading to the punishment of those responsible on the ground that the investigative 
measures normally available in criminal investigations in order to secure the evidence 
cannot be resorted to by the authorities in these «pre-investigation inquiries»54.  
 
																																																						
cit., p. 437; E. BREMS, Procedural protection. An examination of procedural safeguards read into 
substantive Convention rights, in E. BREMS, J. GERARDS (eds.) Shaping rights in the ECHR: the role 
of the European Court of Human Rights in determining the scope of human rights, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014, p. 137, who specifies that the investigation does not need to be judicial. 
51 Valiuliené v. Lithuania, no. 33234/07, 26 March 2013, § 85. This demonstrates that the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is not unknown in respect of Article 2, although this provision protects a non-
derogable right, and this is to be explained by the very nature of positive obligations as opposed to 
the negative ones. See, L.A. SICILIANOS, Out of harm’s way, positive obligations under Article 2 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, in L. EARLY, A. AUSTIN, C. OVEY, O. CHERNISHOVA (eds.) 
The Right to Life, cit., p. 35; and, L. LAVRYSEN, The scope of rights and the scope of obligations. 
Positive obligations, in in E. BREMS, J. GERARDS (eds.) Shaping rights in the ECHR, cit., p. 172. 
52 Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 172; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 
28883/95, 4 May 2001, § 121. 
53 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/04, 27 November 2007, § 66. 
54 Lyapin v. Russia,  no. 46956/09, 24 July 2014, § 133-136; Kulik v. Ukraine, no. 10397/10, 19 
March 2015, § 51; Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, § 193. The limit 
concerns primarily the impossibility to question persons as witness, in the same way and with the 
same safeguards of criminal proceedings, as for example criminal liability for perjury or refusal to 
testify. In the «pre-investigation inquiries» the authorities can only collect “explanations” which do 
not commit their authors in the same way. Furthermore, victims are prevented from effectively 
participate. 
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i. Criminal nature: in a strict sense or according to the notion of «criminal charge»? 
 
Having clarified that the investigations required are necessarily criminal, it should be 
pointed out that so far the Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether only 
criminal proceedings strictu sensu or also administrative punitive proceedings, which are 
criminal in nature according to the Engel criteria55, may satisfy the procedural obligation to 
investigate and punish.  
It could be argued that, having the Court refrained from imposing a single model of 
investigations, even a formally administrative proceeding which is capable of establishing 
the facts and of leading to the punishment of those responsible could discharge the 
procedural obligation under Article 2. However, when taking a closer look at the rationales 
underpinning the States’ duty to provide for criminal law remedies, the opposite conclusion 
could be reached that the procedural obligation may be discharged only by the institution 
of formal criminal proceedings in strict sense. Indeed, when imposing the positive 
obligation to enact criminal law provisions against an infringement of a Convention’s right, 
the Court relies strongly on the symbolic and expressive value of criminal law in order to 
ensure effective deterrence, as only criminal law is able to express public disapproval of a 
serious offence56. This result could not, on the other hand, be achieved by punitive 
proceedings that are not formally criminal, which, as acknowledged by the Court itself, 
normally carry a «lower degree of stigma57». This is, admittedly, the argument underpinning 
the conclusion of the Court in a very recent case, the first one in which the issue in question 
has been addressed, concerning repetead episodes of domestic violence that national 
authorities did not consider sufficiently serious to warrant criminal sanctions and therefore 
punsihed them by a mere administrative fine. The Court indeed observed that such 
																																																						
55 Engel and others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 82, which refers to three criteria: the 
classification of the offence in national law, the nature of the offence and the nature and severity of 
the sanction provided by the law. For more on this topic see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 373. 
56 Supra §… For these considerations see also, F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between 
Criminal Law and Human Rights, cit.; S. MANACORDA, «Dovere di punire»? Gli obblighi di tutela 
penale nell’era della internazionalizzazione del diritto, cit., p. 1364; J. ALIX, Les obligations positives 
de pénalisation et de punition des atteintes à la vie imposées par la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme au titre de l’article 2 de la Convention, cit., p. 223; C. LACROIX, L’influence de la 
jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme. Le droit au procès pénal en cas de 
catastrophe, in Risques études et observations, 2011, 3, p. 173; F. VIGANÒ, Obblighi convenzionali 
di tutela penale, cit., p. 243; J. C. OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings 
for Serious Human Rights Violations, cit., p. 60. 
57 See Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, 21 November 2006, § 43, in which it is accepted that 
the autonomous interpretation of the notion of “criminal charge” under Article 6 has underpinned a 
gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to the traditional categories 
of criminal law which differ from the hard core of criminal law, as for instance tax surcharges. 
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measure «did not have the deterrent effect necessary to be considered as a sufficient 
safeguard against further ill-treatment58». 
The issue of whether only formal criminal sanctions or also administrative punitive ones are 
able to discharge the States’ obligation to effectively punish human rights violations, 
nevertheless, appears to be mostly theoretical, as the breaches of Convention rights for 
which a criminal law remedy is required usually reflect those very fundamental values of 
societies that are normally protected by hard-core criminal law also in domestic systems. 
 
ii. Beyond the mere stage of investigations 
 
The second consideration that can be drawn from the above mentioned definition of the 
duty to carry out effective criminal investigations, is that this procedural obligation is not 
confined to the strict investigation phase, but it extends also to the proceedings as a whole 
and to each stage of the criminal process. This is the reason why a more appropriate 
denomination would be that of “duty to effectively investigate and punish”.  
Indeed, where the investigations have led to the institution of criminal proceedings, it is 
also the trial stage that will fall under the scrutiny of the Court and which must satisfy the 
procedural requirements of the Convention59. In these cases, the Court’s task, having 
regard to the proceedings as a whole, is to review whether and to what extent the domestic 
courts, in reaching their conclusions, may be deemed to have submitted the case to the 
careful scrutiny required by Article 2 of the Convention, so that the deterrent effect of the 
judicial system in place and the significance of the role it is required to play in preventing 
violations of the right to life are not undermined60.  
The Court will carefully assess, therefore, many aspects that go beyond the pure 
investigative measures available, starting from the legal classification given by the courts 
of the facts at issue and their interpretation of the criminal offence, the decisions adopted, 
their motivation and whether it is coherent with the results of the investigations. Finally, it 
will also scrutinize the sentencing and the effective execution of the sentence61. The 
procedural obligation under Article 2, indeed, requires also, where warranted, an effective 
																																																						
58 See, Balsan v. Romania, no. 49645/09, 23 May 2017, § 66. 
59 Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, 30 November 2004, § 96; see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, 
WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 218; F. TULKENS, The 
Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights, cit. 
60 Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 95-96; Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 239. 
For the same argument under Article 3, see Cestaro v. Italy, cit., § 206. 
61 See, F. TULKENS, S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, La clémence pénale et les droits de l’homme. 
Réflexions à marge de la jurisprudence récente de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, in F. 
TULKENS, Y CARTUYVELS, C. GUILLAIN (eds.), La peine dans tous ses états. Hommage à Michel Van 
de Kerchove, Larcier, 2011, p. 127; J. ALIX, Les obligations positives de pénalisation et de punition, 
cit., p. 230. 
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punishment and therefore bans many measures taken in the trial or in the sentencing phase 
aimed de facto at granting impunity62. The sanction imposed, indeed, is regarded as the 
outcome of the proceedings, essential to ensure the deterrent effect of the whole legal 
system, and therefore falls under this procedural dimension of protection63.  
 
It becomes thus clear, as it will be discussed more in depth later, that, although the 
opposite standpoint adopted, there is actually an overlap between the scope of the 
procedural obligation to investigate and the one of the right to a fair criminal trial under 
Article 6 in that they both concern the same judicial proceedings and often the same 
procedural deficiencies. However, the procedural obligation to investigate has a wider 
scope of application64. Not only, as just seen, it covers also the final stage of enforcement 
of the sentence65, but it also starts to apply before the right to a fair trial does. Indeed, the 
procedural obligation covers also those very first steps pertaining to preliminary 
proceedings when it should be decided whether the person under suspicion should be 
charged or not, that are normally undertaken before the actual bringing of a criminal charge 
and to which, by contrast, Article 6 does not apply yet66. 
 
 
B) Limits to the duty to investigate and punish 
 
v. No right in itself to prosecute or punish: an obligation of means 
 
The fact that the duty to investigate and punish extends also to the trial stage and to the 
imposition of a penalty should not, however, suggest that it confers also the right to have 
																																																						
62 Infra, §.. 
63 In this sense, J. ALIX, Les obligations positives de pénalisation et de punition, cit.; HOTTELIER, La 
necessaire complementarité des droits materiels et des garanties de procédure, in Revue 
trimestrelle des droits de l’homme, 2007, 70, p. 573. 
64 In this sense also, E. BREMS, Procedural protection, cit. 
65 Kitanovska Stanojkovic and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 2319/14, 
13 October 2016. 
66 See the joint concurring opinion of judges Casadevall, Berro-Lefevre, Sikuta, Hirvelä, López-
Guerra, Sajó and Silvis to the judgement Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], 20 November 2011, no. 
47708/08, § 4. On the scope of application of Article 6 see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law 
of the European Convention on Human Right, cit., p. 376. In brief, the guarantees of the right to a 
fair trial under Article 6 apply at pre-trial stage only in so far as their initial inobservance risks to 
seriously compromise the fairness of the entire proceedings (Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, no. 
13972/88, 24 November 1993, § 36). In particular they start applying from the moment that a 
preliminary investigation has been opened and the suspect has officially learnt of the investigation 
or begun be affected by it (Eckle v. Germany, no. 8130/78, 15 July 1982, §74). 
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a person prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence, nor that it entails an absolute 
obligation for all prosecutions to result in a conviction or in a particular sentence67.  
To the contrary, it is to be stressed, as constantly insisted on by the Court, that the duty to 
investigate is not an obligation of result, but one of means only, in the sense that the 
national authorities must take all the reasonable steps available to them in order to establish 
the facts and to identify and punish those responsible68. In other words, it is a qualified, not 
absolute obligation69. Nonetheless, the multiple and subtle quality requirements that an 
investigation should meet in order to be Article 2 compliant, allow a very detailed scrutiny 
by the Court on how these efforts were undertaken and on how the State has exercised or 
not its duty to punish70. As it has been correctly commented, it is true that State enjoy a 
“criminal procedural autonomy” in implementing this international obligation, however such 
autonomy is exercised under a very strict surveillance71. 
Therefore, as no right to have third parties prosecuted nor sentenced for a criminal offence 
can be asserted independently, there would be no violation of the duty to effectively 
investigate where, notwithstanding all the reasonable efforts employed by the authorities 
in compliance with the requirements under Article 2, the investigation ends without 
concrete, or with only very limited, results72. Likewise, an acquittal73 or the discontinuation 
of criminal proceedings at the preliminary investigation stage does not run counter to the 
procedural obligation, if the evidence gathered by the authorities is sufficient to rule out 
any criminal responsibility74. What is decisive is, instead, the diligence showed by the 
criminal law authorities: they should have done all that could be reasonably expected of 
them in the circumstances of this particular case and they must have submitted the case 
																																																						
67 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 238; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 
234508/02, 24 March 2011, § 306; Mustafic-Mujic and others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 
49037/15, 30 August 2016, § 107. See also, M. MONTAGNA, Necessità della completezza delle 
indagini, cit., p. 345. 
68 According to L.A. SICILIANOS, Out of harm’s way, positive obligations under Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in L. EARLY, A. AUSTIN, C. OVEY, O. CHERNISHOVA (eds.) The 
Right to Life, cit., p. 29, all positive obligations are, in principle, obligations of means. 
69 Bati and others v. Turkey, nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, 3 June 2004, § 134. 
70 O. CAHN, Obligations positives procédurales et droit à la vie, cit., p. 235, describes the duty to 
investigate as a «hybrid obligation», rather than a mere obligation of means; see also, F. SUDRE, 
Droit Européen et International de droits de l’homme, cit., p. ??, and R. ARIAV, National 
Investigations into Human Rights, cit., p. 861. 
71 See, F. TULKENS – S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, La clémence pénale et les droits de l’homme, cit., p. 
130. 
72 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 66; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 306; Nencheva 
v. Bulgaria, no. 48609/06, 18 June 2013, § 134; Mikheyev v. Russia,  no. 77617/01, 26 January 
2006, § 107. 
73 Otasevic v. Serbia, no. 32198/07, 5 February 2013, § 34. 
74 Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 320. See also, B. EMMERSON, A. ASHWORTH, A. MACDONALD 
(eds.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice, cit., p. 821. 
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to the careful scrutiny required75. A true duty to prosecute and punish, therefore, arises only 
where warranted by the findings of the official investigation and trial respectively76. 
 
In other words, there is a limit to the obligation of effectively investigate and punish certain 
human right violations, and this limit results primarily from the need to respect at once the 
rights of the defence and other Convention rights.  
As the Court has made clear, the duty to investigate under Articles 2 or 3 «does not oblige 
States to do so by conduct that violates the absolute prohibition of inhuman treatment 
under Art. 3 or in a manner that breaches the right of every defendant to a fair trial under 
Art. 6»77. To the contrary, the Court suggests that it is in the face of the most serious cases 
that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree. This 
holds true also for other Convention’s provisions: in relation to Article 7, for instance, the 
Court has maintained that «the national authorities cannot be expected to discharge their 
positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention by acting in breach of the 
requirements of its Article 7, one of which is that the criminal law must not be construed 
extensively to an accused’s detriment78». 
It must be kept in mind indeed that an infringement of the defence’s rights during the 
criminal investigations may even prove to become the cause of the their ineffectiveness, 
and therefore lie at the heart of the violation of such procedural obligation, in cases for 
example when due to such an error all the subsequent investigative acts become null and 
void, thus undermining the capability of the procedure to establish the facts79. Similarly, a 
violation of the rights of the accused in the trial phase, which amounts to a grave breach of 
the criminal procedure rules and imports the repetition of orders for remittal whitin the same 
set of preoceedings and the impossibility of examining the case on the merits, is capable 
of imparing the effectiveness of the proceedings as a whole80. 
																																																						
75 See, Njezic and Stimac v. Croatia, no. 29823/13, 9 April 2015. 
76 This is how the reference by the Court to the «obligation of States to prosecute», which can be 
sometimes found in the case-law, as for instance in Margus v. Croatia [GC], cit., § 127, or C.N. and 
V. v. France, no. 67724/09, 11 October 2012, § 104, is to be understood. In this sense see also, J. 
C. OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings, cit., p. 55, who argues that the 
procedural obligation includes also, at least in those situations in which it is warranted, the 
obligation to prosecute and punish. 
77 Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], cit., § 177; see also Osman v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 116, 
underlying the need to respect also the guarantees of Articles 5 and 8. 
78 See, Myumyun v. Bulgaria, cit., § 76. 
79 See, for instance, Gedrimas v. Lithuania, no. 21048/12, 12 July 2016, § 84, where the 
investigation’s ineffectiveness was caused also by the initial failure by the authorities to accord the 
appropriate status to the suspects, who were instead heard as witnesses. Such a procedural error, 
discovered only years after, rendered all the subsequent investigative acts null and void, so that 
their results could not be used and had to be repeated at a time when it was impossible to do so. 
80 See, Kosteckas v. Lithuania, no. 960/13, 13 June 2017, §§ 43-45, where the repetition of remittals 
by the appellate court motivated by the total lack of reasoning in the first instance judgment and 
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The duty to investigate and punish, therefore, is to be carried out by fully respecting the 
other Convention rights which may be involved, and above all the rights of fair trial under 
its criminal head81 and this, first and foremost, also in the interest of the principle of 
effectiveness itself. 
As regards defence rights, a prominent role in confining the duty to investigate and punish 
is played by the presumption of innocence protected by Article 6 § 2. Such guarantee 
becomes relevant in particular with reference to decisions not to prosecute on account of 
lack of sufficient evidence.  
 
vi. The existence of an evidential threshold test to justify prosecution 
 
Although, as mentioned earlier, no duty to prosecute can be asserted per se, it has been 
observed that several statements of the Court support the proposition that yet a duty to 
bring a prosecution exists where there is sufficient evidence, howsoever defined82. A very 
significant issue that comes about in this connection is whether the existence of a statutory 
evidential threshold to justify a prosecution is compatible or not with the duty to effectively 
investigate and punish. 
This question was raised in a recent case, Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom83 which 
concerned the terrorist attack in the London underground in 2005, following which the 
brother of the applicant was shot dead by the police who believed him to be the terrorist, 
yet he was later found to be innocent and unrelated to the attack. Upon termination of the 
criminal proceedings against the police officers involved by a decision not to prosecute, 
the victim’s sister challenged before the Court of Strasbourg, inter alia, the evidential 
threshold test set forth by law for justifying prosecution, contesting its compatibility with 
the duty to punish. In particular, according to English law, a prosecution may be brought 
																																																						
the de fact changing of the charges against the defendants founded the violation of the procedural 
obligation to effectively investigate and punish for these lead to the proceedings becoming time-
barred thus preventing an examination of the case on the merits; Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska and 
Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, no. 3524/14, 12 January 2017, § 40, where the violation of the rights of the 
defence importing the ineffectiveness of the proceedings was rooted in a lack of sufficient 
information on the nature of the accuse. 
81 In Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 71, the Court expressly held that «the police must 
discharge their duties in a manner which is compatible with the rights and freedoms of the 
individuals and they cannot be criticized for attaching weight to the presumption of innocence or 
failing to use powers of arrest, search and seizure having regard to their reasonable held view that 
they lacked at relevant times the required standard of suspicion to use those powers or that any 
action taken would not in fact have produced concrete results». See also, Dordevic v. Croatia, § 
139, 2012. 
82 B. EMMERSON, A. ASHWORTH, A. MACDONALD (eds.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice, 2012, 
Sweet and Maxwell, p. 821. 
83 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit. 
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only if the evidence collected is enough to provide for a «realistic prospect of conviction»84. 
The main argument was that such standard was excessively high, in that it prevented the 
possibility of any prosecution even when meaningful evidence had been collected and thus 
it de facto led to the impunity of those responsible. 
The Grand Chamber however dismissed the claim, holding that Article 2 cannot be 
interpreted so as to impose a requirement on the authorities to launch a prosecution 
irrespective of the evidence which is available85. It held that States should be permitted to 
have a threshold evidential test to prevent trials when there are weak prospects of 
conviction, and that they enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in setting it86, as in doing so 
they are called to balance competing interests, such as those of victims, the potential 
defendant and public at large. Thus only an arbitrary threshold would be at odds with the 
procedural obligation to effectively investigate and punish87. Furthermore, the adequacy of 
such evidential test should be assessed in the context of the criminal justice system taken 
as a whole; hence a more stringent test could prove justified in systems like the English 
one where unmeritorious cases cannot be filtered out subsequently at trial88. Also, it was 
ruled out that the evidential test should be derogated or lowered on account of the serious 
nature of the crimes involved, such as for instance those involving the use of lethal force 
by State agents89. 
In reaching these conclusions, the Court relied strongly upon the need to respect the 
presumption of innocence and the rights of the defence, stating that «prosecutions should 
never be embarked upon lightly, irrespective of the evidence collected, on account of all 
the negative repercussions that being under trial normally entail for the defendant90»; 
indeed, individuals must also be protected against arbitrary decisions and unjustified 
																																																						
84 Code for Crown Prosecutors, Section 5. The test to bright a prosecution is actually made up by 
two stages: first there is the evidential stage (according to which the prosecutor must be satisfied 
that there is enough evidence to provide a “realistic prospect of conviction”), and second, there is 
the public interest stage (even when there is enough evidence, the prosecutor should consider 
whether a prosecution is required in the public interest). See also, B. EMMERSON, A. ASHWORTH, A. 
MACDONALD (eds.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice, cit., p. 821. 
85 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 266. This approach is to be found, although 
expressed in less explicit terms, also in previous case-law, see Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], 
cit., § 320; Gurtekin and others v. Cyprus (dec.), 11 March 2014, nos. 60441/13, 68206/13, 
68667/13, § 27; Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 71. 
86 See L. LAVRYSEN, The scope of the rights and the scope of obligations. Positive obligations, cit., 
p. 162, on the applicability of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and balancing also on 
positive obligations flowing from absolute and unqualified rights such as Articles 2 or 3. 
87 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 268. 
88 Id., § 270. Indeed, in the English system once the prosecution has been brought, the judge must 
leave the case to the jury as long as there is some evidence, even if it is of a tenuous nature (the 
so-called “Galbraith test”, see § 166 of the judgment). 
89 Id., § 272. 
90 Id., § 265-276. 
	 26	
prosecutions91. Furthermore, according to the Grand Chamber, the setting of an evidential 
test for bringing a prosecution does not simply serve the interests of the defence, rather it 
also contributes to the objective interest of preserving public confidence in the 
prosecutorial systems, which could be undermined if cases were brought to trial without 
sufficient evidence to justify it92.  
Therefore, given the presumption of innocence and the need to preserve public confidence 
in the judicial system, a threshold evidential test in national law that bars prosecution when 
there is no sufficient evidence to offer reasonable prospects of a conviction is not an 
arbitrary obstacle which is incompatible with the duties to investigate and punish serious 
crimes93; it is instead the expression of an inherent limit to the very nature of such duties 
which must be discharged by respecting the rights of the defence. 
 
vii. The revival of the investigative obligation 
 
Yet following an initial decision not to prosecute on account of lack of sufficient evidence, 
the procedural obligation to investigate could nonetheless be revived when new elements 
concerning those facts come into light at a later stage.  
Obviously, if any new assertion or allegation could trigger a fresh investigative obligation, 
an excessive burden would be placed on national authorities94. Therefore, the case-law 
confines this effect to a «plausible or credible allegation, piece of evidence or item of 
information relevant to the identification, and eventual prosecution or punishment of the 
perpetrator» or, more in general, «any information or material which has the potential either 
to undermine the conclusions of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive 
investigation to be pursued further»95. 
Such a reopening of the case, implicitly required by the procedural limb of Article 2, even 
if occurred after a decision which is final according to the relevant national law, would not 
breach the right not to be tried or prosecuted twice guaranteed by Article 4 of Protocol No. 
7, on the ground that a clear distinction is to be drawn between the duplication of criminal 
																																																						
91 Bakke v. Norway (dec.), 21 July 2016, no. 43641/14, § 21. 
92 See also, M.E. GENNUSA, Armani da Silva c. Regno Unito: il diritto alla vita ai tempi del terrorismo, 
in Quaderni costituzionali, 2016, 3, p. 600. 
93 The issue was addressed subsequently also in the case Mustafic-Mujic and others v. the 
Netherlands (dec.), cit., concerning the liability of Dutch officers for the massacre of Srebrenica, in 
which the Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision not to order a prosecution upon the 
considered view that the case would not end in a conviction (§ 123). 
94 For such consideration see also, J. CHEVALIER-WATTS, Effective Investigations under Art. 2 of the 
European Convention in Human Rights: Securing the Right to Life or an Onerous Burden on a 
State?, cit., p. 712 ff., reminding that the Court seeks to interpret positive obligations in a way that 
does not impose impossible or disproportionate burdens on the authorities. 
95 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 70-71. See also, Jelic v. Croatia, no. 57856/11, 12 June 
2014, § 85. 
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proceedings, which is prohibited under the first paragraph, and the resumption of a trial in 
exceptional circumstances, which is permitted under the second paragraph96. The latter 
provision, indeed, expressly envisages the possibility of a prosecution on the same 
charges, in accordance with domestic law, when the case is reopened following the 
discovery of new evidence or of a fundamental shortcoming in the previous proceedings97. 
 
When a fresh obligation to further investigate arises, however, the nature and extent of such 
investigation will depend on the particular circumstances of each case and will inevitably 
differ from that to be expected immediately after the commission of the crime. In particular, 
such new investigation may be restricted to «verifying the credibility of the source, or of the 
purported new evidence» and to whether a full investigation could be launched98. Once 
again, also in this case the authorities are entitled to take into account the prospects of 
success of any prosecution, noting that with a considerable lapse of time since an incident 
evidence deteriorates or cease to exist and the prospects of any effective investigation 
leading to the prosecution of suspects increasingly diminish99.  
In view of the potential influence of the passage of time, it is also to no surprise that the 
quality requirements inherent to the duty to investigate may apply to the fresh obligation to 
a lesser extent, depending on the circumstances of the case. The promptness requirement, 
for instance, will not to have the same significance in such “historical cases”, as most likely 
there will be no urgency of securing the crime scene100. Only the requirement of 
independence of the authorities will in any case remain unchanged, as the passage of time 
does not have any bearing on it101. 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
96 Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7 rules: «1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been 
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 2. The 
provision of the preceeding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance 
with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly 
discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which 
could affect the outcome of the case. (…)». 
97 See, Nikitin v. Russia, no. 50178/99, 20 July 2004, § 44-45. On this issue see, G. DELLA MONICA, 
Ne bis in idem, in A. GAITO (ed.) I princìpi europei del processo penale, cit., p. 339. 
98 Ibidem. See also, Saygi v. Turkey, no. 37715/11, 27 January 2015, § 48; Gasyak and others v. 
Turkey, no. 27872/03, 13 October 2009, § 61-63; Gurtekin and others v. Cyprus (dec.), cit., § 21; 
Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 4704/04, 15 February 2011, § 70. 
99 Gurtekin and others v. Cyprus, cit., § 22. 
100 See, Varnava and others v. Turkey [GC], no. 16064/90, 18 September 2009, §§ 191-192; Gurtekin 
and others v. Cyprus (dec.), cit.,§ 21-22;  
101 See infra §… 
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viii. Limits flowing from the State’s jurisdiction 
 
The engagements undertaken by States to respect and protect human rights under the 
Convention in general are limited pursuant to Article 1 to persons falling under their own 
jurisdiction102. This  limitation accordingly applies also to the positive obligation to 
investigate and punish serious human rights offences, which arises only in respect to facts 
occurred under a State’s jurisdiction, be it territorial or, in certain exceptional 
circumstances, also extra-territorial. So far, these exceptional circumstances allowing a 
departure from the territoriality principle for the establishment of jurisdiction have been 
found to exist not only when the facts have taken place on board aircrafts and vessels 
registered in, or flying the flag of that State103, but also when they occurred in the context 
of military operations abroad where an individual is under the authority and control of the 
State agents, or when the State exercises effective control over an area104.  
To the contrary, the nationality of the victim does not appear to be a special feature capable 
of triggering the State’s jurisdiction to facts occurred beyond its territory, although the 
question has been left partially open. On the one side, in relation to Article 2, the Court has 
expressly held in sharp terms that «Art. 2 does not require member States’ criminal laws to 
provide for universal jurisdiction in cases involving the death of one of their nationals»105. 
On the other hand, in relation to the inherently transnational offence of human trafficking, 
the Court has recently found that Article 4 does not require States to provide for universal 
jurisdiction over trafficking offences committed abroad against non-nationals106. It did not 
address the question, however, of whether universal jurisdiction for cases involving a 
State’s national is to be provided, as that was irrelevant for the particular case. 
Furthermore, the question of universal jurisdiction in respect of own nationals has never 
																																																						
102 See, among others, Bankovic and others v. Belgium and others (dec.) [GC], 52207/99, 12 
December 2001, § 66. 
103 See, Bakanova v. Lithuania, no. 11167/12, 31 May 2016, § 63, in which the Court upheld the 
existence of the obligation to investigate into a death occurred on board a Lithuanian ship while 
travelling abroad. 
104 On the obligation to investigate deaths occurred in the context of military operations abroad 
when the person was under the authority and control of the State agents or when the State 
exercises effective control over an area, see Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., 
§ 149; Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 152. See also, B. EMMERSON, A. ASHWORTH, A. 
MACDONALD (eds.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice, cit., p. 819. On the concept of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction in the ECtHR’s case-law, see J. VERVAELE, Extraordinary Rendition e sparizione forzata 
trasnazionale nel diritto penale e nel diritto internazionale dei diritti umani, in Criminalia, 2012, p. 
136-139. 
105 See, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, § 242-243; and, although 
less clearly, M. and others v. Italy and Bulgaria, no. 40020/03, 31 July 2012, § 167-169. 
106 J. and others v. Austria, no. 58216/12, 17 January 2017, § 114. For a comment of this judgement 
see, V. STOYANOVA, J. and others v. Austria and the strenghtening of States’ obligation to identify 
victims of human trafficking, 7 February 2017, in www.strasbourgobservers.com. 
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been addressed yet neither Article 3 for acts of torture, ill-treatment and enforced 
disappearances.  
In light also of the international law on the issue, it cannot be anticipated what the solution 
of the Court to this problem would be. Indeed, according to most international law 
conventions, States shall exercise their jurisdiction when the victim is one of its nationals 
only if they consider it appropriate107. Therefore, even if the Court were to adopt the 
negative and less burdensome solution proposed in Ranstev v. Cyprus and Russia under 
Article 2 also to facts of torture, ill-treatment, human trafficking it would still be in line with 
the relevant international law standards. 
 
 
C) Autonomous nature and temporal scope of the obligation to investigate 
 
At last, it is necessary to clarify what relationship exists between the procedural obligation 
to investigate read into Article 2 and the other Convention’s provisions mentioned below108 
and the substantive obligation to respect those same rights. In the landmark case Silih v. 
Slovenia109, the Court held that the duty to investigate into alleged violations of a 
substantive right protected by the Convention, be it the right to life or others, «has evolved 
into an autonomous and separate duty» and is a distinct and «detachable obligation» 
which, although triggered from acts concerning the substantive facet of the relative 
provisions, can give rise to a finding of a separate and independent violation110.  
In other words, the procedural obligation to investigate has its own distinct scope and 
operates independently from the substantive limb of protection: it shields right-holders 
from a different and additional kind of injustice than the infringement of the substantial right 
in itself, which concerns solely the need for and the quality of an investigation into an 
alleged human right violation. In this sense, it has been maintained that the adding of this 
procedural layer to the scope of substantive Convention rights has introduced a 
«duplication of the right guaranteed», which has now two autonomous and separate 
																																																						
107 See, for instance,  Art. 5(1)(c) of the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984; Art. 9(1)(c) of the UN Convention for 
the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearnces of 20 December 2006; Art. 15(2) of the 
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supplemented by the Palermo Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons of 15 November 2000. The only exception is 
Art. 31(1) of the Council of Europe Anti-trafficking Convention of 3 May 2005, which makes it instead 
mandatory to establish jurisdiction in respect of offeces committed against own nationals. 
108 See infra §.. 
109 Silih v. Slovenia [GC], no. 71463/01, 9 April 2009, § 159. See also, Janowiec v. Russia [GC], cit., 
§ 142. 
110 The procedural obligation of Article 2 is also to be kept distinct from the obligation to provide for 
an effective remedy under Article 13, even though failure to comply with it may have consequences 
on the latter. See, Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 231. 
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dimensions111. This means that a State can be held liable for a violation of Article 2 for not 
having undertaken any effective investigation even when it is not ultimately responsible for 
the death itself under the substantive limb of that article112. Likewise, an individual may 
complain about the ineffectiveness of the investigations into an ill-treatment, without 
necessarily alleging that the State’s liability also for the ill-treatment in itself.  
Of course, the detachable nature of the procedural obligation directly affects the jurisdiction 
of the Court also from a temporal perspective: when a death or another fact triggering the 
duty to investigate has taken place before the entry into force of the Convention, a State 
may nonetheless be held liable for the investigation subsequently undertaken into such 
event to the extent that those procedural acts have taken place after the critical date, i.e. 
the entry into force of the Convention113.  
In these cases, however, the procedural obligation will come into effect provided that there 
is a «genuine connection» between the triggering event and the entry into force of the 
Convention. In particular, a «genuine connection» is established only if two criteria are met: 
the lapse of time between the offence to be investigated and the critical date is reasonably 
short – normally not longer than ten years - and the major part of the investigation or the 
most important procedural steps took place or ought to have taken place after the critical 
date114. Holding otherwise, it will be impossible for the Court to make a global assessment 
of the effectiveness of the investigations. 
When the «genuine connection test» is not met, only in extraordinary situations the Court 
may, as an exception, have jurisdiction to examine the investigations undertaken into facts 
which took place before the entry into force of the Convention. This occurs, in particular, 
																																																						
111 See, E. DUBOUT, La procéduralisation des obligations relatives aux droits fondamentaux 
substantiels par la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, cit., p. 472. Such autonomous nature, 
however, coexists with the instrumental nature of the procedural obligations, these having been 
designed to improve the protection of the substantive right, see E. BREMS, Procedural protection, 
cit., p. 159. It is assumed that better investigative standards lead to greater accountability and 
consequently to a greater eradication of the substantive rights’ infringements, see J. FIALA-BUTORA, 
Disabling Torture: the obligation to investigate ill-treatment of persons with disabilities, in Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, 2013, p. 245. 
112 See Ramsahai v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, 15 May 2007, § 322. See also, O. CAHN, 
Obligations positives procedurals, cit., p. 237; E. BREMS, Procedural protection, cit., p. 141; H. TRAN, 
Les obligations de vigilance des États parties à la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, 
Bruylant, 2012, p. 141. 
113 This reasoning concerns strictly instantaneous facts, not continuing situations, such as enforced 
disappearances, which have originated before the entry into force of the Convention but persist 
also afterwards. In these cases, no problem of temporal jurisdiction arises, see Varnava and others 
v. Turkey, cit., § 148-149. See, O. CHERNISHOVA, Right to truth in the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, in L. EARLY, A. AUSTIN, C. OVEY, O. CHERNISHOVA (eds.) The Right to Life, cit., p. 
152. 
114 See, Janowiec v. Russia [GC], cit., § 148. For an application of these principles, in cases in which 
temporal jurisdiction was ultimately established, see Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 68; Mocanu v. 
Romania [GC], cit., § 207-211; Otasevic v. Serbia, cit., § 23-26. 
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when the triggering event was of «a larger dimension than an ordinary criminal offence and 
amounted to the negation of the very foundations of the Convention», such as in cases of 
international crimes115. Such possibility of extending the scrutiny of the Court into the past 
encounters, however, the insurmountable limit of the existence of the Convention itself: no 
matter how serious and grave, investigations into facts occurred before 1950, the date of 
adoption of the Convention, fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction116. 
 
 
4. The material scope of application the right to effective criminal investigations 
 
The procedural obligation to investigate into alleged human rights violations, as already 
mentioned, arises only with respect to breaches of certain provisions, which represent the 
noyaux dur of the Convention117. Moreover, even in relation to those provisions, not any 
kind of infringement, but only the ones of a more serious nature trigger to duty to carry out 
specifically criminal investigations, in application of what seems to be a principle of 
proportionality and extrema ratio of criminal law118. As mentioned above, criminal 
proceedings are indeed required only when the criminalisation of the conduct is required 
under the substantive obligations of protection of a Convention right.  
Even though it could be generally maintained that, in principle, the obligation to investigate 
and punish arises in respect to all intentional infringements of physical integrity and 
breaches of a right resulting from an act of violence119, in view of the casuistic approach of 
the case-law however, it proves necessary at this point to try to give a detailed account of 
these different situations that enjoin the national authorities to make an infringement of the 
Conventions’ provisions a criminal offence and to launch criminal investigations into it. 
 
 
A) The right to life under Article 2 
 
With regards to the right to life protected by Article 2, which is the first provision into which 
the Court has read such procedural obligation, a general duty to investigate and establish 
																																																						
115 Janowiec v. Russia [GC], cit., § 150. 
116 Janowiec v. Russia [GC], cit., § 151, in which jurisdiction on the criminal proceedings into the 
events of the Katyn massacre was eventually ruled out, these having took place before the entry 
into force of the Convention. 
117 The existence of a hierarchy among Convention rights is argued by A. ASHWORTH, Security, 
Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights, in B. GOLD, L. LAZARUS (eds.), Security and Human Rights, 
Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 203. 
118 In this sense see also, F. VIGANÒ, L’arbitrio del non punire. Sugli obblighi di tutela penale dei diritti 
fondamentali, cit., p. 2668. 
119 In this sense also, H. TRAN, Les obligations de vigilance des États parties, cit., p. 141. 
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the facts of the case arises in relation to all violent deaths, irrespective of whether State 
agents, private individuals120 or person unknown were involved, and to all cases of death 
other than from natural causes121. Furthermore, this procedural obligation is applicable not 
only when one has actually died, but also when the person was subject to an enforced 
disappearance and can be presumed dead122, and where an individual has sustained life-
threatening injuries or was exposed to an imminent risk to his or her life, although he or she 
eventually survived123. 
 
However, as mentioned above, a criminal investigation is not called for not in each of these 
cases. In certain circumstances, also civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings that 
are able to establish the cause of the death may be sufficient to discharge the procedural 
obligation.  
In this connection, the case-law shows that a criminal remedy is considered the only 
adequate response first of all in respect to intentional killings, regardless of whether 
perpetrated by a private person, State agents or unknown persons124, and then in relation 
to enforced disappearances125. The same is true also when the death is caused by an 
																																																						
120 For the first time by Ergi v. Turkey, no. 23818/94, 28 July 1998, § 82. See also, Yasa v. Turkey, 
cit., § 100; Osman v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 115-122; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit., 
§ 231. 
121 For example, deaths occurring in «suspicious circumstances» or resulting from road traffic 
accidents (see note…) or labour accidents (see Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, no. 60255/00, 9 
May 2006). In this sense see E. MYJER, Investigation into the use of lethal force: standards of 
independence and impartiality, in L. EARLY, A. AUSTIN, C. OVEY, O. CHERNISHOVA (eds.) The Right to 
Life, cit., p. 115; HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, cit., p. 214; M. MONTAGNA, Necessità della completezza delle indagini, cit., p. 349 ss. 
122 See, inter pluris, Turluyeva v. Russia, no. 63638/09, 20 June 2013; Kaya v. Turkey, cit.; Cyprus 
v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014, § 132. See A. MOWBRAY, Duties of investigation, cit. p. 
437 for further references. If the person cannot be presumed dead, Art. 2 is not applicable but the 
investigative duty arises under Article 5 in respect of the arbitrary and unacknowledged detention, 
see infra §… 
123 See Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, 20 December 2004, §52-55; Budayeva and others 
v. Russia, no. 15339/02, 20 March 2008; Kotelnikov v. Russia, no. 45104/05, 12 July 2016, § 97; 
Brincat and others v. Malta, no. 60908/11, 24 July 2014, § 82 with further references. 
124 See, A. ASHWORTH, Positive obligations in criminal law, cit., p. 203. 
125 Turluyeva v. Russia, cit.; Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 132 «upon proof of an arguable claim that 
an individual who was last seen in the custody of the State, subsequently disappeared in a context 
which may be described as life-threatening». According to O. CHERNISHOVA, Right to truth in the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 146, enforced disappearances are 
«comprised of a three-stage act: the arrest or detention of a person by State agents or by a person 
acting with the latter’s support or acquiescence; followed by the refusal to acknowledge the 
detention or give information about the fate of the detainee; and, as a consequence removing such 
person from the protection of the law». For a similar definition see also, Art. 7 (2)(i) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998; and, Art. 2 of the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 December 2006. 
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alleged disproportionate use of force by State agents126 and also where it occurs in 
suspicious circumstances while the victim is in the custody of State agents127. 
In turn, if the infringement of the right to life is not caused intentionally, «the positive 
obligation to set up an “effective judicial system” does not necessarily require criminal 
proceedings to be brought in every case, and may be satisfied if civil, administrative, or 
disciplinary remedies are available to the victims»128. Accordingly, with regards to 
unintentional infringements of the right to life, a distinction should be drawn between 
ordinary cases for which other kinds of proceedings are sufficient, provided that they are 
able to establish the cause of the death129, and other rather exceptional situations for which 
a criminal remedy is instead required.  
Given the casuistic approach of the Court, however, the distinction between the two 
categories is not always drawn by a clear line130, apart from in the following situations in 
which the case-law is more consolidated.  
 
																																																						
126See, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit.; Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit. 
127 See, Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 80, concerning the alleged suicide of a person while in police 
custody; see also, Slimani v. France, no. 57671/00, 27 July 2004, § 30, for deaths of detainees in 
suspicious circumstances out of a lack of appropriate medical treatment; see also, Perevedentsevy 
v. Russia, no. 39583/05, 24 April 2014, § 105; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 46477/99, 14 March 2002, § 74. 
128 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, 17 January 2002, § 51, in the field of medical 
negligence; Mastromatteo v. Italy, no. 37703/97, 24 October 2002, § 94-94, with respect to 
negligence of judicial authorities; Maiorano v. Italy, no 28634/06, 15 December 2009, with respect 
to negligence of prison authorities; Branko Tomasic and others v. Croatia, no. 46598/06, 15 January 
2009. See also, F. TULKENS, The paradoxical relationship, cit., p. 589; J. ALIX, Les obligations 
positives de pénalisation, cit., p. 225. 
129 See, Basyuk v. Ukraine, no. 51151/10, 5 November 2015, § 62: «if neither the pertinent facts 
surrouning the death nor the liability of the parties involved has been established, there appear to 
be no basis for taking a clear stand which forum, civil or criminal, would have been appropriate in 
the circumstances»; and Zoltai v. Hungary and Ireland (dec.), no. 61946/12, 29 September 2015, § 
28: «What is important, however, is that whatever form the investigation takes, the available legal 
remedies, taken together, must amount to legal means capable of establishing the facts, holding 
accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress». See also, Alp v. Turkey (dec.), no. 
3757/09, 9 July 2013; Draganschi v. Romania (dec.), no. 40890/04, 18 May 2010; Molie v. Romania 
(dec.), no. 13754/02, 1 September 2009. 
130 See, O. CAHN, Obligations positives procedurals., cit., p. 239, who maintains that the 
«immaturity» of the procedural obligation does not lend their scope of application to be traced 
precisely. In this sense also M. SIMONATO, Deposizione della vittima e giustizia penale. Una lettura 
del sistema italiano alla luce del quadro europeo, Wolters Kluwer, 2014, p. 48. This holds true, for 
instance, with regards with road traffic accidents where sometimes a civil remedy is deemed to be 
sufficient (Kotelnikov v. Russia, cit., § 101) and in others a criminal one is required. The distinction 
seems to lie in the particular circumstances of the case, especially in the presence of any 
aggravating circumstances (Basyuk v. Ukraine, cit., § 57). It should be noted that in non-life 
threatening cases road traffic accidents may be addressed also under Article 3 (see, Kraulaidis v. 
Lithuania, no. 76805/11, 8 November 2016). 
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Firstly, civil or other types of proceedings are normally sufficient in the specific sphere of 
medical negligence131, inasmuch as these are capable of establishing the cause of the 
death and identifying those responsible, and may lead, where needed, to the imposition of 
an appropriate sanction, such as an award of compensation or a disciplinary measure132.  
However, the Court has held that, even in the sphere of medical negligence, in certain 
exceptional circumstances that go beyond mere ordinary professional negligence, a civil 
remedy which is left to the initiative of the victims is not sufficient133. Here also, however, is 
not perfectly clear what these «exceptional circumstances» are. It has been suggested that 
the distinction could hinge on the collective or individual nature of the episode at issue134, 
but it does not always appear to be correct: individual cases of medical negligence in which 
a criminal remedy was required, and collective ones in which a civil action in damages was 
held to be a sufficient avenue are also to be found in the case-law. For instance, the Court 
maintained that «where a patient is confronted with a failure by a hospital department to 
provide medical treatment and this results in the patient’s life being put in danger» and 
where «the negligence attributable to that hospital’s medical staff went beyond a mere error 
or medical negligence, in so far as doctors working there, in full awareness of the facts and 
in breach of their professional obligations, did not take all the emergency measures 
necessary to attempt to keep their patient alive» then a criminal remedy is required135. By 
contrast, however, this notion of «exceptional circumstances beyond ordinary medical 
negligence» has not been resorted to with respect to cases of multiple HIV blood 
contamination in hospitals, for which the availability of civil actions for damages has been 
found to be sufficient to discharge the procedural obligation136. 
 
The most significant category of unintentional deaths for which, by contrast, a criminal 
response is always required is that of deaths caused by negligence in the context of 
«dangerous activities», when lives have been lost as a result of events occurring under the 
responsibility of public authorities and where it is established that «the negligence 
																																																						
131 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 51. 
132 For a health-care case in which, although sufficient in theory, the civil remedy was not in practice 
capable of discharging the procedural obligation on the ground that it did not provide the 
opportunity to clarify the cause of the death, see Ionita v. Romania, no. 81270/12, 10 January 2017, 
§ 81. 
133 Nencheva and others v. Bulgaria, cit., § 125, concerning the death of children in a social care 
institution. 
134 In this sense D. XENOS, Asserting the Right to Life (Art. 2 ECHR) in the Context of Industry, in 
German Law Journal, 2007, 3, p. 231; C. LACROIX, L’influence de la jurisprudence de la Cour 
Européenne des droits de l’homme. Le droit au procès pénal en cas de catastrophe, cit., p. 173. 
135 Mehemet Senturk and Bekir Senturk v. Turkey, no. 13423/09, 9 April 2013, §104-105; Asiye Genc 
v. Turkey, no. 24109/07, 27 January 2015, § 73. 
136 G.N. and others v. Italy, no. 43134/05, 15 March 2011, § 96; Karchen v France (dec), no. 5722/04, 
4 March 2008. 
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attributable to State officials goes beyond an error of judgement of carelessness in that the 
authorities in question, fully realizing the likely consequences and disregarding the powers 
vested in them, failed to take measures that were necessary and sufficient to avert the risks 
inherent in a dangerous activity»137. In such circumstances, Article 2 imposes a criminal 
response on the grounds that «public authorities are often the only entities to have sufficient 
relevant knowledge to identify and establish the complex phenomena that might have 
caused an incident»138. 
The notion of «dangerous activity» is a broad one139, and although it normally refers to 
industrial activities140, which are dangerous by their very nature, it has been interpreted to 
include also other activities, whether public or not, which may pose life at risk141, such as, 
at least in some cases, public transports142. 
 
The above considerations mandating for a criminal action have been equally found to apply 
also to unintentional deaths or life-threating illnesses caused by natural disasters143 and 
environmental disasters such as situations of very severe pollution144,  two phenomenon 
																																																						
137 Öneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 93. See also, J. ALIX, Les obligations positives de pénalisation et 
de punition, cit. 
138 Ibid. 
139 According to D. VOZZA, Obblighi di tutela penale del diritto alla vita ed accertamento del nesso 
causale, in dirittopenalecontemporaneo.it, 11 October 2016, the list of the «dangerous activities» is 
open and provisional. 
140 Öneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], cit., a case concerning the death of thirty-nine people resulting from a 
landslide following an explosion at a waste-treatment factory. On this specific issue see, D. XENOS, 
Asserting the Right to Life (Art. 2 ECHR) in the Context of Industry, cit., p. 231. 
141 In Iliya Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 19202/03, 24 April 2012, § 72, the notion has been applied to the 
life-threatening injuries sustained by a child in an amusement park, after having entered into a 
building in which there was a electric transformer not in safety. 
142 In Kalender v. Turkey, no. 4314/02, 15 December 2009, § 52-53, concerning a railway crash the 
Court applied the notion of «dangerous activity» thus requiring a criminal law remedy; in Mikhno v. 
Ukraine, no. 32514/12, 1 September 2016, § 131 concerning an airplane crash the same notion 
was applied; by contrast, in a case concerning an airplane crash, Gunes and others v. Turkey (dec.), 
no. 33273/11, 13 September 2016, § 21 the Court, in a questionable decision, did not refer to the 
same notion and held civil proceedings to be sufficient.  
143 Budayeva and others v. Russia, cit., § 142, a case concerning several deaths following a 
mudslide; Murillo Saldias and others v. Spain (dec.), no. 76973/01, 28 November 2006, concerning 
camper caught in a flood at an official camping site; Kolyadenko and others v. Russia, no. 17423/05, 
28 February 2012, §190, a case concerning a flood; M. Ozel and others v. Turkey, no. 14350/05, 17 
November 2015, § 189, a case concerning several deaths resulting from the collapse of buildings 
following an earthquake. On this specific topic, see C. LACROIX, L’influence de la jurisprudence de 
la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme. Le droit au procès pénal en cas de catastrophe, cit., p. 
173. 
144 Brincat and others v. Malta, cit., § 120 a case concerning the death of a person following an 
illness caused by exposure to abestos at the workplace run by a public company; Smaltini v. Italy 
(dec.), no. 43961/09, 24 March 2015, § 51-53, concerning the death of the applicant following an 
illness allegedly caused by the severe pollution from the industrial plant Ilva. The complaint under 
Article 2 concerning the lack of criminal investigations by the other applicants who suffered from 
illnesses which did not attain the life-threatening level were not examined. See also the case A.A. 
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which have been considered to be comparable to that of dangerous activities, as in all such 
cases State responsibility comes into play on account of a failure to take positive measures 
of prevention. 
 
In conclusion, and by way of simplification, a criminal response under the procedural limb 
of Article 2 is always required in relation to intentional killings, to death occurred in 
suspicious circumstances in the custody of State agents and to exceptional cases of 
negligent deaths, such as those resulting from dangerous activities and natural calamities; 
whereas normally, unless exceptional circumstances arise, civil remedies are sufficient in 
front of unintentional deaths. 
 
B) Freedom from torture and ill-treatment under Article 3 
 
The State’s duty to investigate and punish arises also under Article 3, primarily with respect 
to ill-treatment suffered by the police or other State agents145, but also at the hands of 
private individuals146. In this connection, it has been held that «Art. 3 requires States to put 
in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against 
personal integrity, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, 
suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions, and this requirement also 
extends to ill-treatment administered by private individuals»147.  
The procedural obligation to set forth and implement criminal law provisions, therefore, 
covers all serious acts of violence that have reached the minimum level of severity 
necessary to attract the protection of Article 3148. That minimum «depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, 
its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of 
the victim149». This standard, moreover, appears to be normally lower for cases of injuries 
																																																						
and others v. Italy, no. 37277/16, communicated to the Government on 24 June 2016 concerning 
the polluting emissions coming from the Ilva plant. 
145 The procedural obligation under Article 3 was articulated for the first time in Assenov and others 
v. Bulgaria, no. 24760/94, 28 October 1998, §102. See, A. MOWBRAY, Duties of investigation, cit., 
p. 443. The same principle applies in relation to ill-treatment inflicted by foreign State agents on its 
territory, with the State’s connivance or acquiescence, see Al-Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 
July 2014, § 485. 
146 The extension of the procedural obligation to ill-treatment by private individuals was reached in 
M.C. v. Bulgaria, cit., § 151; see also, among many, Premininy v. Russia, no. 44973/04, 10 February 
2011, § 72. For more on this topic see, J. FIALA-BUTORA, Disabling Torture: the obligation to 
investigate, cit., p. 214. 
147 Valiuliené v. Lithuania, cit., § 75. 
148 See, among many, Irina Smirnova v. Bulgaria, 13 October 2016, § 70; Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. 
26827/08, 11 March 2014, § 39; Balazs v. Hungary, no. 15529/12, 20 October 2015, § 56-57.  
149 See, A. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, § 20. For more on this 
quantitative threshold under Article 3 in general see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the 
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inflicted by a State official on a detained person150. Therefore, apart from the classic cases 
of ill-treatment by the police or physical assaults by private individuals151, infringements of 
Article 3 triggering the procedural obligation include, for instance, hatred motivated 
violence152, rape and any non-consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical 
resistance by the victim153, and also serious instances of domestic violence and 
harassment, in view of its humiliating and debasing character for the victim154.  
Finally, it must be kept in mind that Article 3 also has an extraterritorial effect, which means 
that such provision is breached when an individual is removed from a State where there 
are substantial grounds to believe that such removal would expose him to a serious risk of 
being subject to ill-treatment in the destination country155. Accordingly, also this kind of 
allegation is capable of triggering the domestic authorities’ procedural obligation to 
																																																						
European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 236 ff. With respect to non-sufficiently serious 
violence incapable of triggering the positive obligations under Article 3, such as trivial disputes see 
Ilieva and Georgieva v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 9548/07, 17 April 2012; Tonchev v. Bulgaria no. 
18527/02, 19 November 2009; B.V. and others v. Croatia (dec.), no. 38435/13, 15 December 2015. 
It is to be highlighted, however, that acts of violence infringing personal integrity are protected also 
under Article 8, which thus becomes the only applicable provision where the minimum threshold of 
gravity under Article 3 is not reached, see infra §... 
150 Otasevic v. Serbia, cit., § 32. 
151 Beganovic v. Croatia, no. 46423/06, 25 June 2009; Secic v. Croatia, no. 40116/02, 31 May 2007; 
Abdu v. Bulgaria, cit.; Vuletic v. Croatia (dec.), 19256/13, 23 June 2015. 
152 Identoba and others v. Georgia, no. 73235/12, 12 May 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, no. 
12060/12, 12 April 2016. 
153 See, among many, M.C. v. Bulgaria, cit.; M.G.C. v. Romania, no. 61495/11, 15 March 2016; G.U. 
v. Turkey, no. 16143/10, 18 October 2016; W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125/06, 23 January 2014; I.C. v. 
Romania, no. 36934/08, 24 May 2016. Effective investigations into allegations of rape and sexual 
violence are normally addressed under both Articles 3 and 8. 
154 See Valiuliené v. Lithuania, cit.; Irina Smirnova v. Bulgaria, cit.; Mudric v. Moldova, no. 74839/10, 
16 July 2013; M.G. v. Turkey, cit.; Balsan v. Romania, cit.; and, M. and M v. Croatia, no. 50175/12, 
2 May 2017, for domestic violence towards a child. However, in other previous cases episodes of 
domestic violence were considered solely under the procedural limb of Article 8, see Bevacqua and 
S. v. Bulgaria, no. 71127/01, 12 June 2008; A. v. Croatia, no. 55164/08, 14 October 2010. The 
distinction between the provisions on which the violation is grounded seems to depend on the 
gravity of the facts complained of, but it not always proves to be true: the inconsistency of the 
Court’s approach to cases of domestic violence as to the applicability of Article 3 or 8 is highlighted 
by R.J.A. MCQUIGG, The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Valiuliene v. 
Lithuania, in International Journal of Human Rights, 2014, 18, p. 756; see also, C. PARODI, La Corte 
di Strasburgo alle prese con la repressione penale della violenza sulle donne, in 
dirittopenalecontemporaneo.it, 22 May 2013; and, L. LAZARUS, Positive Obligations and Criminal 
justice: duties to protect or coerce?, in University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, 2013, no. 
41. 
155 See, among many, Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, 28 February 2008, § 124-136. For more on 
the extraterritorial effect of Article 3 see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 244-256. 
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investigate, in particular into the unlawful transfer of the individual to such a country where 
he faces a real and imminent risk of ill-treatment156. 
 
Unlike what happens in relation to infringements of the right to life, under Article 3 there are 
no situations in which civil proceedings to obtain compensation or other types of 
proceedings may as well be sufficient to deliver such procedural obligation: a strict criminal 
law remedy is in principle always required against ill-treatments that contravene Article 3.  
The sole limited exception concerns offences committed by minors, for which the Court, 
without dispensing the State from carrying out an effective criminal investigation, has 
accepted that at the end of those proceedings, criminal sanctions may be replaced by other 
measures such as, for instance, community service157. To the contrary, if the offences are 
committed by minors under the age of 14, for which the national system does not provide 
any criminal liability, the procedural obligation under criminal law does not come into play, 
as other means of protection and prevention are called for158. 
 
 
C) Freedom from slavery and forced labour under Article 4 
 
Despite the high importance of this right, demonstrated by the fact that is it declared by 
Article 15 to be non-derogable, during the first fifty years of the Convention’s existence, 
this provision has been rarely invoked. However, the emergence of various forms of human 
trafficking has sparked much interest in it159. It is in the judgement Siliadin v. France160 that 
the Court has asserted for the first time the States’ obligation to criminalise and effectively 
prosecute abuses falling within the material scope of Article 4, that is any act amounting to 
slavery, servitude and forced labour161. The obligation of criminal law protection was later 
																																																						
156 See, Khamidkariyev v. Russia, no. 42332/14, 26 January 2017, § 153, a case concerning the 
disappearance and unlawful transfer of the applicant from Russia to Uzbekistan, where he would 
the real and imminent risk of being ill-treated in detention on account of his being a person 
convicted of a religious extremism crime. For similar cases, see also Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, 
no. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, § 190. See also, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09 , 13 December 2012, § 186. 
157 Beganovic v. Croatia, cit., § 85. 
158 Dordevic v. Croatia, no. 41526/10 , 24 July 2012, § 141-143. 
159 See, A. ASHWORTH, Positive obligations in criminal law, cit., p. 206; B. EMMERSON, A. ASHWORTH, 
A. MACDONALD (eds.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice, cit., p. 832. 
160 Siliadin v. France, cit. On this landmark case, see H. CULLEN, Siliadin v. France: Positive 
obligations under Art. 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Human Rights Law 
Review, 2006, 6, p. 585.  
161 See also, CN v. the United Kingdom, cit.; C.N. and V. v. France, cit.. On the specific issue of 
forced labour see also the case, Chowdoury and others v. Greece, no. 21884/15, 30 March 2017. 
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extended also to the phenomenon of human trafficking in Ranstev v. Cyprus and Russia162, 
when the Court went much further finding that such conduct also engaged the protection 
of Article 4. 
Therefore, any conduct infringeing Article 4 triggers the procedural obligation to effectively 
investigate, prosecute and punish the offenders, no space being left to mere civil 
proceedings, just like under Article 3163. 
 
 
D) The right to liberty and security under Article 5 
 
A parallel procedural obligation to investigate arises under Article 5 in respect to cases of 
«unacknowledged or arbitrary detention» or «enforced disappearances»164, which are 
regarded as the most grave form of violation of that provision and a complete negation of 
its guarantees165. Accordingly, States are required to carry out effective criminal 
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody by State 
agents incommunicado and has not been seen since.  
Besides, Article 5, just like Article 3, also has an extraterritorial dimension, whereby a State 
would be in contravention of such provision if it were to transfer an individual to a country 
where he or she was at real risk of a flagrant breach of his or her rights under Article 5, as 
																																																						
162 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit., § 272-285. On human trafficking see also, L.E. and others v. 
Greece (dec.), cit., § 68 and the case T.I. and others v. Greece, no. 40311/10, communicated to the 
Government on 6 September 2016. See also, V. STOYANOVA, L.E. v. Greece: Human trafficking and 
the scope of States’ positive obligations under the ECHR, in European Human Rights Law Review, 
2016, p. 290. In the view of A. ASHWORTH, Positive obligations in criminal law, cit., p. 208, this was 
a «bold step» taken by the Court, which implied a new right into Article 4, that no one shall be 
subjected to human trafficking. 
163 For more on this subject and for the specific definitions of those conducts and the implications 
on national criminal law, see V. STOYANOVA, Art. 4 of the ECHR and the obligation of criminalizing 
slavery, servitude, forced labour and human trafficking, cit., p. 407. 
164 For this notion, the Court relies on the international law definition given by Article 2 of the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, adopted 
on 20 December 2006 and entered into force on 23 December 2010, which reads: « enforced 
disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation 
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorisation, 
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of 
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such 
a person outside the protection of the law». 
165 See, among many, Turkuyeva v. Russia, cit., §117-119. However, if the disappearance of a 
person takes place in cricumstances that make the death of that individual plausible, the complaint 
will be examined under Article 2. See, A. MOWBRAY, Duties of investigation, cit. p. 446. 
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it would occur were he or she to be subject to arbitrary detention166. It is in application of 
such doctrine that the Court has, thus, considered that the practice of the “extraordinary 
renditions” – defined as the «extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State 
to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, 
where there is a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment» which, as 
implying also a form of arbitrary detention, constitutes an «anathema to the rule of law and 
the values protected by the Convention»167, gives rise to an investigative duty on the 
authorities also under Article 5168.  
 
E) The right to respect for private life and home under Article 8 
 
In addition to Article 3, protection against acts of violence committed by other individuals 
infringing a person’s physical and physiological integrity is provided also by Article 8, which 
enshrines the positive obligation for States to adopt an appropriate legal framework for the 
protection of personal integrity even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves. The nature of the action capable of meeting such positive obligation, however, 
depends on the particular aspect of private life that is at issue. The Court has found that 
where «fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake» then efficient 
criminal law provisions and their application in practice through effective investigations and 
prosecution are required169. It is interesting to remember that, despite its derogable nature, 
it was in respect of this right that the obligation to criminalize was introduced for the first 
time170. 
To the contrary, in respect of less serious acts affecting psychological integrity and not 
involving any violence or abuse, the State’s positive obligation could be fulfilled also when 
																																																						
166 See, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, no. 8139/09, 17 January 2012, § 231-233. 
For more on this topic see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, cit., p. 298-300. 
167 El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], cit., § 221 and 239. 
168 See, for the first time, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], cit.. See 
also, Al-Nashiri v. Poland, cit., and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014. 
For more on this topic see, C. MELONI, Extraordinary renditions della CIA e responsabilità europee: 
il punto di vista della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in dirittopenalecontemporaneo.it, 10 June 
2013. 
169 See, X and Y v. the Netherlands, cit., § 23-24; M.C. v. Bulgaria, cit., § 150; K.U. v. Finland, no. 
2872/02, 2 December 2008, § 43-45, concerning the malicious misrepresentation of a minor on 
internet. 
170 See, X and Y v. the Netherlands, cit., §23-24. For such considerations, see A. ASHWORTH, Positive 
obligations in criminal law, cit., p. 199. 
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civil remedies capable of affording adequate protection are available171. The same holds 
true also for acts infringing aspects other than personal integrity, such as the right to privacy 
and of peaceful enjoyment of one’s home, which are also protected by Article 8172. 
Therefore, also in relation to infringements of the rights protected by Article 8, just like what 
happens for the right to life, one should draw a distinction between cases in which criminal 
law is mandated and others where there is no such requirement. The obligation to 
criminalize and to effectively investigate and punish comes into play under Article 8 only in 
respect to acts that infringe those «essential aspects of private life», such as, for instance, 
rape and sexual abuse, serious instances of domestic violence, and other forms of wilful 
physical attack on the personal integrity of a person, such as minor physical injuries and 
verbal threats173. It also appears that episodes of harassment including verbal assaults and 
physical threats, which in principle could be redressed by civil proceedings, require instead 
a criminal law remedy when aggravated by a racist motivation174. 
 
 
F) Other provisions 
 
Positive duties to take steps to undertake effective investigations accrue also with respect 
to violent behaviours in the context of the freedom of religion under Article 9175, the freedom 
of expression under Article 10176 and the freedom of assembly under Article 11177. However, 
these cases appear less frequently and the Court, rather than examining the obligation to 
investigate in itself, normally addresses the issue of the investigations within the more 
																																																						
171 Soderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, 12 November 2013, § 85, concerning the covert filming 
of a naked child. The decision in this case was criticized by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in his 
dissenting opinion, in whose view the obligation to criminalize also child prognography should have 
been stated. See B.V. and others v. Croatia, cit., § 154, for other examples of acts of more trivial 
nature such as long-lasting disputed between neighbours. 
172 See, Irina Smirnova v. Bulgaria, cit., § 92, where the applicant complained of having been obliged 
to tolerate the presence inside her house of persons foreign to her household and their disagreeable 
conduct; see also, Noveski and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 
25163/08, 13 September 2016, for acts of violence causing damage only to the property, without 
any physical violence; see also, Craxi (no. 2) v. Italy, no. 25337/94, 17 July 2003, §74-75 for the 
disclosure of personal information related to intercepted communications without the person’s 
consent; see also, H.M. v. Turkey, no. 34494/97, 8 August 2006, for illegal searches. 
173 Sandra Jankovic v. Croatia (dec.), 43440/98, 12 October 2000, § 47. 
174 See, R.B. v. Hungary, no. 64602/12, 12 April 2016, §§ 83-84. On the duty of the authorities to 
uncover a possible racist motivation see infra. 
175 See, Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, no. 30587/13 , 24 February 2015, § 110, for a failure to investigate 
disruption of Muslim prayers by offensive and violent demonstrators. 
176 See, Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey, no. 23144/93, 16 March 2000, § 45-46 for the lack of an 
investigation into a campaign of violence against a newspaper. 
177 See, Ouranio Toxo and others v. Greece, no. 74989/01, 20 October 2005, § 43, for the absence 
of an investigation into an attack on the headquarters of a political party. 
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general positive obligations of the State to protect the freedoms at stake, therefore also 
without lingering on the kind of investigation required, if necessarily criminal or not. 
A peculiar approach is however adopted in relation to the obligations to carry out effective 
investigations under Article 1 of Protocol 1, as the Court in that connection has specified 
under which circumstances the investigations must be of criminal nature. Admittedely it 
found that «when an interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions is 
perpetrated by a private individual, a positive obligation arises for the State to ensure in its 
domestic legal system that (…) adequate remedies are provided whereby the victim of an 
interference can seek to vindicate his rights, including, where appropriate, by claiming 
damages in respect of any loss sustained. Furthermore, where the interference is of a 
criminal nature, this obligation will in addition require that the authorities conduct an 
effective criminal investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution178». At the same time, 
however, it has been accepted that in the context of property crimes the possibility of 
bringing civil proceedings against the alleged perpetrators «may provide the victim with a 
viable alternative means of securing the protection of his rights (….) provided that a civil 
action has reasonable prospects of success». Therefore, a State would fail to fullfill its 
procedural obligations only «if the lack of prospects of success of civil proceedings is the 
direct consequence of exceptionally serious and flagrant deficiencies in the conduct of 
criminal proceedings arising out of the same set of facts179».  
Therefore, in respect to these non-violent cases arising from other Convention’s provisions, 
no clear pattern as to the procedural obligation implied emerges180 and, moreover, they all 
have in common that the standards of effectiveness applied by the Court are clearly less 
demanding that those applied in cases of violence under Article 2, 3 and the other 
provisions mentioned previously. 
  
																																																						
178 Blumberga v. Latvia, no. 70930/01, 14 October 2008, § 67. 
179 Id., § 68. See also, L. LAVRYSEN, Human Rights in a Positive State, cit., p. 65. 
180 In this sense, E. BREMS, Procedural protection, cit., p. 144. 
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SECTION II: THE QUALITY REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION 
 
 
1. The type of scrutiny on the quality of the investigations 
 
As one would probably expect, the procedural obligation to investigate and punish cannot 
be discharged by the simple opening of a criminal investigation, which would not by itself 
offer any guarantee. The Court instead requires the criminal enforcement system to operate 
effectively and therefore oversees also the quality of the criminal proceedings in place, 
according to multiple and detailed parameters it has itself elaborated, acting in this way as 
a sort of judge of the procedure181. In its judgements, indeed, the following formula is likely 
to be found: «The Court notes that a criminal investigation was carried out in the current 
case by the domestic authorities. It remains to be assessed whether it was effective182».  
Although the procedural obligation remains one of means only, the strictness with which 
the Court enforces it lies at the heart of the doctrine’s success: the obligation to effectively 
investigate and punish would indeed be meaningless if its standards were too relaxed183. 
States are therefore required to give a detailed account of why and how they decide to 
exercise or not their criminal law enforcement machinery, and their margin of appreciation 
in this respect becomes very narrow184. Nonetheless, the requirements set forth in the case-
law must be regarded as minimum standards, and not as the best possible practice, it 
being open to States to provide for further and higher guarantees185. 
Before going into detail onto each of these specific qualitative criteria elaborated in the 
case-law, it is however necessary to understand what type of scrutiny is exercised by the 
Court on the quality and effectiveness of the criminal proceedings. To do so, it must be 
born in mind firstly that the several quality requirements to be met in order to comply with 
the procedural obligation are often connected to each other and may sometimes even 
																																																						
181 E. DUBOUT, La procéduralisation des obligations relatives aux droits fondamentaux substantiels, 
cit., p. 472; E. BREMS, Procedural protection, cit., p. 148. O. CAHN, Obligations positives 
procedurals, cit., p. 247 criticizes the Court’s refusal to define clearly the criteria against which the 
effectiveness is to be measured, stating that the incoherent and casuistic approach makes it 
impossible for a State to foresee if it has complied with the procedural obligation or not. 
182 See, among many, Miclea v. Romania, no. 69582/12, 13 October 2015, § 40; Chinez v. Romania, 
no. 2040/12, 17 March 2015, § 48. 
183 In this sense also, J. FIALA-BUTORA, Disabling Torture: the obligation to investigate, cit., p. 248. 
184 H. TRAN, Les obligations de vigilance des États, cit., p. 136; S. MIRANDOLA, The involvement of 
the deceased victim’s next of kin in criminal investigations: an analysis of the standards under Article 
2 of the Convention and of Directive 2012/29/EU on the rights of victims of crime, in L. EARLY, A. 
AUSTIN, C. OVEY, O. CHERNISHOVA (eds.) The Right to Life, cit., p. 180. 
185 See, Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 70. 
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overlap: it is possible, indeed, that certain aspects of the procedure be relevant to 
determine compliance or not with more than one of the different standards set by the Court.  
In the recent judgment Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey, the Court has for the first 
time addressed head-on and clarified the relation existing between these multiple 
requirements, expressing the guiding principle for assessing alleged violations of the 
procedural obligation. It held that:  
 
« (…) the Court considers it appropriate to specify that compliance 
with the procedural requirement of Article 2 is assessed on the basis 
of several essential parameters: the adequacy of the investigative 
measures, the promptness of the investigation, the involvement of the 
deceased person’s family and the independence of the investigation. 
These elements are inter-related and each of them, taken separately, 
does not amount to an end in itself, as is the case in respect of the 
independence requirement of Article 6. They are criteria which, taken 
jointly, enable the degree of effectiveness of the investigation to be 
assessed. It is in relation to this purpose of an effective investigation 
that any issues, including that of independence, must be 
assessed.»186 
 
The type of scrutiny carried out by the Court to verify compliance with the procedural 
obligation under Article 2 and others, therefore, consist of a global assessment of the 
effectiveness and adequacy of the criminal investigations as a whole. Although it does 
verify the respect of each specific requirement, ultimately the Court will assess whether the 
single shortcomings discerned did have an impact on the overall effectiveness of the 
proceedings or not. This is because the single requirements should not be examined in 
isolation and irrespective of the other parameters, rather it is their combination which 
makes an investigation effective187. 
This holistic method strongly resembles the «overall examination of the fairness of the 
criminal proceedings» frequently used by the Court to verify respect of the right to a fair 
trial under Article 6, defined as the «proceedings as a whole» test and the «taken together» 
approach188. Also under the latter provision, indeed, very specific rights are guaranteed to 
																																																						
186 Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 225. 
187 See, Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 243; Sarbyanova-Pashliyska and Pashliyska 
v. Bulgaria, cit., § 41; Kraulaidis v. Latvia, cit., § 63, in which the Court stated that «while none of 
the shortcomings in the investigation appears to be particularly grave when taken by itself, it is 
important to assess the proceedings as a whole». 
188 For this definition see, R. GOSS, Criminal fair trial rights: Art. 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 116 ff., who strongly criticizes this approach as ambiguous 
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the defence, but a failure to ensure one of them does not necessarily and automatically 
imply a violation of the right to a fair trial, as such rights are regarded as elements, among 
others, of the concept of a fair trial189.  
The stance taken by the Court has been thus described as a «significant flaw test»190 and 
an «outcome-oriented approach»191: the Court is not concerned with allegations of errors 
or isolated omissions, what matters is not the single shortcoming by itself, but rather the 
actual impact of that procedural error on the investigation as a whole and, more particularly, 
whether it undermined its ability to establish the facts and punish those responsible192. Only 
in such case a violation of the procedural obligation will be found. The outcome of the 
assessment, therefore, will be largely dependent of the specific circumstances of each 
case: the lack of a single investigative measure could be decisive in certain cases, but in 
other even several deficiencies may not diminish the investigation’s ability to establish the 
facts. 
 
Thanks to such a new development of the Court’s scrutiny, which is most likely to have a 
great impact on the outcome of several cases, the critical remarks advanced in the past 
against the previous method adopted by the Court on account of its being excessively 
formalistic, now turn to be disputable193. 
																																																						
and vague on the ground that it is poorly defined and inconsistently applied. In this sense also, S. 
TRECHSEL, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 87-88, who 
holds that this method leaves Article 6 «in a cloud of ambiguity». 
189 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 15 December 
2011, § 143-146. This is especially true for the right to confront witnesses, but does not apply to all 
rights implied under Article 6, see R. GOSS, Criminal fair trial rights, cit., p. 116 ff. On this approach 
towards the right to confront witnesses see, M. BIRAL, L’overall examination: nuove frontiere sul 
diritto a confrontarsi con i testimoni, in Archivio Penale, 2013, 1, p. 1; S. MIRANDOLA, Uso probatorio 
delle dichiarazioni dei testi assenti e giurisprudenza europea: variazioni sul tema ‘Al-Khawaja’, in 
Cassazione Penale, 2017, 1, p. 368. 
190 M. GIALUZ, La protezione della vittima tra Corte EDU e Corte di Giustizia, in L. LUPARIA (ed.), Lo 
statuto europeo delle vittime di reato. Modelli di tutela tra diritto dell’Unione e buone pratiche 
nazionali, Wolters Kluwer, 2015, p. 28. See also, Siliadin v. France, cit., § 130 for a reference to the 
«significant flaws». 
191 J. KUKAVICA, V. FIKFAK, Strasbourg’s U-Turn on Independence as part of an Effective Investigation 
under Article 2, in Cambridge Law Journal, 2015, 74, 3, p. 415. 
192 Sarbyanova-Pashliyska and Pashliyska v. Bulgaria, cit., § 41 and 43, were the excessive lenght 
of the proceedings did not affect the overall adequacy of the criminal law response and therefore 
no violation of the procedural obligation was found. See also, Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 24746/94, 4 May 2001, § 107; B.V. and others v. Croatia (dec.), cit., § 151. See also, HARRIS, 
O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 217. 
193 For a critic of the formalistic approach see, J. CHEVALIER-WATTS, Effective Investigations under 
Art. 2, cit., p. 701. Indeed, before the clarification on the nature of this scrutiny rendered in the case 
Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., the Court’s stance was much more formalistic, 
as in many cases it was confined to detecting the single shortcomings in order to conclude for a 
violation. This occurred, for example, in the case Ramsahai v. the Netherlands [GC], in which the 
majority’s decision was strongly criticized by several dissenting judges on account of the 
	 46	
An additional reason supporting the non-formalistic approach in this context is that, on 
several occasions, the Court has accepted that the nature and degree of scrutiny which 
satisfy the minimum threshold of an investigation’s effectiveness is to be assessed «on the 
basis of all the relevant facts and with regards to the practical realities of the investigation 
work»194. It has constantly held, indeed, that the procedural obligation to investigate must 
be interpreted in a way which does not impose an excessive or unreasonable burden on 
the authorities195.  
This holds true especially in relation to specific situations in which the Court takes into 
account the difficult context in which the investigations take place, for example during 
armed conflict or contexts of generalised violence where it is clear that obstacles may be 
placed in the way of investigators which compel the use of less effective investigative 
measures196, in the context of anti-terrorist operations197, but also where the case 
objectively complex, as for instance when it concerns war crimes or post-war situations198. 
In front of these situations, the Court is indeed prepared to make reasonable allowances 
for the relatively difficult conditions in which the authorities have to work and a negative 
outcome will result only where the shortcomings were not inevitable even in the particular 
difficult conditions of the case199. At the same time, however, the Court strongly reminds 
that such difficult situations do not relieve the authorities from the obligation to effectively 
investigate200. 
 
It should be underlined, lastly, that also the specific offence to be investigated may affect 
to a certain extent the scope of the Court’s scrutiny. Even though these quality 
requirements apply equally to all situations in which the procedural obligation to investigate 
																																																						
excessively formalistic approach. In this sense see also, J. KUKAVICA, V. FIKFAK, Strasbourg’s U-
Turn on Independence, cit., p. 415. 
194 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 234; Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey 
[GC], cit., § 181. 
195 Osman v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 116; Palic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cit., § 70. 
196 Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 164; Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., 
§ 226; Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 319; Hasan Yasar and others v. Turkey, no. 
50059/11, 11 October 2016, § 53.  
197 Tagayeva and others v. Russia, no. 26562/07, 13 April 2017, § 497. 
198 Jelic v. Croatia, cit., § 78-79, in relation to the difficulties of investigating into killings by State 
agents during the war and post-war recovery in a newly independent State. See also, B. and others 
v. Croatia, cit., § 62; Njezic and Stimac v. Croatia, cit.; Palic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cit., § 70; 
Association “21 December 1989” and others v. Romania, no. 33810/07, 24 May 2011, § 142. For 
more on the topic see, O. CHERNISHOVA, Right to truth in the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, cit., p. 153. 
199 Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 226. 
200 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that the procedural obligation to investigate applies even 
in very difficult security conditions, including of armed conflict or contexts of generalised violence. 
See also, A. PETROPOULOU, Liberté et securité. Les mesures antiterroristes et la Cour Européenne 
des droits de l’Homme, Editions Pedone, 2014, p. 333. 
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has been found to arise, regardless of the Convention’s provision concerned201, the Court 
has sometimes stated that its control may be less exacting in respect to certain cases, 
such as those not involving the use of force by State agents, and be particularly stringent 
in the opposite case or when the facts happen to individuals in their custody202. This holds 
all the more true when confronting the duty to investigate violent crimes under Articles 2 or 
3 with the parallel obligation to investigate less serious crimes under other provisions, such 
as those under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 relating to property crimes203. 
Nonetheless, it does not appear that such general statement has indeed translated in 
significant differences in the application of the standards and in a more relaxed treatment 
for the former situations, since as acknowledged by the Court, «the requirements for an 
official investigation are similar»204. 
 
 
2. The duty to activate ex officio 
 
Since the very first time it was established, the duty to investigate was defined as a duty to 
open «an effective official investigation»205. From the very beginning, the official nature of 
the proceedings to be launched into an alleged human right’s violation has thus been 
stressed. This essential trait of the proceedings more precisely means that: 
 
 «the authorities must act on their own motion once the matter has come to their 
attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next of kin to lodge a formal 
complaint or to request particular lines of inquiry»206, «or to take responsibility 
for the conduct of any investigative procedures.»207  
 
																																																						
201 The Court has held that the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 contain «converging principles» in 
relation to the procedural obligation to investigate, see Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 
314. See also, Perevedentsevy v. Russia, cit., § 104, where it is stated that these principles are 
applicable to different categories of cases. In this sense also, H. TRAN, Les obligations de vigilance 
des États, cit., p. 137. 
202 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 234; Bakanova v. Lithuania, cit., § 67; 
Premininy v. Russia, cit., § 74. See also, Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 83 with reference to deaths 
occurred under the custody of State agents. 
203 Blumberga v. Latvia, cit., § 67, where it was held that in relation to such «less serious crimes the 
State would only fail to fulfill its positive obligation in that respect only where flagrant and serious 
deficiencies in the criminal investigation or prosecution can be identified». 
204 Premininy v. Russia, cit., § 74. The only exception concerns the admissibility of strict statute of 
limitation periods, see infra… 
205 McCann v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 161. 
206 Nachova and others v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 43577/98, 6 July 2005, § 111. 
207 Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 74; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 111. 
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The duty to launch an investigation, therefore, arises automatically on national authorities 
once they have become aware of the alleged violation. In this respect, a distinction should 
be drawn between two situations that differently affect the starting point of such obligation 
and the relative onus on the victims to inform the authorities.  
Indeed, no official complaint is needed when the facts are already known by the authorities. 
The Court found that the mere fact that the authorities have been informed of the death 
gives rise ipso facto to the investigative obligation, even in the absence of an express 
complaint208. Likewise, even when strictly speaking no complaint has been made, an 
investigation must be started if there are sufficiently clear indications that ill-treatment has 
been used. Especially in cases of ill-treatment, the authorities must take into account the 
particularly vulnerable situation of the victims and that they will often be less ready or willing 
to make a complaint209; however, this does not entail that States are required, under the 
procedural obligation, to adopt adequate detecting and reporting mechanism, failing which 
their responsibility would be engaged210.  
This holds true also in the context of «dangerous activities»: a criminal complaint is not 
mandatory in cases where the authorities are better placed to know about the original 
cause of the claim, as the circumstances surrounding the death are confined within the 
knowledge of State officials211. 
By contrast, in cases where the authorities may not necessarily be aware of the facts, the 
lodging of a formal criminal complaint is mandated, all the more where the events at stake 
purportedly are the result of a secret operation carried out without any legal basis212. A true 
duty of diligence is here incumbent on victims: they are expected to apply promptly to the 
domestic authorities, since any delays could risk compromising the effectiveness of the 
following investigations213. This duty, however, is to be assessed in the light of the particular 
circumstances of the case, taking into consideration also the possible vulnerability of the 
victim, the complexity of the case and the nature of the human rights violations at stake214. 
																																																						
208 Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 265; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia [GC], cit., § 186; Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 74. See also, H. TRAN, Les obligations de 
vigilance des États, cit., p. 141. 
209 Bati and others v. Turkey, cit., § 133; Otasevic v. Serbia, cit., § 30. For the same standard under 
Article 4 see, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit., § 287; J. and others v. Austria, cit., § 107. 
210 See, O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810/09, 28 January 2014, in which the Court dimissed the 
applicant’s complaint of a lack of effective detection of cases of sexual harassement on children in 
public schools, which prevented her case to be investigated earlier. 
211 Brincat and others v. Malta, cit., § 123. 
212 El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], § 140, in relation to extraordinary 
renditions. 
213 Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], § 264-65; Vuletic v. Croatia, § 24; Velikanov v. Russia, no. 
4124/08, 30 January 2014, § 57. An additional duty of diligence is incumbent on victims to lodge 
the application to the Court as soon as they realize that the investigation in ineffective, see ibidem 
and Kamenica and others v. Serbia (dec.), no. 4159/15, 4 October 2016. 
214 El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], cit., § 142. 
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In case of inertia of the victim in filing such official complaint, therefore, the duty to 
investigate ex officio does not arise and the complaint before Strasbourg will, in principle, 
be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies or for failure to 
respect the six-month time-limit215. 
Yet, once the matter has been brought to the knowledge of the authorities by an official 
complaint, it is for the public prosecutor or other investigative authorities to ensure that an 
effective investigation is carried out into the victim’s complaint216. In this sense, the official 
nature of the investigation rules out - at least in respect of cases where the alleged 
perpetrators are State agents - the existence of a burden on victims to undertake a form of 
subsidiary private prosecution, where provided in the national legal system, to remedy the 
inaction of the public prosecutor217. The Court has held in this regard that, once the matter 
has come to the attention of the authorities, victims are not required to pursue prosecution 
on their own, as this is a responsibility of the public prosecutor, who is certainly better, if 
not exclusively equipped, in that respect218.  
However, a subtle distinction should be drawn here between subsidiary prosecution, 
intended as a remedy to the inertia of the public prosecutor, and an ordinary private 
prosecution, where national law provides that certain offences are never to be prosecuted 
by the State, but only upon action of the victim itself. In respect to this latter situation, the 
Court has found that the Convention does not necessarily requires State-assisted 
prosecution, but it has left a wide margin of appreciation to the States. It has held that «its 
role is not to replace the national authorities and choose in their stead from among the wide 
range of possible measures that could suffice to secure adequate protection of the 
applicant from acts of violence», rather «the choice of the means to secure compliance with 
Article 3 in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a 
matter that falls within the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation, provided that 
criminal-law mechanisms are available to the victim»219. The question remains open, 
however, if such a leeway is afforded to States only in cases where the alleged perpetrators 
are private individuals or whether it has a more general value. 
																																																						
215 Jorgensen and others v. Denmark (dec.), no. 30173/12, 28 June 2016, § 51; Mocanu and others 
v. Romania [GC], cit., § 31.  
216 Matko v. Slovenia, no. 43393/98, 2 November 2006, § 90; Stojnsek v. Slovenia, no. 1926/03, 23 
June 2009, § 79, both cases concerning an alleged ill-treatment by State agents. 
217 On the notion of private prosecution see, M. CAIANIELLO, Poteri dei privati nell’esercizio dell’azione 
penale, Giappichelli, 2003. 
218 Matko v. Slovenia, cit., § 90; Stojnsek v. Slovenia, cit., § 79; Andonovski v. the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, cit., § 90, where the Court stressed that «the judicial investigation initiated 
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Serbia, cit., § 25. 
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In conclusion, the official nature of the investigation is to be understood as a principle of 
mandatory investigations. It means that national authorities are under the obligation to act 
immediately as soon as an alleged serious human right violation has come to their 
knowledge, either directly or from an official complaint filed by the victim, and that the 
launch of a criminal investigation cannot be conditioned upon the initiative of the victims to 
lodge a formal complaint or to undertake a subsidiary private prosecution, nor upon a 
formal authorisation by other administrative authorities220. 
 
 
A) Standards of credibility of the complaint 
 
In the section above it has been demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, an official 
complaint by the victim is necessary for the obligation to investigate to arise. Obviously, 
not any kind of complaint shall have this effect, but only those who appear to be well-
substantiated. To hold otherwise, an excessive and unreasonable burden would be placed 
on national authorities. The grounded nature of the complaint, obviously, does not normally 
come into play with regards to infringements of the right to life under Article 2, as the fact 
that a death has occurred in suspicious circumstances is capable by itself to trigger the 
duty to investigate. What could be in issue in such context is the life-threatening nature or 
not of the injuries sustained, but this is a question that relates more to the minimum gravity 
of the injuries in order to fall within the scope of Article 2, rather than to the credibility of 
the complaint itself.  
The content and credibility of the complaint is instead often at stake in cases concerning 
Articles 3 and 4221. In this connection, it is well-established in the case-law that Article 3 
requires the authorities to investigate allegations of ill-treatment only when they are 
«arguable» and «raise a reasonable suspicion»222. Likewise, with a slightly different 
formulation, for the investigative duty to arise under Article 4, the circumstances must have 
given rise to a «credible suspicion» that the person was subject to a treatment in violation 
of such provision, which is «not inherently implausible»223. In view of the importance of this 
																																																						
220 See, Coraman v. Turkey, no. 16585/08, 15 July 2014, § 40, in which domestic law required an 
authorisation by the Prefect for bringing criminal proceedings against members of the police. 
221 Also under Article 3 the credibility of the complaints is a separate, though interconnected 
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criterion for the emergence of the procedural obligation, it is therefore necessary to analyse 
what an «arguable claim» is. 
First of all, it should be stressed that the fact that the Court has not found it proven that the 
applicant was ill-treated, or that the claim in such regard was not arguable, does not 
preclude the complaint under Article 3 from being «arguable» for the purposes of the 
obligation to investigate224. Here also, the procedural obligation’s autonomous and 
separate nature from the underlying substantive obligation emerges. Furthermore, it 
appears that the evaluation of the credibility of the complaint is undertaken ex ante, with 
reference to the moment in which it was submitted to the authorities, without taking into 
consideration any other evidence or finding subsequently come into light. 
Secondly, the assessment of the arguable nature of the complaint is made in concreto, 
from an objective viewpoint and depends on the specific circumstances of each case225. In 
most cases, the claim is regarded as arguable where medical evidence supporting the 
allegations is available and the account of the facts is sufficiently detailed and precise226. 
However, there may be instances in which a claim may be deemed to be arguable even in 
the lack of any medical evidence227. In some cases, the victim may be relieved from 
submitting medical evidence in support of his or her allegations in view of his or her 
vulnerability, as that could be impossible in the circumstances at hand, and the seriousness 
of the allegations and their detailed nature is sufficient to trigger the obligation to 
investigate228. In others, by contrast, there must be other elements that confirm the 
allegations and raise a reasonable suspicion, such as for example the existence of a general 
practice of mistreatment known to the public229. Finally, a decisive argument is support of 
the arguable nature of the claim appears to be the fact that national authorities have indeed 
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opened an investigation into it. In such a case, the Court proceeds on the assumption that 
the complaint is credible, without lingering much on its specific content230.  
 
In essence, the criteria on which the Court bases its assessment of the arguable nature of 
a complaint are very poorly defined and appear to be highly dependent on the specific 
circumstances of each case. This lack of clarity, nonetheless, seems to favour a broad 
interpretation of what an «arguable claim» is, which benefits the victims by extending the 
investigative obligation even in less strong cases where no medical report is submitted. 
 
 
3. Independence of the authorities in charge of the investigations 
 
Another standard against which compliance with the procedural obligation is to be verified 
concerns the independence of the investigation, both in law and in practice. In particular,  
 
«the persons responsible for the investigations should be independent of anyone 
implicated or likely to be implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of 
hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence.»231 
 
The requirement of independence, not surprisingly, is normally called into question only in 
relation to cases where the alleged killing or ill-treatment have occurred at the hand of State 
agents; when the alleged perpetrators are, instead, private individuals, issues of 
independence of the authorities are less likely to arise. 
If one considers, as mentioned before, that the procedural obligation extends beyond the 
strict investigation phase also to the subsequent trial and that it binds not just a particular 
authority but rather the respondent State as a whole232, it becomes apparent that all 
persons and bodies involved in the criminal law enforcement must be independent233. 
Thereby not only the police and the prosecutor, but also the forensic experts charged with 
carrying out specific checks should enjoy formal and de facto independence from those 
implicated in the events234. Furthermore, when a form of judicial review over a decision not 
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233 In Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 219, reference is made to «the 
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to prosecute is provided by domestic law, then also the judge or court responsible for 
reviewing such decision should abide by the independence requirement235, as well as the 
trial court itself236, where the case is actually sent to trial. 
 
Turning to its substance, it is to be noted that this requirement touching upon the subjects 
charged with the investigations actually embraces two distinct aspects: on one side, the 
statutory or institutional independence (section A) and, on the other, practical 
independence (section B). These two elements however are not always to be taken 
separately, but their assessment seems, to a certain extent, to converge and overlap, 
especially following the Court’s definite shift away from an absolutist understanding and 
towards an «outcome-orientated approach» in the interpretation of the standard of 
independence237. 
 
 
A. Institutional or statutory independence 
 
The first category, which is called statutory or institutional independence, encompasses 
both the existence in domestic regulation of appropriate statutory or regulatory safeguards 
of independence for those responsible for the investigations, as well as the lack of any 
institutional or hierarchical connection between the investigative authorities in the broad 
sense and the persons suspected to be implicated in the events. Whilst there are cases in 
which only one of these aspects in called into question, in many others these are 
interrelated. The mere aspect of statutory independence, for example, is often put into 
question in the context of cases assigned to military jurisdiction, where the prosecutor or 
the judges competent to investigate or decide on crimes committed by the military are also 
military servicemen in a relationship of subordination within the military hierarchy238.  
In these cases of lack of appropriate statutory safeguards, however, the central issue is 
how the independence of the criminal law enforcement authorities is to be assessed. It has 
long been unclear, indeed, whether the element of independence in the context of the 
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procedural obligation under Article 2 and other provisions had to meet similar criteria to 
those required under Article 6 for a fair trial, or whether a lower standard was sufficient. As 
a result of persisting inconsistencies in previous case-law, which had revealed the 
existence of two opposite approaches, a more pragmatic one and another which can be 
described as absolutist239, the question was eventually addressed and resolved in the 
leading-case Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey240.  
In such occasion, the Court acknowledged that, although the statutory criteria of 
independence of the judge for a fair trial under Article 6 may inspire the examination of 
similar procedural issues under other provisions such as Article 2241, these requirements 
nonetheless may not be assessed in the same manner. The main difference is rooted in the 
fact that, whilst under Article 6 the independence of the court is an aim to be guaranteed 
in itself, in the context of the procedural obligation to investigate such feature is only one 
of the several standards which jointly serve towards ensuring the effectiveness of the 
criminal proceedings242. 
Thereby, Article 6 requires an absolute independence of the judge, which is to be assessed 
in abstracto according to the relevant statutory provisions. By contrast, the procedural limb 
of Article 2 and other provisions «does not require an absolute independence», but only 
«that the authorities are sufficiently independent of the persons and structures whose 
responsibility is likely to be involved»243. Accordingly, what is called for is a concrete 
examination of the independence of the investigation in its entirety in the light of all the 
specific circumstances of the case, rather than an abstract assessment of the compliance 
with the statutory criteria elaborated under Article 6. An «outcome-oriented approach244» 
has thus been clearly established, and the opposite absolutist one according to which a 
perceived lack of statutory independence would be sufficient to find a violation of the 
procedural obligation, irrespective of whether it had had a bearing on the effectiveness of 
the investigations or not, was in fact rejected245. 
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Therefore, it is now clear that the finding of a lack of statutory or institutional independence 
of the authorities, due to the abstract absence of appropriate regulatory safeguards 
according to the criteria of Article 6, is not per se sufficient to conclude for the 
ineffectiveness of the criminal response, but it simply leads to a stricter scrutiny on whether 
the investigations as a whole were conducted independently enough246. In other words, a 
second step is necessary: it must be determined that such a flaw in the statutory 
independence has compromised the effectiveness of the proceedings by undermining their 
ability to shed light into the facts and punish those responsible. This further examination in 
concreto is carried out by verifying, on the one hand, whether the authority whose statutory 
independence is tainted, be it a prosecutor or a member of the court or other, had any 
special ties to the persons likely to be investigated on; and, on the other, whether there is 
tangible evidence of bias in his conduct247. It appears that the presence of either one of 
these situations is enough to ultimately undermine its independence. 
As to the first aspect, the fact that the investigators belong to the same force or corps of 
the persons whose responsibility is likely to be involved is not sufficient in itself in order for 
their independence to be flawed, but other concrete elements are needed to support such 
a conclusion248. In any case, however, no problems would arise when investigative measure 
of «technical and objective nature» are undertaken by a special unit within that force, that 
has specific expertise, for example of technical and scientific nature249. 
The independence of the investigators is, conversely, negatively affected when there are 
special ties, hierarchical or of other kind, among these and the persons who are likely to be 
involved (a situation which, as mentioned before, could be contentious in itself even when 
no preliminary issue of appropriate statutory independence arises). Apart from the most 
extreme cases in which the investigators are themselves the potential suspects250, such 
special relationships emerge where the investigators are direct colleagues or have a close 
working or personal relationship or a hierarchical link with the persons implicated in the 
																																																						
246 Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 224. 
247 Id., § 237. See also, Mikhno v. Ukraine, cit., § 136. 
248 Id., § 243; Ozpolat and others v. Turkey, no. 23551/10, 27 October 2015, § 88; Karpisiewicz v. 
Poland, cit., § 59, though with specific reference to the medical experts appointed in the 
investigations. 
249 Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 322; Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., 
§ 244; Ozpolat and others v. Turkey, cit., § 88; Guerdner and others v. France, no. 68780/10, 17 
April 2014, § 83. According to S. SKINNER, The Right to Life, Democracy and State Responsibility in 
“Urban Guerrilla” Conflict: the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber Judgement in 
Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, in Human Rights Law Review, 2011, 3, p. 567, an elucidation on the 
distinction between «technical and objective tasks» and others would be needed to determine when 
the independence of the authorities may be impinged upon or not. 
250 Kolevi v. Bulgaria, cit., § 211; Scavuzzo Hager v. Switzerland, no. 41773/98, 7 February 2006, § 
81; Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, 18 June 2002, § 342; Maslova v. Russia, no. 15980/12 , 14 
February 2017, §§ 87-88. 
	 56	
events or likely to be so251. In such case, even the fact that the investigations were 
supervised by another independent authority, such as for example a prosecutor, is not held 
to be enough of a safeguard to remedy such an important flaw252. The only possible 
exception, which however appears to have been suggested merely in theory and never 
actually fulfilled in practice, is where special reasons of urgency do not allow the waiting 
for the arrival of another unit in taking the first investigative steps253. 
As to the second aspect concering a tangible proof of bias in its conduct, if the authority 
whose statutory independence is tainted is the prosecutor or another investigator, such 
evidence is to be searched in its way of pursuing the investigations: it should be considered 
whether he followed all possible lines of inquiry, whether he collected all the necessary 
evidence and whether he did not accept in an acritical manner the versions of events 
supplied by those involved254. In relation to judges, instead, it is their manner of deciding 
which falls under scrutiny: the Court must be convinced that they were not inclined to 
refrain from shedding light on the facts, to accept without question the conclusions 
submitted to them or to prevent the instigation of criminal proceedings against the 
suspects255.  
In other words, it is the practical independence of the authorities involved which is 
ultimately evaluated when assessing the concrete impact of the lack of statutory 
independence on the overall effectiveness of the investigation. It is demonstrated, once 
more, that these different profiles are thus interrelated and often overlap. 
 
 
B. Practical independence 
 
Coming at last to the the other profile mentioned at the beginning, as opposed to the 
institutional or statutory independence, the so-called «practical independence» can come 
into play by itself, or as just seen, as one of the aspect to take into consideration in the 
concrete assessment of the lack of statutory independence on the investigations’ 
effectiveness.  
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It is more similar of a concept to that of impartiality, with which it is often interchanged by 
the Court. It has been described as «self-reliance in ascertaining and evaluating the 
evidence256» or as meaning that «the persons carrying out the investigations should not be 
subjected to any restrictions, improper influence, inducement, pressure, threat or 
interference, whether direct or indirect, from those implicated in the events»257. Practical 
independence is normally tainted, therefore, when investigators rely heavily and 
automatically accept the reports or statements by State agents implicated in the incident, 
failing to scrutinize their veracity and accuracy and without conducting any further relevant 
inquiries258. This does not imply, however, that practical independence is necessarily 
tainted when a prosecutor relies on the police reports of the investigations: it is clear that 
this is often inevitable as it is meant to be so, hence it can be an issue in itself. The question 
is whether the prosecutor has sufficiently assessed its veracity and reliability or not259. 
In order for the impartiality to be ensured where those involved in the investigations are 
public figures of high rank who may potentially have an influence over the investigators, in 
some cases, the Court further requires the adoption of special measures to reduce the risk 
of collusion and to remove the persons potentially implicated from having even an indirect 
power over the other actors of the investigation or potential witnesses260. 
Finally, as mentioned in the beginning, also the experts involved in the investigations are 
expected to be not only institutionally or hierarchically independent, but also impartial: their 
impartiality could, for instance, be called into question where they appear to have 
preconceived ideas on the guilt or innocence of the suspect, because before carrying out 
their task they have openly expressed their opinion on the matter261. Here also, however, a 
pragmatic approach is called for and such apparent lack of a clear mind could be 
countervailed in the specific circumstances of the case. 
 
 
C. Judicial review of the investigations 
 
Another issue which has come forth in relation to independence of the investigations is 
whether this standard is to be interpreted as requiring also a form of judicial review at the 
end of the investigation phase to scrutinize their effectiveness and independence.  
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The Court, although acknowledging that such a judicial review would be an important 
additional safeguard for the transparency and independence of the investigations, 
however, did not interpret Article 2 as to necessarily require the intervention of a court or 
judge at the closing of the investigations262. In reaching this conclusion it relied strongly on 
its understanding of the procedural obligations as not imposing on State’s any particular 
model or system of criminal justice. Yet, it also accepted that when a judicial review of a 
decision not to prosecute is provided, then such review must be taken into account in the 
evaluation of the independence of the investigation as a whole, in particular by assessing 
whether it could have rectified the shortcomings detected in the prosecutor’s 
investigation263. 
It seems, nonetheless, that the door has been left open for a different solution to be reached 
in the future: indeed, the Court carefully stated that «such intervention may prove necessary 
in certain cases, given the nature of the facts in issue and the particular context in which 
they occur»264. The question that still remains open, therefore, is whether such approach 
not requiring any judicial review at the end of the investigations could be limited only to 
similar cases (in particular where no flagrant shortcoming in the investigations had been 
found) or it could be extended also to different situations and be of general application. 
 
 
4. Promptness and reasonable expedition 
 
In addition to the standards of independence and of activation ex officio, it has been found 
that also a requirement of «promptness and reasonable expedition» is implicit in the context 
of the procedural obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged human rights violations. 
After all, the effectiveness of criminal proceedings is inevitably dependent on their temporal 
dimension, not only when considering the State’s duty to enact criminal provision, but also 
in order to ensure the subjective rights of fair trial of the defendants265. In particular, the 
Court has considered that:  
 
«while there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an 
investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities in 
investigating (…) may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public 
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confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any 
appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts»266.  
 
The rationale behind this requirement seems to lie mostly in the fact that «the passage of 
time will inevitably erode the amount and quality of the evidence available and the 
appearance of a lack of diligence will cast doubt on the good faith of the investigative 
efforts, as well as drag out the ordeal for the members of the family»267. Indeed, time is 
often essential in preserving vital evidence at a scene and in questioning witnesses while 
their memories are fresh and detailed. 
 
Promptness and reasonable expedition imply two different cumulative demands, so that 
the failure to ensure just one of them could in itself be detrimental to the effectiveness of 
the investigations as a whole.  
On the one hand, promptness means that the investigations should start as soon as 
possible, immediately when the procedural obligation arises, that is when a complaint is 
made by the victim or when the authorities are aware or ought to be aware of the facts268. 
It also appears that the more serious the allegations, the prompter the authorities’ response 
should be269. There is no precise time-limit within which investigation should ideally be 
launched, but the scrutiny of the Court is very strict: the passage of years from the events 
will certainly fall foul of this standard270, but the same may occur with a delay of some 
months or only weeks271. 
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On the other hand, it is also expected that, once opened, the criminal proceedings be 
pursued with determination and without any unjustified delays272. Clearly, it is not sufficient 
that solely the investigations in strict sense are conducted expeditiously, but when charges 
are brought against an individual then also the trial stage should conform to such standard 
of reasonable expedition273. Therefore, whilst a lack of promptness normally concerns the 
failure to open criminal investigations in due time, a finding of excessive length of the 
procedure could upset either the preliminary investigative stage or the following trial, not 
to mention also both phases274. It could be, indeed, that the diligence of the authorities in 
carrying out the trial phase cannot remedy initial failings and delays in the investigations, 
especially where these have caused important evidence to be lost275.  
Situations which could negatively affect the reasonable duration of the investigation phase 
in a strict sense and that are normally taken into consideration by the Court are, among 
many, the presence of prolonged periods of unexplained inactivity276, frequent remittals of 
the case to the investigators by the competent superior authority for additional integrative 
investigations upon acknowledgment of their incompleteness277, significant delays in 
hearing the potential suspect or witnesses278, delays due to a lack of coordination among 
the investigating authorities279, the fact that the case is continuously transferred to the 
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where the suspects and witnesses were heard only three and a half years after the incident; C.A.S. 
and C.S. v. Romania, cit., § 74 for a delay of two months in hearing the suspect; Aydan v.Turkey, 
no. 16281/10, 12 March 2013, § 112, for the relevance of a delay of only seven days. See also, 
Turluyeva v. Russia, cit., § 105; Basenko v. Ukraine, no. 24213/08, 26 November 2015, § 62. 
279 See Selim Yildrim and others v. Turkey, cit., § 71; Milena Felicia Dumitrescu v. Romania, cit., § 
57. See also, H. TRAN, Les obligations de vigilance des États parties, cit., p.150. 
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competence of different prosecutors280 or that the investigations are discontinued and then 
reopened several times 281 or that a significant lapse of time passes before the order to 
resume the investigations is implemented282. However, also a very swift termination of the 
investigation may be indicative of a deficiency: it has been noted, indeed, that «the 
authorities should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close an investigation»283 
and that «where examinations are incomplete and superficial, (…) these steps cannot be 
considered as a prompt and serious attempt to find out what happened, but rather as a 
hasty search for any reasons for discontinuing the investigation»284. 
Shortcomings that, in turn, may hamper the expedition of the trial stage are, besides 
significant delays occurring between the issuing of the indictment and the beginning of 
trial285, also the commission of procedural errors that result in a need to start over the 
proceedings286, and frequent adjournments of the hearings, owing to either the absence of 
the defendant287 or his counsels288 or to a failure to duly notify the defendant of the date of 
the hearing289. Indeed, although the Court in principle accepts that the absence of the 
defendant may cause some delays in the progress of trial, however, it requires that 
domestic courts take all reasonable efforts to find him and to ensure his attendance, and 
not simply choose to postpone the hearings instead, mindful of the fact that considerable 
delays may adversely affect the effectiveness of proceedings to the detriment of both the 
victims and defendants, regardless of their outcome290. In other words, it is crucial that the 
																																																						
280 Al-Nashiri v. Poland, cit., § 493, where the prosecutors in charge were disqualified from dealing 
with the case, and subsequantly the case was transferred to other prosecutors; Turluyeva v. Russia, 
cit., § 106. 
281 See, Kraulaidis v. Lithuania, cit., § 61; Perevedentsevy v. Russia, cit., § 112; Mudayev v. Russia, 
cit., § 105; Basenko v. Ukraine, cit., § 63. 
282 See, Perevedentsevy v. Russia, cit., § 111. 
283 El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], cit., § 183; Savriddin Dzhurayev v. 
Russia, cit., § 188. 
284 Karabet and others v. Ukraine, cit., § 286. 
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after the indictment brought by the prosecutor due to a problem of court backlog; M. and M. v. 
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composition of the bench had to be dealt with by restarting the trial; Kosteckas v. Lithuania, cit., § 
43-35, where the repetition of remittals by the appellate court motivated by the total lack of 
reasoning in the first instance judgment and the de facto changing of the charges against the 
defendants. 
287 Ugur v. Turkey (dec.), no. 63819/10, 1 March 2016, § 104; M.A. v. Slovenia, no. 3400/07, 15 
January 2015, § 50; W. v. Slovenia, cit., § 66; Oztunc v. Turkey, no. 14777/08, 9 February 2016, § 
76-90. 
288 Sukru Yildiz v. Turkey, no. 4100/10, 17 March 2015, § 67. 
289 Milena Felicia Dumitrescu v. Romania, cit., § 60. 
290 Ugur v. Turkey, cit., § 104; M.A. v. Slovenia, cit., § 50. See also, Ebcin v. Turkey, cit., § 55. 
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authorities show interest in finding the defendant and bringing him to justice291. Symptoms 
to the contrary would be, for instance, the fact that sanctions for failure to attend were not 
envisaged where provided292, the fact that only few inquiries are undertaken when the 
defendant is not to be found293 and that international arrests warrants are not timely issued 
in cases where the defendant is known to be abroad294. Finally, even an excessively 
formalistic interpretation of domestic law may reveal the unwillingness of the authorities to 
bring the defendants to justice and may thus upset the fair balance required between the 
interests of the victims and those of the defence. In a case against Turkey, in particular, the 
Court held that the interpretation given by the domestic courts of the rule according to 
which a defendant who had absconded could not be convicted without having been heard 
by the appellate court, even where he had already been heard at a previous stage of the 
proceedings, and even where the appellate judge simply has to apply a new more lenient 
law adopted in the meanwhile, was excessively formalistic and determined a complete 
paralysis of the proceedings, which was not even called in order to respect the fair trial 
rights of the defence since Article 6 does not proscribe proceedings in absentia in 
themselves295. 
 
 
A. Developments in the assessment of the reasonable expedition 
 
The similarities existing between the criteria for the assessment of the reasonableness of 
the duration of a criminal proceedings in the context of the procedural obligations to 
investigate and the ones used to verify respect of the reasonable length of the proceedings 
guarantee under Article 6 are surprising. In both cases, indeed, there is no absolute time-
limit of reasonableness, but the degree of diligence expected of the authorities in carrying 
out the proceedings expeditiously depends instead on the specific circumstances of the 
case.  
Under both provisions the most relevant factor normally taken into consideration in 
evaluating the expedition required is the complexity of the case296. Accordingly, in the 
																																																						
291 See, Oztunc v. Turkey, cit., § 76-80, where it is also specified that the obligation to apprehend 
the defendants is one of means only. 
292 See, M.A. v. Slovenia, cit., § 50. 
293 See, W. v. Slovenia, cit., cit., § 67. 
294 See, M.A. v. Slovenia, cit., § 50; W. v. Slovenia, cit., § 67, where international arrest warrants 
were issued only ten years after the discovery of the defendants residing abroad. The issuing of 
international arrest warrant comes into play also in relation to the State’s duty to cooperate, see 
infra. 
295 See, Oztunc v. Turkey, cit., § 81-90. 
296 The complexity of the case is a factor taken into account by the Court to determine whether the 
length of the proceedings was reasonable under Article 6, together with other factors such as the 
conduct of the applicants and of the competent authorities and what is at stake for the applicant. 
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specific context of the procedural obligation to investigate, the Court is ready to tolerate 
lengthier criminal proceedings where, for example, the scope of the case is very wide, it 
involves a significant number of suspects, victims or witnesses, or recourse to multiple 
forensic examinations297, or where there are particular practical difficulties in gathering the 
evidence298. In some cases, it is also taken into account whether the delays were 
attributable or not to the applicant, by the same token as under Article 6299. In at least one 
case, moreover, when addressing the delays in the criminal proceedings under Article 2, 
the Court referred explicitly to the standards used under Article 6300.  
 
In addition to these criteria, however, in the context of the procedural obligations there are 
specific situations which in the Court’s view would always call for an even speedier 
response and for a greater diligence on the part of the authorities. When the investigations 
concern crimes of violence against women, indeed, the Court has found that, in view of the 
particular situation of insecurity and vulnerability in which the victims found themselves, 
the authorities should react within the shortest time possible301. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that when the proceedings concern crimes of sexual violence against minors a 
speedy trial is all the more required in order to reduce as much as possible the risks of 
secondary victimisation resulting from the criminal proceedings themselves, since they are 
perceived as a distressing and traumatic situation302. Lastly, it has been pointed out that, 
although the requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in all cases, 
																																																						
For more on this subject see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, cit., p. 440. 
297 Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 86; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, cit., § 
121; Nencheva and others v. Bulgaria, cit., § 130. For cases in which the Court took into account 
the fact that the case was relatively simple, see Kotelnikov v. Russia, cit., § 106; Kraulaidis v. 
Lithuania, cit., § 59; Timus and Taurus v. the Republic of Moldova, cit., § 54; S.Z. v. Bulgaria, cit., 
§ 51. For a case where the complexity justified the lenght of the criminal proceedings see, Cestaro 
and others v. Italy, cit., § 223. 
298 See, Al-Nashiri v. Poland, cit., § 493, for the difficulties of gathering evidence of the existence of 
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1989” and others v. Romania, cit., § 142. 
299 Sukru Yildiz v. Turkey, cit., § 67; Kotelnikov v. Russia, cit., § 105-106; Hilal Mammadov v. 
Azerbaijan, cit., § 95. 
300 Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, cit., § 41. 
301 See, M.G. v. Turkey, cit., § 93-95. In reaching such conclusion the Court relied also on Art. 49 of 
the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestica violence, signed on 11 April 2011, which reads: «Parties shall take the necessary 
legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all 
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302 See, N.D. v. Slovenia, cit., § 61; W. v. Slovenia, cit., § 69, both concerning cases of rape against 
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where there is a possibility of removing an individual from a harmful situation «the 
investigation must be undertaken as a matter of urgency»303. 
By contrast, there are “historical cases”, where the events occurred in a distant past, in 
which the standard of expedition is more relaxed than in respect of recent incidents304. 
 
When discussing how the assessment of a lack of promptness and of excessive length of 
the criminal proceedings is carried out under the procedural obligation to effectively 
investigate and punish, account should be given of what seems to be a very recent shift 
undergoing in the Court’s approach, as a result of the leading-case Mustafa Tunc and 
Fecire Tunc v. Turkey, in which the general principles guiding the assessment of the 
investigations’ shortcomings have been set forth305.  
In the past, the Court’s approach seemed to be, at least in certain cases, quite formalistic. 
The finding of significant delays in the progress of the proceedings or already in the opening 
of the investigations, indeed, could lead in principle to a finding of ineffectiveness of the 
criminal investigations as a whole, regardless of whether such deficiency did actually 
prejudice their capability of establishing the facts and identifying and punishing those 
responsible. In the Court’s words, «it is established that Article 2 requires investigations to 
begin promptly and to proceed with reasonable expedition (..), and this is required quite 
apart from any question of whether the delay actually impacted on the effectiveness of the 
investigation»306 . In application of such reasoning, the Court has sometimes concluded 
that «while it is not possible to speculate whether these delays (…) prejudiced in any way 
the outcome of the proceedings, in the Court’s opinion they cannot be reconciled with the 
procedural requirement of promptness. Accordingly, there has been a violation of the 
respondent State’s procedural obligations under Art. 3 of the Convention»307.  
Following the definitive establishment in the abovementioned judgement of the opposite 
outcome-oriented approach and of the need for a global assessment of the investigations 
as a whole, however, it is most probable that such a formalistic method will not be followed 
anymore in the future308. To the contrary, it is very likely that the finding of significant delays 
in the national proceedings will result in the violation of the procedural obligation only where 
																																																						
303 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit., § 287, in relation of a case of human trafficking. 
304 See supra. 
305 See supra. 
306 McCaughey v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 130. This premise, however, was criticized by judge 
Kalaydjieva in her concurring opinion to the judgement. See also, Ebcin v. Turkey, cit., § 56, where 
the fact that the criminal proceedings ultimately ended in convictions did not alter the finding of 
ineffectiveness of the proceedings out of their excessive length. 
307 Y. v. Slovenia, cit., § 99-100. 
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certain cases, see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., § 132. The case-law does not appear fully coherent 
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it can be proven that they concretely compromised the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
investigations as a whole.  
This occurred, for instance, in a recent case in which the Court took the view that «the 
requirement of promptness under Article 2 should not be examined in isolation and 
irrespective of the other parameters, the combination of which makes an investigation 
effective»309. Therefore, notwithstanding the significant delay incurred in the investigations 
and trial, which lasted in total for over fifteen years, the Court held that the criminal 
proceedings had achieved their essential purpose, as the cause of the death had 
nevertheless been established and the responsible convicted and ordered to pay 
compensation to the victim. In this sense, the delay, although regrettable, cannot be said 
to have caused a loss of evidence to the detriment of the quality of the results of the 
proceedings. In the Court’s view, therefore, the delay in itself is not sufficient to ground a 
violation of the procedural obligation on account of the fact that it did not ultimately 
undermine the effectiveness of the proceedings310. Thereby, a significant shift from the 
methods used to assess the reasonable length of the proceedings under Article 6 has took 
place, in that under such provision excessive delays in the proceedings will always result 
in a violation of the right to a fair trial. 
 
There is one case, however, in which the effectiveness of the proceedings is always 
inevitably impaired by the excessive delays in their progress, that is where the unjustified 
protraction of the criminal proceedings results in the expiry of the statute of limitations 
periods and thus in precluding any examination on the merits of the case being undertaken. 
In the Court’s view, indeed, «regardless of the final outcome of the proceedings, the 
protection mechanisms available under domestic law should operate in practice in a 
manner allowing for the examination of the merits of a particular case within a reasonable 
time»311. Therefore, where the inactivity or lack of diligence of the authorities leads to the 
proceedings becoming statute-barred and thus hinders the examination of the merits of 
the case, the procedural obligation is not complied with312. Indeed, «the deterrent effect of 
the criminal system would not be sufficient to ensure the prevention against acts of ill-
treatment where the perpetrators at the end of criminal proceedings may benefit from 
																																																						
309 Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, cit., § 41. 
310 Id., § 42-43. 
311 N.D. v Slovenia, cit., § 58; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, cit., 112; W. v. Slovenia, cit., § 65. 
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prosecution becoming time-barred due to the inactivity of the authorities»313, thus enjoying 
virtual impunity314.  
In other words, the discontinuation of criminal proceedings without any examination of the 
merits owing to the expiration of limitation periods is incompatible with the procedural 
obligations to investigate and punish where this has occurred as a result of flaws in the 
action of the domestic authorities and their lack of diligence in dealing with the case315. This 
conclusion holds true in general, irrespective of the involvement of State agents or not in 
the case316. However, as it will be discussed in depth later, where State agents are involved 
the expiration of limitation periods will be incompatible with the procedural obligations to 
effectively investigate and punish also where it is not determined by a lack of promptness 
in the authorities’ actions317. 
 
5. Adequacy and thoroughness 
Coming now to the requirements that directly affect the substance of the procedural 
obligation, an investigation in order to be effective must first of all be adequate, that is it 
must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts and, where appropriate, to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible318. Indeed, the primary purpose of the 
duty to investigate is that of establishing the circumstances of the facts in the most 
complete and precise manner as possible319.  
Yet, the requirement of adequacy and thoroughness takes many forms: it relates firstly to 
the scope and broadness of the procedure (par. A), then also to the collection of all the 
evidence available (par. B) and finally to the assessment of the facts and the reasoning of 
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314 See also, Bati and others v. Turkey, cit., § 136. 
315 See, Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 346; Valiueliené v. Lithuania, cit., § 85; 
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317 See infra. 
318 See, Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 172; Armani da Silva v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], cit., § 233. 
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the authorities’ decisions (par. C). 
 
A. Broadness of the investigations 
The adequacy and thoroughness of the investigation relates first of all to the scope of the 
procedure320. Indeed, to comply with such requirement the investigations must in the first 
place be broad enough to explore all the circumstances surrounding the death or ill-
treatment which could be relevant for the understanding of the situation in its entirety and 
for the establishment of the facts in an objective manner. In other words, «the carrying out 
of an investigation solely with a view to establishing or ruling out the involvement of other 
persons in a suspicious death is not sufficient to satisfy the procedural obligation; the 
national authorities’ obligation also extends to establishing the cause of the death»321.  
Where the proceedings concern, for example, a death resulting from the use of lethal force 
by a State agent, the Court has found that «the investigation must be capable of 
determining whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances», thus 
duly considering also the crucial issue of proportionality of the force used322, and that it 
must also «be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into account not 
only the actions of the State agents who directly used lethal force but also all the 
surrounding circumstances, including such matters as to planning and control of the 
operation in question»323. Similarly, in the context of medical negligence, the proceedings 
must be capable of establishing the cause of the death of the patient under the care and 
responsibility of health professionals and any liability on the part of the latter324. 
The need of thoroughness in exploring all the relevant circumstances, therefore, concerns 
firstly the factual aspects of the case325. For instance, an investigation into only one episode 
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of violence instead of into the entire situation of persistent harassment to which the person 
was subject constitutes an obvious shortcoming affecting the adequacy of the proceedings 
in this regards326. The same occurs, for example, where the investigation into the 
disappearance of an individual who had taken into custody of State agents does not seek 
to elucidate the circumstances and legal grounds of his arrest and of his alleged release327. 
Apart from the objective circumstances of the case, the requirement of completeness 
obviously extends also to the potential individuals involved in the case. An investigation 
inquiring solely into the responsibility of certain suspects, and not others, will fall foul of 
such standard328. In the specific context of war crimes, the foregoing implies that the 
investigation should not be restricted to bringing to justice only those militaries in command 
for their failure to prevent or punish war crimes committed by their subordinates, but that 
the proceedings must be extended to pursue the prosecution of also the direct 
perpetrators, who cannot be exonerated from their own criminal responsibility329. 
In addition to all the relevant factual circumstances, also the legal classification of the 
offence and the charges brought play an important role in determining the broadness of 
the investigations. It is clear, indeed, that a too narrow definition of a criminal offence in 
substantive could lead to certain facts being necessarily left outside the scope of the 
proceedings which become therefore too limited and inadequate. This was the case, for 
instance, in C.N. v. the United Kingdom, where due to flaws in substantive criminal law, the 
investigations were limited to criminal offences which normally, but not necessarily, 
accompany the offences of servitude, slavery and forced labour, with the consequence that 
victims of such treatment who were not at the same time victims of those related offences 
were left without any remedy330. 
Moreover, a very important role in determining the appropriate scope of the investigations 
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is played by the victims’ reports to the authorities and the information they brought to their 
attention, which normally, where not completely frivolous, should always deserve some 
degree of verification331. The Court, indeed, seems to take into account whether the victims’ 
allegations and suspicions have all been inquired into or to the contrary, discarded without 
explanation332. 
Furthermore, in order to establish the facts of the case, it is expected of the authorities in 
charge of the investigations to explore all possible lines of inquiry: any potential hypothesis 
and explanation must be contemplated and inquired into at the beginning of the 
investigation, even if it will ultimately be discarded on account of the subsequent findings. 
In other words, the restricted and limited scope of an investigation could affect its 
effectiveness. This means that the investigators should not leave out a priori any obvious 
hypothesis other than the one which they ultimately accept or discard, in that «failing to 
follow an obvious line of enquiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation’s ability 
to establish the circumstances of the case and the identity of those responsible»333. In this 
connection, the Court does not «in general consider it appropriate to interfere with the lines 
of inquiry pursued by the authorities or the findings of fact made by them, unless they 
manifestly fail to take into account relevant elements or are arbitrary and biased»334. For 
example, in S.Z. v. Bulgaria, the Court reproached the national authorities for having 
investigated only into the episode of abduction of the applicant in view of prostitution, yet 
failing completely to explore the victim’s allegations of the existence of a criminal 
organization aimed at trafficking in human beings335. 
 
i. Duty to uncover possible discriminatory motives 
When considering the broadness and comprehensiveness of the proceedings, special 
attention is given to the exploration of possible racist or discriminatory motives for the acts 
of violence under investigation, in that a failure to inquire into them would breach the 
procedural obligation. In other words, not only the crime but als the underlying intention 
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needs to be investigated336. 
Since the judgement Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, the Court has indeed found that the 
procedural obligations under Article 2 and the other already mentioned provisions imply 
also the duty of States to uncover the existence of a possible causal link between racist 
attitudes and an act of violence, in order to elucidate whether ethnic hatred played any role 
in the events337. Such additional obligation has been subsequently further extended to any 
prejudice-motivated and hate crime in general, be it for racial reasons or other 
discriminatory grounds of different kind, such as for example based on sexual orientation 
and identity338.  
In particular, the following definition and rationale has been put forward:  
 
«when investigating violent incidents triggered by suspected racist attitudes, the 
State authorities are required to take all reasonable action to ascertain whether 
there were racist motives and to establish whether feelings of hatred or 
prejudices based on a person’s ethnic origin played a role in the events. Treating 
racially motivated violence and brutality on an equal footing with cases lacking 
any racist overtones would be tantamount to turning a blind eye to the specific 
nature of acts which are particularly destructive of fundamental human rights. A 
failure to make a distinction in the way in which situations which are essentially 
different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with 
Article 14 of the Convention.»339  
 
The distinction between ordinary violent crimes and prejudice-motivated violence must be 
made both in law and in practice. It is clear, indeed, that a lack of differentiation in the 
domestic criminal provisions would make the investigative efforts to discover 
discriminatory motives in practice impossible or, even in the best cases, useless. It is no 
surprise that the scope of the investigative actions is pre-determined by the legal 
classification of the crime according to the criminal legislation in force340. Thereby, the Court 
actually requires national substantive criminal laws to provide for such a distinction 
																																																						
336 See, A. SEIBERT-FOHR, Prosecuting serious human rights offences, Oxford University Press, 2009, 
p. 135. 
337 Nachova and others v. Bulgaria [GC], cit., §§ 160-161. The Court further acknowleged that such 
obligation is also part of the responsibility of States under Article 14, and thus, owing to such 
interplay, the provisions on which it will be examined depends on the particular circumstances of 
the case.  
338 See, Identoba and others v. Georgia, cit., § 77; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, cit., §§ 105-106. 
339 Abdu v. Bulgaria, cit., § 44. 
340 In Myumyun v. Bulgaria, cit., § 68, the Court acknowledged that in general «an indispensable 
prerequisite» for discharging the procedural obligation is the concomitant obligation of States to 
have criminal law provisions appropriately penalising human rights offences; see also, Cestaro v. 
Italy, cit., § 209; Gafgen v. Germany [GC], cit., § 117. 
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between ordinary crimes and hate crimes, by regarding racist or discriminatory motives as 
an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offence or as a separate aggravated 
form of crime, punished more heavily341. Accordingly, before considering the practical 
details of the investigations, the Court examines the relevant domestic legislation in order 
to assess whether it allows to take into due consideration – or else said, to punish more 
severely - the peculiarity of bias-motivated crimes and whether it is in principle capable to 
unveil the discriminatory motive behind the offence342. 
Coming thus again to the strict investigative duty, this has been interpreted, in particular, 
to the effect that any plausible evidence and substantiated allegation suggesting possible 
racist or discriminatory motives for the acts of violence, as for example evidence of racist 
or homophobic verbal abuse during the incident or the fact that the perpetrators are known 
to belong to a racist ideology343, call for an initial verification on the part of the authorities 
and possibly for a thorough investigation of all the facts in order to uncover any possible 
racist overtones. Even in the absence of specific allegations suggesting discriminatory 
motives in the particular case, the general context of the attack has to be taken into 
account: admittedly, the duty to investigate into them arises also when general practices 
of discrimination and hostility against members of a particular community or an ethnic 
minority are of common knowledge in a certain country344. This is especially true with 
regards to Roma, who in the Court’s view are a «specific type of disadvantaged and 
vulnerable minority» that require special protection and, when it comes to offences 
committed against them, also «vigorous investigations»345. 
Furthermore, the obligation on the authorities to seek a possible link between the racist 
																																																						
341 See, Skorjanec v. Croatia, no. 25536/14, 28 March 2017, § 60-62. In this sense also, anticipating 
the findings of such judgment, J. ALIX, Les obligations positives de pénalisation et de punition, cit., 
p. 226; F. TULKENS – S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, La clémence pénale et les droits de l’homme, cit., 
p. 131, who stresses that the Court impose such requirement without using those term in an explicit 
manner. 
342 For cases in which the domestic legislation provided in theory sufficient protection, see Abdu v. 
Bulgaria, cit. § 47; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, cit., § 124; Identoba and others v. Georgia, cit., § 77; 
Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 58; Skorjanec v. Croatia, cit., § 60-62. See, R.B. v. Hungary, cit., § 90 for 
a case in which the domestic criminal provisions failed to provide an appropriate legal avenue to 
seek remedy for a racially motivated attack. 
343 In this sense see, Abdu v. Bulgaria, cit., §§ 49-50; Nachova and others v. Bulgaria [GC], cit., § 
164; R.B. v. Hungary, cit., § 88; Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 61. For the same factual circumstances 
in relation to a case of homophobic hate, see Identoba and others v. Georgia, cit., § 77. For a case 
in which, a contrario, there was no evidence of racial overtones warranting an investigation into 
such circumstance see, Beganovic v. Croatia, cit., §§ 95-98, and Seidova and others v. Bulgaria, 
no. 310/04 , 18 November 2011, §§ 71-74. 
344 See in this sense, in relation to police abuses against Roma people in Romania, Ciorcan and 
others v. Romania, cit., §§ 163-164; also on Roma issues, see R.B. v. Hungary, cit., § 84. See also, 
Sakir v. Greece, no. 48475/09, 24 March 2016, §§ 70-72, for general episodes of racist violence in 
Athens. 
345 Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 53. 
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attitudes and a given act of violence arises not only in relation to victims that have or are 
perceived to have a peculiar characteristic or status, but also towards individuals who 
become hate crime victims not because of their own personal status, but owing to their 
special relationship or association, such as friendship, marriage, membership in a group or 
else, with persons who have that status346. In the recent case Skorjanec v. Croatia347, which 
concerned an episode of violence perpetrated against a couple, the Court reproached the 
fact that the domestic courts treated only the partner of the applicant as victim of a hate 
crime because of his Roma origins, whereas the applicant could not be regarded as such 
merely on the ground that she was not Roma herself, and was treated merely as a witness. 
In the Court’s view, however, this should not have prevented the authorities to consider 
whether a link between the attack on the applicant and a racist motive existed because of 
her relationship with the other victim, who was of Roma origins. Such a failure was thus 
regarded as an insufficient assessment of the circumstances of the case, irreconcilable 
with the State’s obligation to take all reasonable steps to unmask a possible racist motive 
behind the attack. Put in other terms, the Court has thereby established that «in assessing 
hate crimes it is not the background of the victim which is essential, but the nature of hate 
of the perpetrators348». 
Indeed, in situations like the ones just described, where there is plausible evidence 
suggesting possible hate motives for the acts of violence, a complete omission by the 
authorities to look into such possible discriminatory motives would irreversibly taint the 
adequacy of the investigations, whose scope would not be sufficiently broad349. Yet, being 
mindful of the difficulties inherent in proving discriminatory motivations, the Court does not 
regard this duty as an absolute obligation, but rather expects all reasonable investigative 
measures to be undertaken by the authorities, having regard to the circumstances of the 
case. In other words, it will be scrutinized whether the investigators sought for possible 
evidence in support of the allegations by all means, regardless of their actual final outcome. 
In particular:  
 
«the authorities must do whatever is reasonable in the circumstances to collect 
																																																						
346 According to OSCE, Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide, OSCE/ODIHR, 2009, available at 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/36426?download=true, «persons affiliated or associated with a group 
that shares a protected characteristic can easily be overlooked as a category to include in hate 
crime laws. Therefore, hate crime laws should also penalize those who attack others on the basis 
of their association with members of protected group». 
347 Skorjanec v. Croatia, cit., § 66-71. 
348 S. OUALD CHAIB, Skorjanec v. Croatia: victims of racist hate-crime “by association” protected by 
the ECHR, in strasbourgobservers.com, 13 June 2017. 
349 See, Sakir v. Greece, cit., § 72 where the investigators overlooked completely the racist 
motivations behind the attack. 
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and secure the evidence, to explore all practical means of discovering the truth, 
and to deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting 
suspicious facts that may be indicative of violence induced by, for instance, 
racial or religious intolerance, or violence motivated by gender-based 
discrimination»350.  
 
The case Abdu v. Bulgaria351 is very significant in this sense: the prosecutor’s decision 
finding that racial motivation for the violence suffered by the applicant was not established 
was heavily criticized by the Court in light of the fact that before reaching such conclusion 
no attempt was made to actually interrogate the suspects on the motivation for their acts 
nor to question the witnesses on any insults they might have heard during the fight.  
In other words, it is the diligence of the authorities in gathering the evidence available which 
proves decisive. At the same time, however, diligence is necessary, but it may not be 
sufficient. Indeed, once all the evidence available has been duly collected, the Court will 
then also review whether and to what extent the authorities have submitted the case to the 
careful scrutiny required by the procedural obligations. It will thus scrutinize the 
assessments made of the circumstances of the case and the reasons given for their 
decisions. For instance, in the case Balazs v. Hungary352, concerning the attack by a private 
individual against a Roma, although the authorities were sufficiently diligent in gathering all 
the evidence available on the possible racist motives of the violence, the Court nevertheless 
concluded that they had failed to subject the case to the careful scrutiny required as their 
assessment of the circumstances of the case was manifestly unreasonable, in that they 
insisted in identifying an exclusive racist motive, instead of being satisfied of the existence 
of mixed motives among which a racist one, and also failed to explain why the racist motive 
could not be deduced from some hate crimes indicators detected such as the perpetrator’s 
posts on internet. 
 
B. Duty to collect and secure the evidence 
Apart from its scope, the thoroughness of an investigation is measured also from the 
quantity and quality of evidence that it has gathered in order to permit a full establishment 
of the facts and the identification of those responsible. In particular:  
 
«the authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the 
evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, 
																																																						
350 M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, cit., § 113; Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 52. 
351 Abdu v. Bulgaria, cit., §§ 49-50. 
352 Balazs v. Hungary, cit., §§ 58-75. 
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forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a 
complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the clinical 
findings, including the cause of death.»353 
 
The first crucial diligence obligation weighing on the authorities in order to comply with the 
adequacy criterion is, therefore, the duty to take all the necessary and available steps in 
order to secure and collect all the relevant evidence available. Albeit being impossible to 
reduce the variety of situations which might occur to a bare check-list of acts of 
investigations to be undertaken354, it appears from an analysis of the case-law that there 
are certain investigative measures which are regarded as essential for the establishment of 
the facts, failing which the efforts undertaken are not deemed to be adequate355.  
It is important to underline in this connection, however, that the omission of a particular act 
of investigation does not automatically taint the adequacy of the proceedings, but, pursuant 
to the outcome-oriented approach adopted by the Court in this context, only those 
deficiencies undermining their ability to establish the cause of death or the person 
responsible will risk falling foul of this standard356.  
Furthermore, when assessing the adequacy of the investigative measures undertaken by 
the authorities to gather evidence, a crucial role is played also by the requests coming from 
the victims: the Court, indeed, often takes into account whether the authorities have failed 
to perform the acts requested even though these might have contributed to the 
establishment of the facts357. In must be considered, however, that there is not absolute 
duty in this sense, but that the authorities – during the investigations and at trial – may filter 
the admission or the collection of evidence according to its relevance or superfluity358.  
According to the peculiar circumstances of each case, the measures in principle deemed 
to be essential for an investigation to be adequate include: an audition of all the 
																																																						
353 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 233; Al-Skeini and others v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], cit., § 166. 
354 See, Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, 18 May 2000, § 80; Timus and Taurus v. the Republic 
of Moldova, cit., § 48. 
355 In this sense see also, H. TRAN, Les obligations de vigilance des États parties, cit., p. 144. 
356 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 233; Al-Skeini and others v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], cit., § 166. For a concrete example see, Mustafic-Mujic and others v. the 
Netherlands (dec.), cit., § 119. 
357 See, for instance, Etxebarria Caballero v. Spain, cit.; Ataun Rojo v. Spain, no. 3344/13, 7 October 
2014; Pereira-Henriques v. Luxembourg, cit., § 62. 
358 In this sense see, Dinu v. Romania, cit.; Perrillat-Bottonet v. Switerland, no. 66773/13, 20 
November 2014, § 68; Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, no. 50196/99, 17 March 2005, § 155; Y. v. 
Slovenia, cit.,§ 98. For more on this topic, see infra … 
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eyewitnesses359, which presupposes taking every effort in order to identify them360; the 
hearing of the victim361; the questioning of the suspects362; the preserving and sealing-off 
of the scene in order to secure the integrity of the evidence likely to be important in solving 
the case363; the reconstruction of the events where necessary for the establishment of the 
facts364; a confrontation between the victim and the alleged perpetrators or among the 
witnesses, where their versions of the events are irreconcilable365; and forensic evidence, 
such as ballistic examinations of the bullets366, the collection of fingerprints of the 
weapons367, forensic examination of the premises368, medical examinations of the injuries 
																																																						
359 For examples of cases in which the Court has reproached the failure to question all the material 
witnesses, see Sakir v. Greece, cit.; Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 13 May 2014; Bouyid v. 
Belgium [GC], cit., § 128; Vasil Hristov v. Bulgaria, cit., § 41; Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, cit.; Otasevic 
v. Serbia, cit., § 33; M.C. v. Poland, no. 23692/09, 3 March 2015, § 107. In this connection, the lack 
of power to compel witnesses to testify is an important deficiency taken into consideration by the 
Court, see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, cit.; Hugh Jordan v. the United 
Kingdom, cit., § 127. 
360 See Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 170; Yusiv v. Lithuania, cit., § 73. 
361  For examples of cases in which the failure to hear the victim was held to be a significant 
shortcoming see, Alberti v. Italy, cit., § 65-66; Sakir v. Greece, cit.; Muhacir Cicek v. Turkey, cit.; 
Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 126; Matko v. Slovenia, cit., § 90; M. and others v. Italy and 
Bulgaria, cit., § 106.  
362 For the omission to question the suspects see, Secic v. Croatia, cit.; Scavuzzo-Hager v. 
Switzerland, cit., § 83; Matko v. Slovenia, cit., § 90. This investigative measure obviously 
presupposes on part of the authorities also taking every effort in order to identify the possible 
suspects, see Ataykaya v. Turkey, no. 50275/08, 22 July 2014, § 50; Vasil Hristov v. Bulgaria, cit., 
§ 41; L.E. v. Greece, cit., § 83; W. v. Slovenia, cit., § 67. However, in Mustafic-Mujic and others v. 
the Netherlands (dec.), cit., § 119, the Court noted that the failure to hear the suspects was 
immaterial in that case since the details of their involvement were already well known; it took into 
consideration also that it was unclear what additional information hearing them could have brought, 
since they were also entitled to the right to silence. 
363 See, Mustafa and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit.; by contrast, for cases in which the authorities 
had omitted to do so, see Guzelaydin v. Turkey, no. 26470/10, 20 September 2016, § 89; Jaloud v. 
the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 217-220 where in particular the bullet was not stored; Tagayeva and 
others v. Russia, cit., § 515-516, where the location of the bodies on the crime scene had not been 
reported and no samples were collected to find traces of explosives. 
364 For a similar omission see, Gramada v. Romania, no. 14974/09, 11 February 2014; Makbule 
Kaymaz and others v. Turkey, no. 651/10, 25 February 2014; Alberti v. Italy, cit. A contrario, where 
failure to reconstruct the events did not undermine the adequacy of the proceedings as the facts 
had already been fully established see, Camekan v. Turkey, cit..  
365 For such an omission see, Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, cit.; Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., § 128; 
Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 126. 
366 For a similar omission see, Gramada v. Romania, cit.. 
367 For a similar shortcoming see, Guzelaydin v. Turkey, cit.; Makbule Kaymaz and others v. Turkey, 
cit. 
368 For the omission of medical examinations see, Mikhail Nikolayev v. Russia, no. 40192/06, 6 
December 2016, cit.; Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 125; Matko v. Slovenia, cit., § 90; M. and 
others v. Italy and Bulgaria, cit., § 106. Moreover, the hearing of the doctor who drafted the medical 
report could also prove essential, see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., § 128; Etxebarria Caballero v. 
Spain, cit.; Ataun Rojo v. Spain, cit.  
	 76	
sustained and their causes369 or an autopsy370. In cases where there are discrepancies 
between the statements given by the witnesses, or the victim and the suspect, the domestic 
authorities are further expected to make an effort to clarify the facts and solve those 
contradictions371. 
Furthermore, with respect to cases of sexual violence where often direct evidence of the 
fact is missing, a stringent need to test the credibility of the victim with increased diligence 
and a context-sensitive approach arises, especially where he or she is particularly 
vulnerable, such as in cases of minors or disabled individuals. In the Court’s view, the 
necessary measures that should be resorted under such circumstances in order to allow a 
better assessment of the credibility of the victim’s statements, either during the 
investigations or at trial, are a psychological expertise, a confrontation, the questioning of 
persons close to the victim such as family or friends, the exploration on whether there might 
be any reasons to bring false accusations372.  
 
In order for the investigation to be adequate, however, gathering all the evidence available 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition: the Court, indeed, further expects from the 
authorities the taking of all necessary measures in order to secure also the quality of the 
evidence collected, in view of its being genuine to the highest possible degree. In this 
connection, the standards against which the investigators’ diligence is assessed vary 
according to the type of evidence at issue.  
In respect to eyewitness testimony, for instance, the Courts takes into consideration both 
the time and the manner in which the questioning took place. It is argued that taking the 
witness’ statements immediately after the events would be the best solution, as the passing 
of time entails a high risk that their memory of the events fades and that their statements 
thus become unreliable or contaminated373. At the same time, it is necessary for the 
interviews to be conducted in an appropriate manner, which reflects a serious attempt to 
establish the facts, and not in a merely perfunctory way as a pure formality. This means 
that the questioning of a witness, especially when a police agent, cannot be confined to 
the simple taking of written statements or to asking to provide his or her account of the 
																																																						
369 For a similar omission see, Sakir v. Greece, cit; Nadrosov v. Russia, no. 9297/02, 31 July 2007, 
§ 43. 
370 For a case in which an autopsy was not carried out see, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf 
of Valentin Campeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, 17 July 2014, § 146. 
371 See, Miclea v. Romania, cit., § 42. This duty is complemented, where solving the discrepancies 
is not possible, by the duty to explain those inconsistencies in their reasoning, see infra... 
372 In this sense see, G.U. v. Turkey, cit.; C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, cit., § 78; I.C. v. Romania, cit.; 
I.G. v. the Republic of Moldova, cit., § 43 a contrario, Y v. Slovenia, cit., § 98. For a case in which 
the domestic authorities’ efforts in assessing the victim’s credibility were held to be sufficient, see 
M.P. v. Bulgaria, cit., § 113. 
373 See, Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 173; Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc 
v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 197; Miclea v. Romania, cit., § 41. 
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events, without the investigators conducting any further inquiry on its veracity and no 
question whatsoever being put to him or her, or only questions of very superficial and 
standard nature lacking specificity374. On the other hand, however, the need to question the 
witness in an appropriate manner has not been interpreted in the sense of requiring 
necessarily a cross-examination and that the prosecutor hears oral evidence before 
deciding whether or not to prosecute375. 
Furthermore, in certain circumstances the Court expects from the authorities also the 
taking of positive steps in order to better ensure the quality and credibility of the oral 
evidence. Thereby, a crucial duty weighing on the authorities is that of taking appropriate 
measures to prevent or reduce risks of collusion or distortion of the truth among the 
witnesses or suspects, such as for example keeping them separate from one another 
before being questioned376.  
Secondly, the Court seems to suggest also the adoption of protection measures where 
necessary to obtain a genuine declaration from the witness or victim, owing to the fact that 
he or she is in a situation of vulnerability. This occurred, for instance, in relation to an 
irregular migrant witness, where the Court reproached the police for failing to ensure that 
he was heard in conditions that granted his credibility and the exactitude of the information 
provided377. The same happened with respect to detainees having allegedly suffered from 
ill-treatment: here also the Court blamed the investigators for failing to ensure the victims’ 
and witnesses’ safety as regards any fears of intimidation or retaliation, since they had not 
been heard in private, but in the presence of the prison administration authorities378. Finally, 
the adoption of protection measures highly concerns children and minor witnesses or 
victims. In G.U. v. Turkey, for instance, the main shortcoming affecting the proceedings 
was that no effort had been made to hear the victim, who was a minor, in conditions which 
were conducive to obtaining a more precise and reliable description of the events, such as 
for example by interviewing him not in a public hearing but behind closed doors and with 
the assistance of a psychologist. In this case, the Court has even gone further, suggesting 
that criminal procedures should take into due account the vulnerability of children that are 
																																																						
374 See, Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 126; Otasevic v. Serbia, cit., § 33; Matko v. Slovenia, cit., 
§ 90; Chmil v. Ukraine, no. 20806/10, 29 October 2015, § 89; Miclea v. Romania, cit., § 42. 
375 See, Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 263. 
376 See, Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 206-208; Ramsahai v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 
330; Makbule Kaymaz and others v. Turkey, cit., § 141; Muhacir Cicek and others v. Turkey, cit., § 
74; Suleyman Demir and Hasan Demir v. Turkey, cit., § 52. In this connection, the non-adoption of 
such measure would  in principle taint the adequacy of the investigations even where there is no 
evidece of actual collusion. 
377 See, Sakir v. Greece, cit., § 68. A similar conclusion was reached, mutatis mutandis, in Al-Skeini 
and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 170, where it was suggested that the authorities 
should have persuaded the Iraqui witnesses that they would not place themselves at risk by coming 
forward and giving information. 
378 See, Karabet and others v. Ukraine, cit., §§ 273-276; Karpylenko v. Ukraine, cit., § 128. 
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involved in them, as victims or witnesses, and that States should adopt rules of procedure 
that ensure and secure the collection of statements from children379. The protection of 
victims and witnesses during criminal proceedings seems therefore to have a double 
function: it comes into play not only as a measure to safeguard the integrity of their private 
life under Article 8380, but also, at the same time, as a necessary instrument to ensure the 
reliability of the evidence and, in that way, the effectiveness of criminal proceedings. 
To the contrary, in certain cases the witness’ protection measures may clash with the need 
to gather all the evidence available in the most complete manner: this occurs, for instance, 
in relation to decisions to grant anonymity to a witness. In this regard the Court has had 
the opportunity to make clear that the principles emerging from its case-law on anonymous 
witnesses under Article 6 may be relevant also to assess whether such a measure is 
compatible with the State’s duty to provide for an appropriate forum for securing the public 
accountability of those responsible for a human right offence381. Accordingly, it found that 
any handicaps under which the victims may have laboured as a result of such decision may 
be counterbalanced by the fact that the witness were nonetheless compelled to give 
evidence, though hidden from the public, in sight of the judge and their lawyers. 
 
Another type of evidence whose quality often falls under the extensive review of the Court 
is forensic and expert evidence. In relation to such evidence, it has been made clear, first 
of all, that «a forensic examiner must enjoy formal and de facto independence, have been 
provided with specialised training and have a mandate which is broad in scope»382. 
Therefore, aside from a lack of independence, both the involvement of an expert who is not 
properly qualified, and an excessively restricted scope of its mandate which fails to answer 
fundamental questions of the case may impinge upon the adequacy of the investigations383.  
Such quality and thoroughness requirements naturally covers all different kinds of forensic 
evidence, from autopsies to medical reports. With specific regards to medical 
examinations, for example, this implies that «when a doctor writes a report after a medical 
examination of a person who alleges having been ill-treated, it is extremely important that 
he states the degree of consistency with the allegations of ill-treatment. A conclusion 
																																																						
379 G.U. v. Turkey, cit., §§ 71-73. 
380 See, in this sense, Y. v. Slovenia, cit., § 101-116, where a violation of  the victim’s Article 8 rights 
was found on the ground that the way in which she was cross-examined at trial overstepped the 
fair balance required between the victim’s personal integrity and the defence’s right under Art. 6. 
381 See, Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, cit., §§ 155-158. 
382 Karabet and others v. Ukraine, cit., § 264. See also, A. MOWBRAY, Duties of investigation, cit. p. 
441. 
383 See, in this sense, Aydogdu v. Turkey, no. 40448/06, 30 August 2016, §§ 99-100; Petrovic v. 
Serbia, cit., §§ 85-86; Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 213; Tanli v. Turkey, no. 26129/95, 10 
April 2001, § 150; Scavuzzo-Hager and others v. Switzerland, cit., § 83. A contrario see, Mustafa 
Tunc and Fecire Tunc [GC], § 188; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., §§ 317-319. 
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indicating the degree of support for the allegations of ill-treatment should be based on a 
discussion of possible differential diagnoses»384. Moreover, where the medical 
examinations are performed while the person is in custody or detention, then additional 
care is required: these must be carried out by properly qualified doctors and outside the 
presence of the police385. 
With regards to autopsies, furthermore, it has been held that these should provide «a 
complete and accurate record of possible signs of ill-treatment and injury and an objective 
analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death386» and should possibly be also 
accompanied by photographs387. Finally, the adequacy of a forensic examination also 
means that the authorities should seek to solve any contradictions existing among several 
reports on the same issue388. In such cases, it has been held that «only a detailed and 
scientifically substantiated report containing reasons for the contradictions between the 
lower institutes’ opinions and answers to the questions put by the prosecuting authorities 
and the applicants would have been capable of inspiring public confidence in the 
administration of justice and assisting the judicial authorities in discharging their duties»389. 
 
i. Duty to resort to international cooperation 
The mentioned duty to take all the reasonable steps to secure the relevant evidence does 
not necessarily stop at a State’s border. To the contrary, the Court has made crystal clear 
that such obligation extends to any evidence, «whether or not it is located in the territory 
of the investigating State»390. Yet, according to a rule of customary international law, the 
execution of investigative acts by a foreign authority in the territory of a foreign State would 
be an infringement of its sovereignty391. Therefore States have to agree to afford each other 
assistance in cross-border evidence gathering, and this can be done either through letters 
of rogatory, whose execution is dependent on the requested State’s will, or by subscribing 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties that provide for the duty to afford the requested 
assistance392.  
																																																						
384 Karabet and others v. Ukraine, cit., § 267; Davitidze v. Russia, no. 8810/05, 30 May 2013, § 115. 
See also, Chmil v. Ukraine, cit., § 90. 
385 See, Daslik v. Turkey, no. 38305/07, 13 June 2017, § 63. 
386 Tanli v. Turkey, cit., § 149. 
387 See, Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., §§ 212-216; Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc [GC], cit., 
§ 188; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., §§ 317-319; Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 86. 
388 See, Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 96. 
389 Ionita v. Romania, cit., § 82; Baldovin v. Romania, no. 11385/05, 7 June 2011, § 23. 
390 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit., § 240. 
391 See, in this sense, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 399. 
392 On this topic see, J. VERVAELE, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters to Control 
(Transantional) Criminality, in ID., European Criminal Justice in the Post-Lisbon Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Trento, 2014, p. 140. 
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Since normally there is no legal obligation to subscribe to such treaties or to execute the 
cooperation requests, it is of pivotal importance that the case-law on the procedural 
obligations to effectively investigate and punish human right offences has to the contrary 
elaborated a duty enjoyining States to cooperate with each other in the gathering of 
evidence abroad in a transnational context393. The rationale put forward in support of this 
additional obligation to offer and engage in international cooperation is that «otherwise 
those indulging in cross-border attacks will be able to operate with impunity and the 
authorities of Contracting State where the unlawful attacks have taken place will be foiled 
in their own efforts to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens394». In particular, the 
Court has found that:  
 
«States are also subject to a duty in cross-border cases to cooperate effectively 
with the relevant authorities of other States concerned in the investigation of 
events which occurred outside their territories»395; 
 
and, at the same time, that:  
 
«the corollary of the obligation to secure the evidence located in other 
jurisdictions is a duty on the State where the evidence is located to render any 
assistance within its competence and means sought under a legal assistance 
request»396.  
 
Yet, clearly, the nature and scope of the cooperation required and what measures are to 
be adopted to this end will depend on the particular circumstances of each case397. The 
Court will not therefore indicate which measures should be taken to comply with their 
obligations most effectively, nor will it review whether the States have complied with their 
international obligations under mutual assistance treaties. It will only examine whether the 
																																																						
393 See, Guzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey, no. 36925/07, 4 April 2017, § 284-287. 
According to J. VERVAELE, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters., cit., p. 140, Mutual Legal 
Assistance obligations can be derived from positive duties under international human rights law, 
«certainly when it comes to the duty to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and punish core 
international crimes». See also, J. VERVAELE, Extraordinary rendition e sparizione forzata 
trasnazionale, cit., p. 157-159. A similar duty has been developed also in the case-law of the 
IACtHR, see judgment La Cantuta v. Peru, 29 November 2006, § 160. 
394 O’Loughlin and others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23274/04, 25 August 2005, § 2, where 
the applicants complained that the United Kingdom had failed to secure evidence and arrest the 
suspects who were present in its territory in relation to a bombing occurred in Ireland.  
395 Ranstev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit.,, § 288; M. and others v. Italy and Bulgaria, cit., § 167. 
396 Id., § 244. 
397 See, Guzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey, cit., § 287; O’Loughlin and others v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.), cit., § 2. 
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authorities have done all that could be reasonably expected of them and, when faced with 
a partial or total failure to act, it will determine to what extent a minimum effort was possible 
and should have been made398. 
In other words, under the procedural obligations to investigate, States have a twofold duty, 
on one side, to invest efforts in seeking cooperation from other States in order to obtain 
evidence or the surrender of suspects located abroad and, on the other, to provide any 
assistance requested by another State, where possible. It does not appear however that 
these duties have yet been further interpreted in the sense that States are bound to 
subscribe Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and therefore could be held liable for failing to 
having done so. To the contrary, the Court has expressly maintained that where the 
international treaty in force excludes the possibility to extradite a person to the requesting 
State, the investigating State cannot be held liable for the standstill caused in the criminal 
proceedings at issue399.  
The duty to resort to and to provide legal assistance and cooperation thus appears to be 
limited to the legal framework currently in force: where a Mutual Legal Assistance or 
Extradition Treaty exists, then the authorities’ failure to submit such a request would 
encroach the adequacy of the whole investigation400; to the contrary, in the absence of any 
such treaty, a State is not necessarily required to make legal assistance requests devoid of 
any reasonable prospects of success401. Correspondingly, the requesting State is also 
bound to provide the legal assistance required when that is feasible402. 
Lastly, it should be mentioned also that the duty to resort to international legal assistance 
is informed also by the requirement of promptness: not only will the Court verify whether 
																																																						
398 See, Guzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey, cit., § 289. 
399 See, Palic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cit., § 65. 
400 See, Ranstev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit., § 288; and Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, no. 44883/09, 23 
February 2016, § 270 for failure to submit a request for extradition, albeit the existence of an 
extradition treaty. For a case in which the authorities have resorted to international cooperation see, 
Ghedir and others v. France, no. 20579/12, 16 July 2015, § 133; M. and others v. Italy and Bulgaria, 
cit., § 169. 
401 See, J. and others v. Austria, cit., § 117, where owing to the absence of any mutual assistance 
treaty with Saudi Arabia and the fact that in the past legal assistance requests had often been 
refused by it, the Court took the view that a request for legal assistance, although available in theory, 
was not required in the present case as it did not have any reasonable prospects of success. See 
also, V. STOYANOVA, J. and others v. Austria and the strenghtening of States’ obligation, cit. See 
also, Zoltai v. Hungary and Ireland, cit., in relation to legal obstacles to the surrender of a suspect 
within EU member States. However, there are other cases in which the Court blamed the 
investigators for not having attempted to cooperate with foreign authorities, without lingering on 
whether such request would have or not any prospects of success, see L.E. v. Greece, cit., § 85; 
Bakanova v. Lithuania, cit., § 74. 
402 See, Guzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey, cit., § 292, in which, although both Cyprus 
and Turkey are parties to the European Convention on Extradition of 1957, the extradition requests 
made by the Cypriot Government were ignored by the Turkish authorities, who simply remained 
silent on the matter. 
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the authorities have made use of the measures available, but it will also assess their 
diligence and whether they have done it timely or with undue delays403. 
 
 
C. The assessment of the evidence and the risks of “fourth instance” 
 
The demand of thoroughness touches not only upon the scope of the proceedings and the 
collection of all the relevant evidence, but has a bearing also on the assessment and 
evaluation made by the domestic authorities of the elements collected, and on the 
motivation supporting it. Indeed, it has been constantly repeated that:  
 
«the investigation’s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective and 
impartial analysis of all relevant elements404.»  
 
In particular, the investigating authorities should avoid any selective or inconsistent 
approach in the assessment of the evidence, whereby different standards of evaluation are 
applied to, for instance, testimonies of the victim and the testimonies of the police, which 
are addressed in a more deferential manner405. 
In order to verify compliance with such demand, it is inevitable that the Court engages in a 
review of the decision-making process undertaken at national level, overseeing the factual 
and legal analysis carried out by domestic courts. However, the Court is mindful of its 
limited role in this field, which must be kept distinct from that of an appellate court: it is not, 
indeed, a supranational court of fourth instance. Curiously enough, this so-called “fourth 
instance doctrine” elaborated in relation to the scrutiny over the fairness of criminal 
proceedings under Article 6406, is apparently followed also when addressing the decision-
making process of national authorities under the procedural obligation to effectively 
investigate and punish. Also in this context, indeed, the Court frequently maintains that «it 
is not the task of this Court to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by 
domestic courts, unless and in so far as such errors may have infringed rights and freedoms 
																																																						
403 For cases in which the promptess of the request of legal assistance was at issue see, Bakanova 
v. Lithuania, cit., § 74; W. v. Slovenia, cit., § 67. 
404 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 234; Salin and Karsin v. Turkey, cit., § 80. 
405 See, Nadrosov v. Russia, cit., § 44 where the Court criticizes the prosecutor’s «selective and 
somewhat inconsistent approach to the assessment of the evidence» and «his deferential attitude 
to the police officers» involved. See also, Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 96; Timus and Taurus v. the 
Republic of Moldova, cit., § 55; Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 123; Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., 
§ 130; Yusiv v. Lithuania, cit., § 73. See also, A. SEIBERT-FOHR, Prosecuting serious human rights 
offences, cit., p. 136. 
406 For more on the fourth instance doctrine see, R. GOSS, Criminal fair trial rights, cit., p. 42-58; 
HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 17-
18. 
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protected by the Convention407», and that «aware of its subsidiary role, the Court is mindful 
of it being prevented from substituting its own assessment of the facts for that of the 
national authorities408». In this sense, «when it comes to establishing the facts, and sensitive 
to the subsidiary nature of its role, (the Court) must be cautious in taking on the role of a 
first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances 
of a particular case409».  
Put another way, the Court should be prevented from conducting and “appellate-style 
review”, that is a review of factual or legal analysis or conclusions of domestic decisions410. 
However, at the same time, it must be able oversee the effectiveness requirements of a 
criminal proceedings, in particular the one discussed here on whether the national 
authorities have thoroughly and carefully assessed all the relevant evidence. In the Court’s 
own words, notwithstanding the limits of its role, «the Court has to apply a particularly 
thorough scrutiny where allegations have been made under Article 3 […]. In other words, 
in such a context the Court is prepared to conduct a thorough examination of the findings 
of the national courts. In examining them it may take account of the quality of the domestic 
proceedings and any possible flaws in the decision-making process411». 
This ostensible tension inherent in the Court’s role is resolved, in the context of the duty to 
investigate, in favour of the exceptions to the fourth instance doctrine even to a greater 
extent than what occurs under Article 6412: the engagement by the Court in an appellate-
style review of the national decision, in fact, appears to have become the rule. Indeed, 
though maintaining that it is prevented from substituting itself to the domestic authorities 
in the assessment of the evidence and in drawing conclusions on the basis of such 
assessment, the Court does in fact do so413. It could be argued that, as purported in many 
																																																						
407 See, Gedrimas v. Lithuania, cit., § 63. 
408 See, Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 75. 
409 Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 182. 
410 For such a definition reference is made to R. GOSS, Criminal fair trial rights, cit., p. 47, who also 
refers to how the Court itself understands such concept. See in particular, Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 
2) [GC], no. 22251/08, 15 February 2015, §§ 61-63, where it is stated that the Court should not 
review the findings of national courts unless there are arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, which 
occurs, for instance, when they have made «an error that no reasonable court could ever had made» 
or took a decision that «has no legal basis in domestic law and no connection with the established 
facts». 
411 See, Gedrimas v. Lithuania, cit., § 63. 
412 For a criticism of the forth instance doctrine under Article 6, see R. GOSS, Criminal fair trial rights, 
cit., p. 47-58, who argues that the exceptions to it have ostensibly become the rule. 
413 See, among many, Kaverzin v. Ukraine, cit., § 111: «although it is in the first place for the national 
authorities, in this case for the prosecutor, to assess the relevant evidence and to draw conclusions 
on the basis of such assessment, the Court cannot disregard the fact that the prosecutor’s findings 
lack important details and relevant substantiation». See also, Gedrimas v. Lithuania, cit., § 68: 
«while the Court is mindful of its limited role in assessing the findings of fact by domestic authorities 
[…], it considers that in the specific circumstances of the present case there are serious reasons to 
question some of those findings». See also, Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 75: «Aware of its subsidiary 
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judgements, such an appellate-style review is undertaken only when the there are elements 
demonstrating that the authorities’ conclusions are arbitrary or have manifestly ignored 
some relevant facts414. As stated by the Court, indeed: 
 
«Though the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and remains 
free to make its own appreciation in the light of all the material before it, in normal 
circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings 
of fact reached by the domestic courts415». 
 
But, in fact, in order to verify whether that has occurred, a preliminary review on the 
decision-making process is implicitly required in every case. 
In substance, the Court does always engage in overseeing the national authorities decision-
making process, but it will substitute its own assessment of the facts and correspondingly 
find a breach of the thoroughness requirement only in those cases where the domestic 
conclusions are arbitrary, in the sense that they are irreconcilable with the evidence 
available and the facts established in the proceedings416. 
 
D. The duty to provide reasons for decisions concluding the proceedings 
Another aspect strictly linked to the one just mentioned is the reasoning of the domestic 
decisions concluding the criminal proceedings. Indeed, the requirement of thoroughness, 
																																																						
role, the Court is mindful of it being prevented from substituting its own assessment of the facts for 
that of the national authorities. Nevertheless, it cannot but note that the prosecuting authorities’ 
insistence on identifying an exclusive racist motive, their reluctance to link Mr E.D.’s posts to the 
incident despite remarkable concordances and, lastly, their failure to identify the racist motive in 
the face of powerful hate crime indicators such as the posts resulted from a manifestly 
unreasonable assessment of the circumstances of the case». 
414 See, Seidova v. Bulgaria, cit., § 57: «en l’absence d’éléments indiquant que les conclusions des 
autorités internes étaient arbitraires ou ont manifestement ignorés des faits pertinents, […] la Cour 
ne saurait substituer son appréciation à celle des autorités internes». See also, Baliuciai v. Lithuania 
(dec.), no. 29056/15, 20 October 2015, § 46. 
415 Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc [GC], § 182; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 180. 
416 See, Mikhail Nikolayev v. Russia, cit., §100, in which the national conclusions were at odds with 
the results of a forensic medical report; Pomylyayko v. Russia, cit., § 56, where the domestic 
findings where not supported by any evidence, all of it pointing in the different sense; Gedrimas v. 
Lithuania, cit., §§ 68-74 where the findings of the authorities were not corresponding to the 
evidence collected; Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 75; Chinez v. Romania, cit., §§ 49-50, where the 
findings where not corroborated by any evidence; Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 347, 
where the national conclusions sat ill with the facts established during the proceedings; Denis 
Vasilyev v. Russia, cit., § 128, where also the findings were irreconcilable with the facts as 
established in the proceedings. For the opposite outcome see, Mustafic-Mujic and others v. the 
Netherlands (dec.), cit., §§ 124-130. 
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in this last sense discussed above, also supposes that the authorities give reasons for their 
decisions: it is only through the motivation that it is possible to verify whether or not the 
assessment of the evidence collected has been carried out diligently and thoroughly and 
whether the authorities have subjected the facts to the careful scrutiny required by the 
procedural obligations417. A reasoned decision, besides, is essential also to ensure public 
scrutiny over the administration of justice and to enable the victim to use any legal 
challenge available against it418. 
Although never expressly acknowledged by the Court, a true duty for criminal enforcement 
authorities to adequately motivate their decisions has thus been implicitly derived from the 
thoroughness requirement, which, although from a different perspective, overlaps to a 
certain extent with the accused’s right to a reasoned judgement under Article 6419.  
More precisely, under the procedural obligation to investigate, a proper reasoning is 
mandated for all decisions concluding the criminal proceedings: firstly, for decisions not to 
prosecute or to close the investigations taken by public prosecutors or other competent 
authorities420, as well as for the eventual subsequent judicial rulings upholding them in the 
event a judicial review is provided for in the national legal system421, and also, where the 
investigations actually led to a trial, for the courts’ final judgements and second-instance 
judgments422. In this connection, it is worth noting that the flaws of an initial decision not to 
prosecute or to acquit the defendants could in principle be remedied by the higher instance 
ruling, but only to the extent that the latter specifically addresses the previous deficiencies 
and answers the relevant arguments submitted by the appealing parties423. In the opposite 
case, the shortcomings in the first decision’s motivation will not be redressed. 
As to the substance of the duty to give reasons, the Court has specified that the authorities 
must: 
 
																																																						
417 On the duty to motivate decisions see also, E. BREMS, Procedural protection, cit., p. 152; J. C. 
OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings, cit., p. 125. 
418 See, Kelly and others v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 117. See also, infra … 
419 On the accused right to a reasoned judgement under Article 6 see, S. TRECHSEL, Human Rights 
in Criminal Proceedings, cit., p. 102-110; HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 430; P. ROBERTS, Does Art. 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights Require Reasoned Verdicts in Criminal Trials?, in Human Rights Law Review, 2011, 
2, p. 213. 
420 See, among many, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., § 130; Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., 
§ 345; Kelly and others v. the United Kingodom, cit., § 117; Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 96; Gedrimas 
v. Lithuania, cit., § 68-74; Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 123; Smaltini v. Italy (dec.), cit., § 56. 
421 See, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., § 130; Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 96; Chinez v. Romania, cit., § 
50; Dalakov v. Russia, no. 35152/09, 16 February 2016, § 73; M.C. v. Poland, cit., § 108. 
422 See, Gramada v. Romania, cit., § 74. 
423 See, Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, cit., § 128; Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 128; Chinez v. 
Romania, cit., § 50; Petrovic v. Serbia, cit.,  § 96. 
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«deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting 
suspicious facts»424 
 
and that:  
 
«where controversial incidents are concerned, and especially those which 
potentially engage the responsibility of the State, a reasoned decision setting 
out in writing the evidence, as well as the finding once the investigation has been 
completed, should be provided […]. Otherwise, a lack of transparency might not 
ensure public confidence in the State’s adherence to the rule of law and prevent 
any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.»425 
 
Whilst providing very little guidance on how the adequacy of the reasons is determined and 
on what is the general standard of review to apply in evaluating the reasons provided, the 
Court nonetheless ostensibly engages in extensive review of the quality of national 
decisions’ motivations. From what it will be discussed below, it appears that what is 
mandated is that the domestic authorities set out in a sufficiently clear and comprehensive 
manner the factual and legal grounds on which they base their findings, with reference to 
all the evidence collected, so as to allow not only the victims, but also the general public 
to understand how the facts and the evidence were assessed426. Indeed, the obligation to 
motivate is not complied with not only where the domestic authorities fail to provide any 
reasons whatsoever for their decisions427, but also where the motivation given proves to be 
insufficient in light of the circumstances of the case428.  
From a review of the case-law, it emerges that a motivation is generally regarded as 
insufficient, in particular, where it disregards completely certain important pieces of 
																																																						
424 Balazs v. Hungary, cit., § 52. 
425 Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 92. See also Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 345 where the 
Court blamed the public prosecutor for failing to «indicate what evidence had been used with a 
view to establishing the facts». 
426 For an example of duly motivated decision see, Smaltini v. Italy (dec.), cit., §§ 56-59 and the 
comments of D. VOZZA, Obblighi di tutela penale del diritto alla vita, cit. 
427 See, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., § 130; and, Alpar v. Turkey, cit., § 49 where the authorities 
decided not to prosecute on account of the insufficiency of the evidence, yet failing to explain why 
the evidence collected was insufficient. 
428 Also for the right to a reasoned judgement under Article 6 «the question whether a court has 
failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons can only be determined in the light of the particular 
circumstances of the case», see Salov v. Ukraine, no. 65518/01, 6 September 2005, § 89. According 
to, R. GOSS, Criminal fair trial rights, cit., p. 48, however, «determining a case on the facts of a 
particular case should not disguise the need for the Court to identify a general standard against 
which it measures the adequacy of reasons». 
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evidence that had been collected429, where it does not address and explain the 
contradictions existing between the evidence430, or where it fails to elucidate on why a 
person’s account of the events is to be considered credible, whereas the opposite one is 
not431. This last issue is highly critical especially where the decision relies strongly on the 
police officers’ account of the events without any perceivable justification, to the detriment 
of the victim’s version: it has already been mentioned above, indeed, that a strict scrutiny 
of the credibility of the agents’ involved is an element to take into consideration also when 
assessing the practical independence of the investigators432. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that a reasoning is expected from the criminal law 
enforcement authorities also when dismissing particular evidence requests submitted by 
the victims in the course of the proceedings, as it will be examined more in depth 
hereinafter433. 
 
 
6. Public scrutiny and the right to truth 
 
In order for an investigation into human rights offences to be credible and effective, the 
Court has also held that: 
 
«there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its 
results434».  
 
A form of publicity and transparency of the proceedings or their outcome, indeed, serves 
towards the purpose of ensuring accountability of the authorities and their actions in the 
																																																						
429 See, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., § 130; Salin and Karsin v. Turkey, cit., § 80; M.C. v. Poland, 
cit., § 107; Chinez v. Romania, cit., §§ 49-50; Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 96. 
430 See, M.C. v. Poland, cit., § 107; Mikahil Nikolayev v. Russia, cit., § 100; Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., 
§ 96; Gedrimas v. Lithuania, cit., § 74; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Campeanu 
v. Romania, cit., § 146; Aydan v. Turkey, cit., § 115. See, for an opposite positive outcome, Y. v. 
Slovenia, cit., § 98. It should be reminded that national authorities are under the duty to seek solving 
any contradiction in the evidence collected, see supra… 
431 See, G.U. v. Turkey, cit., § 71; Miclea v. Romania, cit., § 42; Mikahil Nikolayev v. Russia, cit., § 
100. 
432 See supra. See also, Petrovic v. Serbia, cit., § 96 where the domestic court appeared to accept 
the police agents’ version of the events to such an extent that it was prepared to omit to take into 
account any relevant evidence which did not corroborate it. See also, Timus and Taurus v. the 
Republic of Moldova, cit., § 55; Nalbandyan v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 123; Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cit., 
§ 130; Yusiv v. Lithuania, cit., § 73. 
433 See, infra. 
434 See, Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, 13 June 2002, § 140; Hugh Jordan v. the United 
Kingdom, cit., § 109; Mustafa and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 179; Paul and Audrey Edwards 
v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 73. 
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conduct of the investigations in practice and in theory and, thereby, to maintain public 
confidence in the authorities’ adherence to the rule of law and to prevent any appearance 
of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts435. The role played by the requirement of public 
scrutiny, therefore, mirrors, although from the perspective of the victim, that of the principle 
of publicity of criminal proceedings within the meaning of the right to a fair trial under Article 
6, which protects the defendant against the administration of justice in secret436. 
However, it has been accepted that «the degree of public scrutiny required may well vary 
from case to case437»: the widest public exposure is thus called for where great public 
interest is attached to the events at stake owing to the gravity and importance of the issues 
involved. In this sense, a particular intense public scrutiny of the investigations was 
required, for instance, in a case concerning the death of a vulnerable individual in prison438 
and in another concerning an episode of extraordinary renditions, where it has been found 
that the public has a «legitimate interest» in being informed of the investigations and their 
results439. 
Prior to discussing what is exactly meant by public scrutiny of the proceedings, it is worth 
noting that such element is strictly interlaced to the additional requirement of involvement 
of the victims in the investigations, which will be analysed hereinafter440. It often occurs, 
indeed, that compliance with these two criteria is assessed simultaneously, in the sense 
that an adequate involvement of the victims in the proceedings is regarded as sufficient 
also to ensure the requisite public scrutiny, no other additional measure being necessary 
to that end. It is only very rarely, in fact, that the element of public scrutiny is considered 
by the Court separately by itself and therefore it becomes more difficult to define what 
specific obligations are imposed under such head. 
 
From an analysis of the case-law, public scrutiny in a strict sense essentially means 
disclosure and access to the victims and/or the general public of information concerning 
the progress of the investigations and their results441. In this connection, it is important to 
stress that the element of public scrutiny of the investigations has recently been linked to 
																																																						
435 Id. 
436 On this issue see, S. MIRANDOLA, Un’altra camera di consiglio destinata a schiudersi?, in 
Cassazione Penale, 2013, no. 10, p. 3580. 
437 Id. 
438 See, Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 83. 
439 See, Al Nashiri v. Poland, cit., § 497. 
440 See infra. 
441 See, Al Nashiri v. Poland, cit., § 497, where the Court held that the general public has «a 
legitimate interest in being informed of the investigations and its results». See also Association “21 
December 1989” and others v. Romania, cit., § 141 where the Court held that the public interest in 
there existing a public scrutiny of the investigations was not protected on the ground that essential 
information for the investigation, previously classified as “secret”, was made accessible only twenty 
years after the events. 
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the internationally emerging right to truth442. In particular, the Court, first only with a timid 
allusion443 and then more openly, has suggested that where allegations of serious human 
rights violations are involved in the investigations «the right to truth regarding the relevant 
circumstances of the case» has a place in the context of the procedural obligations to 
investigate, in which it is broadly implicit, and belongs «not solely to the victim of the crime 
and his or her family but also to other victims of similar violations and the general public, 
who have the right to know what has happened»444. It is apparent, indeed, that an 
inadequate investigation may have a negative impact on the right of victims and of the 
general public of being informed of what happened through the ascertainment and 
establishment of true facts, which seems to be ultimately the main purpose and raison 
d’être of the procedural obligations to investigate445. 
Nonetheless, it is accepted that the requisite access of the public or the victims may be 
provided for in other stages of the proceedings, and not necessarily during the strict 
investigation phase446. Accordingly, publication or disclosure of police reports and 
investigative materials cannot be regarded as an automatic requirement on the ground that 
it may involve sensitive issues with possible prejudicial effects on private individuals or 
																																																						
442 The right to truth is codified as a private and societal right in Art. 24 (2) of the International 
Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance and in Resolution 68/165 
of the UN General Assembly of 18 December 2013; it has also been widely acknowledged in the 
jurisprudence of many human rights bodies, included the Inter American Court of Human Rights 
(judgement Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 29 July 1988). On the origins and evolution of the 
right to truth in international law see, O. CHERNISHOVA, Right to truth in the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 152; NAQVI, The Right to Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, 
in International Review of the Red Cross, 2006, 88, p. 245; J.E. MÉNDEZ, F.J. BARIFFI, Right to Truth 
in International Law, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 2011. 
443 Reference is made to the judgment El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 
cit., § 191, in which the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the right to truth as a victim-based 
procedural aspect of a core right. The right to truth is implied in the right to an effective 
investigations according to O. CHERNISHOVA, Right to truth in the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, cit., p. 157; C. MELONI, Extraordinary renditions della CIA e responsabilità europee, 
cit., p.; F. FABBRINI, The European Court of Human Rights, Extraordinary Renditions and the Right 
to Truth: Ensuring Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations Committed in the Fight Against 
Terrorism, in Human Rights Law Review, 2014, 14, p. 85-106; T. SCOVAZZI, Segreto di Stato e diritti 
umani: il sipario nero sul caso Abu Omar, in Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2016, 1, p. 166; 
see also the joint concurring opinion of Judges Tulkens, Spielmann, Sicilianos and Keller to the 
judgement El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], cit. 
444 Al Nashiri v. Poland, cit., § 495. The double dimension of the right to truth, a private and a societal 
one, has thus been confirmed by the Court, despite the initial cautiousness mirrored also in a joint 
concurring opinion of Judges Casadevall and Lòpez Guerra to the judgement El-Masri v. the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], cit., § 191, in which it was held that the right to truth could 
have as sole beneficiary the victim of the crime and not the public at large. In this sense also, O. 
CHERNISHOVA, Right to truth in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 160. 
445 See supra. According to M. TARUFFO, Verità e giustizia di transizione, in Criminalia, 2015, p. 21, 
the establishment of true facts is, more in general, the prerequisite for an effective legal system. 
446 Mustafa and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 179; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 304. 
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other investigations447. This brings about the issue of the existence of possible limits to the 
disclosure and publication of information concerning criminal investigations. Whilst many 
of these will be discussed hereinafter in relation to the requisite involvement of victims 
owing to the fact that they are more strictly related to the rights of victims in criminal 
proceedings, one interest highly relevant in this connection and possibly limiting the 
authorities’ duty to disclose information regarding investigations into human rights offences 
is national security. In this regard, the Court has held that national security concerns «do 
not give the investigating authorities complete discretion in refusing disclosure of material 
to the victim or public»; to the contrary, «even if there is a strong public interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of sources of information or material, in particular in cases involving 
the fight against terrorism, it is essential that as much information as possible about 
allegations and evidence should be disclosed to the parties in the proceedings without 
compromising national security. Where full disclosure is not possible, the difficulties that 
this causes should be counterbalanced in such a way that a party can effectively defend 
its interests»448. In other words, it falls to the authorities to find a solution which, without 
unacceptably compromising national security, secures a sufficient degree of public scrutiny 
over the investigations.  
Coming back to the implications of public scrutiny and its limits, it has been found moreover 
that the obligation to ensure public scrutiny of the proceedings does not go as far to require 
the holding of public hearings449, nor that all proceedings following an inquiry be public450. 
Such possibility left open for the holding of private hearings in the context of the procedural 
obligation to investigate mirrors the existence of similar exceptions also to the respective 
accused’s right to a public hearing and to the principle of publicity of criminal proceedings 
under Article 6451. Furthermore, it is not expected that all decisions be made public either, 
at least as long as the victims have been provided with a reasoned decision and allowed 
full access to the case file: under such circumstances, indeed, the victims could make the 
decision public themselves and the risk of improper cover up or concealment of evidence 
by the authorities involved is hence obviated452. What thus seems to be necessary for a 
sufficient degree of public scrutiny to be secured in the case of non-prosecution is surely 
																																																						
447 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 236. See infra. 
448 Al Nashiri v. Poland, cit., § 494. 
449 See, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 320, where the Court concluded that proceedings 
may therefore be discontinued at the preliminary investigations stage. 
450 See, Ramsahai v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 353, in respect to the proceedings before the 
Court of Appeal. 
451 See, Jussila v. Finland [GC], cit., § 41-43; Belashev v. Russia, no. 28617/03, 4 December 2008, 
§ 83. On the right to a public hearing under Article 6 see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. ?; S. MIRANDOLA, Un’altra camera di consiglio 
destinata a schiudersi?, cit., p. 3580. 
452 See, Ramsahai v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 353, in respect to a Court of Appeal’s decision. 
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a reasoned decision, in order to reassure public that the rule of law has been respected453. 
Once again, such limitation equates the scope of the respective accused right to the public 
pronouncement of the judgement under Article 6, which is ensured even in the absence of 
an oral reading out of the judgment in open court where sufficient publicity is achieved by 
other means454.  
 
 
7. The involvement of the victim in the criminal proceedings 
 
The requirement of public scrutiny, as mentioned earlier, is strictly connected to the one of 
involvement of the victim or its next-of-kin in the criminal proceedings. Both elements, 
indeed, serve towards the common aim of ensuring public accountability of the authorities 
and public scrutiny of their actions in the conduct of the investigations455. Admittedly, the 
Court has held that, although the degree of public scrutiny may vary from case to case,  
 
«in all cases the next of kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to 
the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests456.» 
 
Accordingly, whereas information to the general public on the progress and results of the 
investigations is not always called for, the involvement of the victim in the criminal 
proceedings must be ensured in all cases457, as a general requirement under the procedural 
aspect of the State’s obligation the protect the right to life and the other rights mentioned 
earlier458. In this sense, the victim is seen as the subject through which the general interest 
																																																						
453 See, Kelly and others v. the United Kingdom, cit., §§ 117-118, in relation to a killing resulting 
from the use of lethal force by State agents. 
454 See, Pretto and others v. Italy, no. 7984/77, 8 December 1983, § 27-28. On the right to a public 
hearing under Article 6 see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, cit., p. ?. 
455 Perevedentsevy v. Russia, cit., § 118. According to J. FIALA-BUTORA, Disabling Torture: the 
obligation to investigate, cit., p. 267, the publicity requirement is aimed at providing a balance 
between victims’ and suspects’ opportunity to influence the investigations. 
456 Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, cit., no. 24746/94, § 109, 4 May 2001, and McKerr v. the 
United Kingdom, cit., §115. 
457 It must be borne in mind, however, that the scope of the victims’ involvement rights is however 
limited by the notion of “criminal proceedings” within the meaning of Article 6, which refers strictly 
to proceedings for the determination of a criminal charge and does not cover, for instance, ancillary 
proceedings such as those for the execution of a European Arrest Warrant, in respect of which 
victims cannot claim any participatory right. See in this sense, Zoltai v. Hungary and Ireland, cit., § 
32. For the non-applicability in general of Art. 6 under its criminal limb to such proceedings see, 
Monedero Angora v. Spain (dec.), 7 October 2008. 
458 In this sense, see also J. C. OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings, cit., 
p. 124, who stresses the importance of the acknowledgement that victims have legitimate interests 
in the criminal proceedings for human rights violations. 
	 92	
in having a form of public scrutiny on the proceedings is ensured. Its participation to the 
proceedings, therefore, has a twofold function: it serves not only the victim’s private and 
legitimate interests, which are based «on their close and personal concern with the subject 
matter of the inquiry»459, but also at the same time the interest of society at large in the 
publicity of criminal proceedings. 
 
It is should be assessed, however, how the Court has interpreted this principle of necessary 
involvement of the victims in criminal proceedings and what are the legitimate interests of 
victims that must be ensured, in order to understand exactly which specific rights are 
implicitly guaranteed to victims along the investigations and trial. This is particularly 
interesting if one considers that victims of crime do not benefit from the guarantees of the 
right to a fair criminal trial under Article 6, unless and in so far as they have joined the 
proceedings as civil party, which results in Article 6 becoming applicable to their claim 
under its civil limb460; therefore, the acknowledgement to victims of crime of some rights 
that, as it will be discussed below, are very similar to the fair trial rights of Article 6 
irrespective of the bringing of a civil claim represents a great step forward in strengthening 
the role of victims in criminal proceedings, although only in the very specific and limited 
field of serious human rights offences461. 
 
Before exploring the specific rights that the Court has implicitly ensured to victims, some 
general features of the requisite victim’s involvement in the procedure should be 
addressed. First of all, it should be stressed that their involvement in criminal proceedings 
should be automatic: just as the authorities are required to start an investigation on their 
own motion, likewise they must also involve the victims in the proceedings automatically, 
and not subject their participation to the lodging of a formal criminal complaint and to an 
application on their part to join the proceedings as a civil party462.  
																																																						
459 Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 46 and 75. 
460 See, M. CHIAVARIO, Il “diritto al processo” delle vittime dei reati e la Corte europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo, in Rivista di diritto processuale, 2001, n. 4, p. 938; S. ALLEGREZZA, La riscoperta della 
vittima nella giustizia penale europea, in S. ALLEGREZZA, H. BELLUTA, M. GIALUZ, L. LUPARIA (eds.), Lo 
scudo e la spada. Esigenze di protezione e poteri delle vittime nel processo penale tra Europa e 
Italia, Giappichelli, 2012, p. 20; M. SIMONATO, Deposizione della vittima e giustizia penale. Una lettura 
del sistema italiano alla luce del quadro europeo, cit., p. 49. 
461 In this sense also, M. GIALUZ, La protezione della vittima tra Corte EDU e Corte di Giustizia, cit., 
p. 29. According to M. SIMONATO, Deposizione della vittima e giustizia penale. Una lettura del 
sistema italiano alla luce del quadro europeo, cit., p. 45, the Court protects the interests of the 
victims only indirectly, through the lens of the duties to criminalize and effectively investigate serious 
human rights offences. 
462 See, Slimani v. France, cit., § 47-48, where the Court concluded that the victim should have been 
allowed to take part in the inquest without having to lodge a criminal complaint beforehand; it also 
observed that French legislation had been recently amended on that point accordingly. See also J. 
FIALA-BUTORA, Disabling Torture: the obligation to investigate, cit., p. 267. 
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Secondly, the involvement of the victims must in any case be prompt, and preferably 
ensured immediately after the opening of the investigations463. In Anusca v. Moldova464, the 
Court has stated that there should not be any significant delays before the victim’s family 
is involved in the proceedings, and that they should be involved regardless of whether it 
has already been concluded that a crime has been committed or not.  
However, it appears that the authorities do not have a duty to search on their own initiative 
for relatives of the victim with a view to informing them of the institution of investigations 
or their procedural rights in this respect. This principle was established in Gray v. 
Germany465, a case where the victim was a foreigner and the events at issue occurred 
abroad. It is unclear whether the same conclusion could be reached in other situations 
where for examples the victims are residing in the respondent State and complying with 
such an obligation would not be as burdensome for the authorities.  
Finally, as to the temporal limits of these victims’ rights, the requisite involvement of the 
victims in the procedure is not limited to the strict investigation phase, but extends to the 
whole criminal proceedings, including to the subsequent trial and sentencing phase466. 
 
 
A. The right to be informed of the progress of the proceedings 
 
Once having been identified, victims have first of all «the right be kept informed on the 
progress and developments of the investigations»467 promptly and without unreasonable 
delays. Although it is not clear what it is exactly meant by information on the progress of 
the investigations, and though it seems that such requirement is interpreted less rigorously 
when it touches upon a case of medical negligence where a criminal remedy is not required 
rather than upon a killing by State agents468, in any case the authorities are obviously not 
expected to consult or inform the victims of every step taken in the courts of the criminal 
proceedings469, and victims have no right, for instance, to be informed of the defendant’s 
release on parole from freedom or transfer to house arrest470. They also do not have a right 
to be informed beforehand of the decision to proceed through a summary proceedings, 
																																																						
463 Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 4762/05, § 132, 17 December 2009; Vasîlca v. the Republic 
of Moldova, no. 69527/10, § 34, 11 February 2014; and Association “21 December 1989” and 
Others v. Romania, cit., §140-141. 
464 Anusca v. Moldova, cit., § 44. 
465 Gray v. Germany, no. 49278/09, § 88, 22 May 2014 
466 See, Basenko v. Ukraine, cit., § 69-71. 
467 Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 349; and Perevedentsevy v. Russia, cit., § 120. 
468 See, Gray v. Germany, cit., § 86-90, where the Court upheld the authorities’ failure to inform the 
victims of the intiation of the criminal proceedings and of the issuing of a penal order against the 
perpetrator. 
469 See, Cakicisoy and others v. Cyprus (dec.), § 45. 
470 See, Rumor v. Italy, § 72. 
	 94	
such as a penal order, where the facts have been already sufficiently established and the 
holding of a public hearing would not further contribute to the trial court’s assessment of 
the case471. 
The objective scope of the right to information, in particular, extends first and foremost to 
all «judicial decisions concerning the investigations472», a notion which includes not only 
the decisions concluding the investigations, being it a decision not to prosecute473 or a 
decision to commit for trial474, but also more interlocutory measures such as the suspension 
or the resuming of the investigations475. Moreover, information should be provided also on 
the eventual following phases: victims should be made aware of the dates in which the trial 
will take place and of its outcome476. 
As it is understandable, a major role is played in this sense by the domestic authorities’ 
duty to timely inform the victims of a decision not to prosecute, and of providing the 
reasons supporting it with reference to the evidence collected and the findings reached, in 
order for them to use any legal challenge against it477. In several cases, indeed, the Court 
has found a breach of the procedural obligation to investigate when the victims had only 
been informed of judicial decisions not to prosecute with considerable delay and no 
information on the reasons for those decisions was provided, given that such a situation 
was likely to prevent the possibility of any effective challenge on their part478. Accordingly, 
victims not only have the right to be informed promptly of a decision discontinuing the 
investigation, but also to know the reasons supporting it479. To this effect, the authorities’ 
duty to motivate their decision, which, as discussed before, is imposed also under the 
requirement of thoroughness of the investigation, is further strengthened. 
																																																						
471 See, Gray v. Germany, § 91. 
472 See, Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey, § 210. 
473 See, Abakarova v. Russia, § 96; Gulec v. Turkey, § 82; Ogur v. Turkey, § 92; Slimani v. France, 
§ 44; Hilal Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 97; Dalakov v. Russia, § 67. 
474 See, Basenko v. Ukraine, § 62. 
475 See, Mudayev v. Russia, § 104; Perevedentsevy v. Russia, § 122; Khamila Isayeva v. Russia, § 
132; Zinovchik v. Russia, no. 27217/06, 9 February 2012, § 63. 
476 See, Basenko v. Ukraine, cit., § 69-70; Ugur v. Turkey, cit., § 107. 
477 See, Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 124, and Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. 
Turkey [GC], cit., § 210-216. 
478 Ogur v. Turkey, cit., § 92; Trufin v. Romania, no. 3990/04, 20 October 2009, § 52; Velcea and 
Mazăre v. Romania, no. 64301/01, 1 December 2009, § 114; Anık and Others v. Turkey, no. 
63758/00, 5 June 2007, § 76-77; Rantsev v.Cyprus and Russia, cit., § 239; and Association “21 
December 1989” and Others, cit., §140-141. 
479 See, Kelly and others v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 117, where the Court states that «[the lack 
of reasons for such a decision] denies the family of the victim access to information about a matter 
of crucial importance to them and prevents any legal challenge of the decision». See also, Velcea 
and Mazare v. Romania, cit., § 114. 
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Aside from that, other information that domestic authorities might be expected to provide 
concern, for instance, the possibilities of accessing to legal assistance and the different 
remedies open to them480. 
 
 
B. The right to effective participation and legal assistance 
 
As the Convention in general protects rights that are effective, not illusory, also the 
involvement of the victims in the criminal proceedings must be of such nature. This implies 
that it is not sufficient for national legislation to afford certain powers to victims, but it is 
also necessary that the latter are able to exercise those rights in concreto, without in the 
facts being prevented from doing it481.  
Accordingly, the requirement of effective involvement entails that domestic authorities have 
a positive obligation to adopt special measures of protection and assistance towards 
victims that are, owing to their personal circumstances, are particularly vulnerable and who, 
without such measures, would be prevented to effectively participate in the proceedings. 
This issue has been addressed, for example, in relation to a victim who was an orphan an 
a minor and was not appointed a legal guardian nor a representative that could assist her 
especially while being heard by the authorities482, but also in relation to an adult victim with 
a severe handicap who could not move unaided and required permanent psychological 
assistance483. It is arguable, therefore, that the victims’s right of effective participation is 
protected in equal manner to that of the defence under Article 6, whereby also the adoption 
of positive measure in order to enable the accused to effectively participate in the 
proceedings may be required484. 
Among the possible measures of protection to ensure effective participation of the victim 
in the criminal proceedings, an important role is clearly played by the entitlement of victims 
to free legal representation and assistance. Whereas the accused enjoys under Article 6 § 
3 a right to free legal assistance, such a right, under more limited conditions, is conferred 
also under other ECHR provisions to persons who do not have such status, even in the 
context of civil proceedings. In such cases, the common rationale underpinning the 
entitlement of a right to free legal assistance to persons other than the accused seems to 
																																																						
480 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit., § 240. 
481 Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 312-313. 
482 See, Abakarova v. Russia, cit., § 96-97. 
483 See, Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773/05, 26 July 2012, § 115. 
484 See, Timergaliyev v. Russia, no. 40631/02, 14 October 2008, § 51; T. v. the United Kingdom, no. 
2472/94, 16 December 1999, §§ 79-89; Stanford v. the United Kingdom, 23 February 1994, § 26. 
For more on this topic see, HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK (eds.), Law of the European Convention on 
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be need to ensure the effectiveness of their judicial protection. Therefore, also in the 
context of the right of victims to participate to criminal proceedings the Court has applied 
such standard, finding that «in certain circumstances the State’s procedural obligations to 
ensure the effective participation of the victims in the investigation of their complaints of ill-
treatment may extend to the issues of providing effective access to free legal 
representation485». In other words, victims of crime are not entitled to an absolute and 
general right of legal aid in criminal proceedings concerning serious human rights offence, 
but only where, in view of their personal circumstances, failure to grant them legal 
assistance would prevent them from effectively participate in the proceedings in order to 
protect their legitimate interests. 
 
C. The right to provide evidence and to be heard 
 
From a review of the case-law it is clear that the requirement of effective participation also 
confers to victims the right to be involved in the criminal proceedings also by being afforded 
the possibility to submit relevant evidence to the competent authorities and to request 
additional investigative measures486. In line with the general principle according to which 
the admissibility of evidence is a matter for national law provision, however, no stand has 
ever been taken in the case-law on what weight should be accorded to the evidence 
provided by the victim. 
Such rights has been, moreover, subject to a very reasonable limit: domestic authorities do 
not have the duty «to satisfy every request for a particular investigative measure made by 
a relative in the course of the investigations»487, especially where the evidence requested is 
superfluous and would not contribute to the establishment of the facts488. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that in case of refusal, the investigative authorities have a 
true duty to at least address the request made by the victim and to provide reasons for 
refusing to carry out the specific measure or to collect the particular evidence desired489, 
especially – though not only - where such evidence seems highly relevant for the 
																																																						
485 See, Balsan v. Romania, cit., § 67; and also, Savitskyy v. Ukraine, cit., § 117. 
486 In this sense also, J. FIALA-BUTORA, Disabling Torture: the obligation to investigate, cit., p. 250. 
487 Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], cit., § 348; and Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], 
cit., § 304. 
488 See, Mustafic-Mujic v. the Netherlands (dec.), cit.,  § 118-119, where the Court noted that the 
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v. Romania (dec.), § 78. 
489 See, Hilal Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 96; Dinu v. Romania, § 83; Istratoiu v. Romania (dec.), no. 
56556/10, 27 October 2015, § 78; Kalicki v. Poland, no. 46797/08 , 8 December 2015, § 56; Smaltini 
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establishment of the facts490. The Court will indeed criticize the authorities for failing to even 
address the victim’s evidence request491, for failure to provide reasons to dismiss it or for 
providing only arbitrary ones492. Similar considerations apply also to other kind of 
submissions and arguments that victims may make in relation to the proceedings, other 
than requesting the gathering of specific evidence: the authorities nonetheless have the 
duty to address and reply to the victim’s submissions493. 
 
There is nonetheless one particular means of evidence that should normally always be 
undertaken by the authorities when requested, which is the hearing of the victims. It is 
apparent indeed, that victims have the right to be heard, which means the right to have an 
opportunity to give their version of the events, already in the investigation stage, which 
must be mentioned in the final decision to show that it has been considered494. Admittedly, 
a timely and prompt questioning of the victim by the investigating authorities is one of the 
main elements taken into account by the Court in assessing whether the former was 
effectively involved in the proceedings495.  
The questioning of the victim, as discussed previously, is relevant not only as a mean of 
involving this subject in the proceedings but also with regards to the duty of the authorities 
to carry out a thorough investigation and to collect all the available evidence496.  
Where the victim is particularly vulnerable, in light of its personal circumstances or of the 
offence that was committed, both requirements – though from different perspectives – 
suggest to carry out the questioning by adopting specific measures of protection that take 
into account and counter its probable unwillingness and reluctance to provide an account 
of the events: these measures are needed not only to obtain a more detailed and reliable 
statement, but also to allow a genuine and effective involvement of the victim in the 
proceedings, that is respectful of its dignity. Such measures include, for instance, the 
																																																						
490 See, Dolek v. Turkey, cit., § 81. 
491 See, Miclea v. Romania (dec.), cit., § 46; Hilal Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, cit., § 96; Cangoz and 
others v. Turkey, cit., § 147. 
492 See, Dolek v. Turkey, cit., § 81. A contrario, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], cit., § 313, in which 
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493 See, Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, cit., § 126, and M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, cit., § 123, in relation 
to a detailed and reasoned request of the victim to the prosecutor to give a different legal 
classification to the offence.  
494 In this sense see also, J. C. OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings, cit., 
p. 131; A. SEIBERT-FOHR, Prosecuting serious human rights offences, cit., p. 139. 
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Gul v. Turkey, no. 22676/93, 14 December 2000, § 93. 
496 See, supra. 
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presence of a psychologist during the questioning, that the interviewer is a specialized 
agent, that the interview is conducted in private and not in a public hearing497. 
 
The right to provide evidence may translate finally, though in very limited terms, in the 
opportunity for victims to participate to the gathering of evidence, when that is possible, 
according to a principle of equality of arms. In Perevedentsevy v. Russia498, for instance, 
the Court reproached the fact that the victims were never informed or consulted about any 
proposed evidence, so they could not take part in giving evidence to the experts. 
From the review of the case-law, however, it is not clear in which terms such right is actually 
guaranteed. In Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy499, for instance, the applicants complained that 
they had been informed of the decision to carry out an autopsy with such brief delay that it 
was in practice impossible for them to appoint an expert of their choosing who wold take 
part in the forensic examination during the investigation stage. The Court, however, found 
that the requirement of effective involvement of victims in the proceedings did not go as 
far as to confer them that power to participate to the forensic examinations through an 
expert of their choosing. Likewise, in Cakicisoy and others v. Cyprus, the Court made clear 
that there is no «obligation for the victims’ relatives to be treated as parties in the 
investigations as such»500. 
To the contrary, in Ugur v. Turkey, the Court criticized the national authorities for having 
failed to notify the victim about the date of the trial hearing, in that it «denied the applicants 
and their lawyers the opportunity to confront and put questions to the police chief, but also 
displayed a lack of respect for the principle of equality of arms501». By the same token, in 
Basenko v. Ukraine, the Court concluded that the national authorities had failed to ensure 
effective access of the victim to the procedure in that he was not summoned nor notified 
of the trial hearings and thus «he was precluded from effectively participating in the 
domestic proceedings at the trial and sentencing phase and was therefore prevented from 
challenging S.’s sentence which he found inadequate»502. Similar findings were reached 
also in respect to the peculiar context of Coroner’s inquests in Northern Ireland, where the 
Court found that the legitimate interests of the victims were not sufficiently ensured on the 
ground that they were not able to attend the hearings of the inquiry and, as a result, were 
not able to put any questions to the witnesses503. 
																																																						
497 See, G.U. v. Turkey, cit., § 71-73. 
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In light of these cases, it could be argued that participation of victims in the collection of 
the evidence in accordance with the principles of an adversarial hearing and of equality of 
arms is not ensured in absolute terms under the procedural obligation to effectively 
investigate and punish human rights offences, but it is subject to a different degree of 
protection depending on the different stages of the criminal proceedings504. While the right 
to participate in the collection of evidence is almost not ensured at all during the strict 
investigation phase, where the authorities enjoy a wide discretion in deciding whether to 
involve the victims or not, during the trial stage victims must to the contrary be afforded 
the opportunity to be present and to effectively participate in the taking of the evidence. As 
mentioned previously, indeed, the involvement of victims is not confined to the 
investigation stage but may be exercised also in the subsequent trial phase. This 
conclusion, which draws a difference according to the procedural phase of the criminal 
proceedings, is supported also by the Court’s finding in relation to the right of victims to 
access the case file, which will be discussed in detail below.  
 
 
D. The right of access to the case file 
 
A crucial role in ensuring that victims may effectively participate in the proceedings is 
played by their possibility to access the materials of the case-file: only where victims are 
aware of the evidence collected and of their results, it is then possible for them to point out 
any potential omissions and further lines of inquiry to be pursued by the authorities; in the 
opposite case, their ability to influence the conduct of the proceedings and to offer their 
contribution would instead only remain illusory and theoretical. Therefore, another element 
that the Court takes into consideration when assessing the requisite victim’s involvement 
in the proceedings is the right of access to the case-file.  
It is no surprise, however, that making the materials of the investigations accessible to 
victims may conflict with other relevant interests, such as the respect of the rights of others 
or the interests of justice that often imply the need to preserve the secrecy of the data 
possessed in order not to hamper the effective continuation of the investigations505. 
																																																						
participation to the witnesses’ questioning because they were denied previous access to the case-
file. 
504 Also, M. MONTAGNA, I diritti minimi della vittima, in A. GAITO (ed.), I princìpi europei del processo 
penale, cit., p. 324, concludes that national criminal procedures should develop a method of 
establishing of the facts that includes the victim. 
505 For such considerations see, Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, no. 1727/04, 24 June 
2010, § 71-74. 
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Moreover, it has even been held that in certain cases granting such access could even have 
negative repercussions on the presumption of innocence506. 
Therefore, the victim’s right of access to the case file during the investigations is not 
guaranteed in absolute terms, but it subject to important limitations. 
Admittedly, the Court has found that: 
 
«disclosure or publication of police reports and investigative materials may 
involve sensitive issues with possible prejudicial effects on private individuals or 
other investigations and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an automatic 
requirement under Article 2. The requisite access of the public or the victim’s 
relatives may therefore be provided for in other stages of the procedure507». 
 
Upon this consideration, it is only in very rare situations that a complaint about the failure 
to access the case file during the strict investigation stage would lead the Court to conclude 
that the victims had not been sufficiently involved in the proceedings. This was the case, 
for instance, in Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine508, where the applicants were 
granted access to the file only after the completion of the investigation and the Court held 
that, despite the existence of legitimate interests warranting restrictions to such access 
during the pre-trial stage, a fair balance should be struck between those interests and the 
victim’s right to effective participation in the proceedings. It thus found that such a balance 
is not struck where the law, as in that specific case, does not provide any special procedure 
for granting access to the file in the pre-trial stage, indicating «the grounds for refusing and 
granting the access, the extent to which a claimant may be given access, the time-limits 
for consideration of the relevant requests and providing the access». 
To the contrary, granting victims access to the case-file after the notification of a decision 
not to prosecute concluding the investigations is in most cases accepted by the Court to 
be compatible with the requirement of effective involvement of the victims in the 
proceedings509; whereas, a breach of the procedural obligation is found when the case file 
was not accessible to victims neither after the closing of the investigation, given that such 
																																																						
506 See, Gürtekin and others v. Cyprus (dec.), cit., § 29. See also, Žerajić and Gojković v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 16503/08 and 67588/09, 13 November 2014, where the Court uopheld 
the national authorities’ refusal to disclose to the applicants the names of the potential suspects 
against whom insufficient evidence had been gathered for prosecution. 
507 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 236; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 
129; Giuliani and Gaggio [GC], cit., § 304; and Ramsahai and others v. the Netherlands [GC], 
cit., § 347. See also, J. C. OCHOA S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings, 
cit., p. 124. 
508 Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, cit., § 71-74. For a similar finding see also Zinovchik 
v. Russia, cit., § 62. 
509 See, Khamila Isayeva v. Russia, cit., § 133; Seidova and others v. Bulgaria, cit., § 59-61; Anik 
and others v. Turkey, cit., § 76-77; Cangoz and others v. Turkey, cit., § 142-146. 
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limitation would substantially frustrate any possibility to bring an effective challenge against 
such decision510. 
Furthermore, access to the materials of the case should be granted to victims also where 
the investigations have been suspended for failure to identify the suspect and thus remain 
adjourned over years, although with the possibility of exception of specific documents 
classified confidential or secret511. 
 
Finally, although the Court has not so far been confronted with the issue of a refusal to 
grant to the victim access to the case-file during trial, from what it has been discussed 
above about the reasons that may justify restrictions to such access only before the 
conclusion of the investigations and the need to ensure it once the investigations have 
instead been completed, it could be argued that such a refusal would be at odds with the 
requisite victims’ involvement in the proceedings in as much as it prevents them to defend 
their interests in the procedure, which are to be identified with clarifying the facts 
surrounding the offence. This interpretation is supported also by the findings of the Court 
in Kelly and others v. the United Kingdom512, where the victim’s inability to have access to 
the witnesses’ statements given during the police inquiry before the appearance of the 
witness at the hearing before the Coroner was criticized since it placed them at significant 
disadvantage in terms of preparation and ability to participate in the questioning. By 
contrast, in Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, the non-disclosure of certain documents to 
the victims was accepted by the Court as, in light of all the other evidence they had at their 
disposal, the decision to withhold such documents did not undermine the fact-finding role 
of the inquest or denied the family an active participation in the proceedings513. 
 
To conclude, from the analysis of the case-law it results that victims have the right to 
access the materials collected during the investigation; however this right is not absolute, 
but may be subject to restrictions while the inquiries are ongoing, in order to satisfy other 
legitimate interests that cease to be relevant following the closing of the pre-trial stage, 
																																																						
510 See, Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 213-214; Ramsahai and others v. the 
Netherlands [GC], cit., § 349; and Gürtekin and others v. Cyprus (dec.), cit., § 29; Jaloud v. the 
Netherlands [GC], cit., § 224; Savitskyy v. Ukraine, cit., § 114, where the law allowed access to the 
case file to victims only upoun closing of the investigations and provided that the case was sent to 
trial. 
511 See, Aslakhanova and others v. Russia, cit., § 236. 
512 Kelly and others v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 128. 
513 Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, cit., § 161. 
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when therefore materials must be made accessible to victims in order for them to effectively 
exercise any challenge available or to effectively participate to the trial stage514. 
Such conclusion it all the more interesting when compared to the respective right of the 
accused to access the case file during the preliminary investigation under Article 6, which 
it arguably almost equivalent to the victim’s standpoint. Indeed, in the recent case A.T. v. 
Luxembourg515, the Court found that the right to a fair trial under Article 6 does not require 
full access to the case file by the defendant during the investigation stage. Conversely, as 
it happens with regards to victims, it remains possible to limit such access by the accused 
when the interest of justice related to the effectiveness of the investigations require it516. In 
that particular case the Court upheld the authorities’  decision not to grant the suspect 
access to the case file in advance of questioning before the investigating judge. 
 
 
E. No right to judicial review of a decision not to prosecute 
 
The stress put by the Court on the ability of the victims to effectively challenge a decision 
not to prosecute when addressing the issue of their right of access to the case-file would 
lead one to reasonably expect that the possibility to appeal against an unsatisfactory 
conclusion of the investigations must be granted automatically in the national legal systems 
if a sufficient level of victim’s involvement in the criminal proceedings is to be ensured.  
By contrast, in the judgment in the case Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC]517, in 
which the applicant complained of the limited scope that characterizes in England judicial 
review of a decision not to prosecute, the Court seems to have reached a different 
conclusion. Indeed, it upheld the previous ruling in the case Gürtekin and others v. Cyprus 
(dec.), where it found that the procedural obligation in Article 2 does not necessarily require 
that there should be judicial review of investigative decisions as such, even though where 
such review exists, it is doubtless a re-assuring safeguard of accountability and 
transparency518. To the same effect, also in Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], 
even though not under the perspective of the victim’s involvement in the proceedings but 
																																																						
514 See also, S. MIRANDOLA, The involvement of the deceased victim’s next of kin in criminal 
investigations: an analysis of the ECHR standards under Article 2 and of the Directive 2012/29/EU 
on the rights of victims of crime, cit., p. 179 – 187. 
515 A.T. v. Luxembourg, no. 30460/13, 9 April 2015, § 79-81. 
516 Similar limitations on the accused right of access to the file are possible also under Article 5 § 4, 
which confers on the accused a right of access to file in order to effectively challenge lawfulness of 
arrest and detention on remand, see Podeschi v. San Marino, no. 66357/14, 13 April 2017, § 170-
193. 
517 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 277-281. 
518 See Gurtekin and others v. Cyprus (dec.), cit., § 28. See also to the same effects, Petrović v. 
Serbia, cit., § 93. 
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when addressing the requirement of independence of the authorities, the Court had ruled 
that the intervention of a court or a judge at the closing of the investigation is not an 
automatic requirement, but only «in certain cases, given the nature of the facts in issue and 
the particular context in which they occurred, the intervention of a review body may prove 
necessary»519. In light of these considerations, the Court therefore concluded that where 
such opportunity of judicial review is provided it will be taken into consideration as an 
additional means to ensure the victim’s involvement in the proceedings520, but it held also 
that there is nothing to suggest that the scope of the review could not be confined to 
address only alleged errors of law, and not also the merits of the decision521. 
As matters currently stand, therefore, the right to judicial review of a decision not to 
prosecute is not an absolute requirement for the victims to be sufficiently involved in the 
proceedings, although a door has been left open for a different solution under specific 
circumstances; even where such a review is provided for under national law, its scope may 
be restricted to questions of law without thereby breaching the procedural obligation to 
investigate. 
 
 
8. Effective punishment 
 
The procedural obligation to investigate and punish human rights offences, as mentioned 
in the beginning, is not limited to the strict investigation phase, but it extends also to the 
following stages of the criminal proceedings, including the phases of imposition and 
execution of the sentence522. Indeed, the outcome of the criminal proceedings and the 
sanction imposed do play a decisive role523. The last requirement against which the 
effectiveness of the criminal proceedings is measured, admittedly, concerns precisely the 
adequacy of the sanction that is imposed on the perpetrators and its actual enforcement. 
Once again, it is the principle of effectiveness expressed in the well-known formula “rights 
that are practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory524”, which justifies this last 
standard: the obligation to ensure criminal law protection of the most fundamental human 
rights through the provision and enactment of criminal provision and the subsequent 
criminal investigations would remain only a dead letter if those found to be responsible 
																																																						
519 Mustafa Tunc and Fecire Tunc v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 232-233. 
520 See also Castro and Lavenia v. Italy (dec.), no. 46190/13 , 31 May 2016, § 77, where the Court’s 
conclusion that the victims had been sufficiently involved in the proceedings was mainly based on 
the fact that they had challenged the decision not to prosecute which resulted in a reopening of the 
investigations. 
521 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], cit., § 277-281. 
522 See, Yesil and Sevim v. Turkey, cit., §37. 
523 See, Cestaro and others v. Italy, cit., § 205; Gafgen v. Germany [GC], cit., § 121. 
524 See, Airey v. Ireland, cit., § 24. 
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were not adequately and effectively punished.525 This perspective recalls the thought of 
Cesare Beccaria, according to whom «a certain punishment, though mild, will make more 
impression than the fear of a more terrible one, coupled with the hope of impunity526». 
Once found that an effective preliminary investigation that fully met all the procedural 
requirements has indeed taken place, the Court therefore goes on to consider whether the 
judicial authorities «actually showed determination to punish those responsible527». 
In order to scrutinize the willingness of the national authorities not to leave unpunished the 
offences that have been ascertained through effective investigations, the Court takes into 
consideration, on one side, the adequacy of the sanction imposed and its enforcement, 
and on the other, the presence of any «legal techniques» that may form an obstacle to the 
imposition or the execution of the sentence528. 
 
 
A. Adequate sanction 
 
It is known that the procedural obligation to investigate does not entail any obligation for a 
conviction to result in a particular sentence. Yet, in order to determine whether the State 
has discharged its international law obligation under the Convention to protect the right at 
stake by effectively punishing those found to be responsible of its infringement, the Court 
must have regard to the national courts’ considerations while convicting those responsible 
and to the punishment imposed as a result529, to see whether they have submitted the case 
to the careful scrutiny required so that the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place 
and the significance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to 
life are not undermined. Nevertheless, in light of its role, which as recalled previously is not 
that of a «fourth instance», the Court accepts that determining the degree of guilt and the 
appropriate sentence are matters within the jurisdiction of national criminal court and 
therefore normally «grants substantial deference to the national courts in the choice of the 
appropriate sanctions to be imposed» for ill-treatment, killings or other very serious human 
right offences530. However, if the positive obligation to effectively investigate and punish is 
not to lose much of its meaning and the rights to remain only theoretical and illusory, the 
																																																						
525 See, F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights, cit., p. 
587. 
526 C. BECCARIA, Dei delitti e delle pene, 1764. 
527 Okkali v. Turkey, no. 52067/99 , 17 October 2006, § 68; Ali and Ayse Duran v. Turkey, no. 
42942/02 , 8 April 2008, § 66. See also, Oneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], cit., § 115. 
528 See, F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights, cit., p. 
587. 
529 See, Ali and Ayse Duran v. Turkey, cit., § 66. 
530 See, Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, cit., § 62. See also, Gafgen v. Germany [GC], cit., § 
123; Ali and Ayse Duran v. Turkey, cit., § 66; Darraj v. France, cit., § 48. 
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Court must retain its supervisory function and «exercise a certain power of review and 
intervene in cases of manifest disproportion between the gravity of the act and the 
punishment imposed531».  
In other words, when it comes to appraising the punishment imposed on the perpetrators 
as a result of the criminal proceedings undertaken on a very serious human right offence, 
the Court does not normally put into question the adequacy of the sanction chosen by the 
national authorities, unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the gravity of the act at stake. 
This approach reflects, to a certain extent, the reasoning followed by the Court in the 
opposite and parallel situation: where the defendant complains that sentence imposed is 
excessively severe in relation to the gravity of the facts. Here also, indeed, the Court holds 
that a grossly disproportionate sentence would amount to an inhuman treatement in 
violation of Article 3, but this test is particularly high and would be met only in rare and 
unique occasions532. 
In the case the sentence imposed appears to be excessively lenient, therefore, the Court 
will review the reasons adduced by the national courts to support the choice of a very low 
penalty, in order to assess whether they submitted the case to the careful scrutiny required, 
correctly appreciating the seriousness of the act or whether they «used their power of 
discretion to lessen the consequences of a serious criminal act rather than to show that 
such act could in no way be tolerated533», for instance by giving arbitrary and manifestly 
unfounded reasons for such a reduction of the sentence. In such latter case, where national 
provisions are used de facto to avoid an effective punishment, the sanction imposed cannot 
be regarded as adequate and effective and the Court will find a violation of the procedural 
obligation to ensure criminal protection to the Convention right at stake on that account. 
Clearly, the adequacy of the sanction depends on the specific circumstances of each 
case534. 
For instance, in Okkali v. Turkey, the Court censured the national court’s decision to 
sentence the perpetrators to the minimum sanction provided by law on the ground that, in 
doing so, they overlooked completely a number of aggravating factors, such as the 
particular nature of the offence and the gravity of the damages caused, which should have 
																																																						
531 Ibidem. See also, Cestaro v. Italy, cit., § 207. According to J. ALIX, Les obligations positives de 
pénalisation et de punition, cit., p. 230-31, this is a control on the proportionality of the sanction, 
which is «relatively narrow» and leads to a condemnation of punishment that are very modest or 
fictitious. In the view of A. BALSAMO, L’art. 3 della CEDU e il sistema italiano – The statute of limitation 
in the Italian system requires to be amended, in Cassazione Penale, 2014, 11, p. 3925, this 
proportionality control present elements of retributivism and utilitarism. 
532 See, Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013, 
§ 102. 
533 Okkali v. Turkey, § 68. J. ALIX, Les obligations positives de pénalisation et de punition, cit., p. 
230-31, suggests that it is the bad faith of the authorities which is being sanctioned. 
534 See, Cestaro and others v. Italy, cit., § 208. 
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taken into account according to Turkish law535. Likewise, in Zynep Ozcan v. Turkey, the 
Court criticized that the culprits benefitted of attenuating circumstances on account of their 
behaviour in the course of the proceedings, despite the fact that they never had attended 
any hearing536. On the contrary, in Leparkiene v. Lithuania, notwithstanding the low penalty 
imposed on the defendants, the Court found that the national judges had sufficient regard 
to the extremely serious consequences of the incident and gave substantial reasoning for 
imposing the medium term allowed by law and for opting to suspend it537.  
In principle, however, the imposition of a very lenient sentence or of a derisory pecuniary 
fine, that corresponds to the minimum penalty allowed by law, and whose execution in also 
suspended is deemed to be manifestly disproportionate and devoid of the necessary 
deterrent effect. Indeed, in the Court’s view, the suspension of a sentence is «comparable 
to a partial amnesty and is a measure which cannot be considered permissible under its 
jurisprudence since, consequently, the convicted officers enjoyed virtual impunity despite 
their conviction538». There are very few cases, however, in which the suspension of the 
sentence imposed on account of serious acts of ill-treatment or killing has been accepted 
by the Court and found to be compatible with the procedural obligation to effectively 
investigate and punish those acts539. 
 
 
B. Unacceptable obstacles to the imposition or execution of the sentence 
 
The Court is, how it has been held, at the very least «suspicious» of «any legal techniques 
which, in extreme cases, form an obstacle to prosecution or trial or which, in less extreme 
cases, lead to some kind of relaxation of the sentences imposed or executed540». Not 
surprisingly, this approach taken by the Court has been defined as «la jurisprudence de la 
main pénale lourde541». These measures that hinder in practice any effective punishment 
																																																						
535 Okkali v. Turkey, cit., § 73. For similar circumstances see also, Valeriu and Nicolae Rosca v. the 
Republic of Moldova, no. 41704/02 , 20 October 2009,§ 73. 
536 Zynep Ozcan v. Turkey, no. 45906/99, 20 February 2007, § 43. 
537 Leparskiene v. Lithuania, no. Leparskiene , 7 July 2009, § 53. See also, for a similar reasoning, 
Cestaro and others v. Italy, cit., § 224, where the imposition of the minimum penalty provided by 
law was justified by the fact that the whole police operation was orderd by the Head of Police and 
therefore the agents had acted under such psychological pressure. 
538 Ali and Ayse Duran v. Turkey, cit., § 69. See also, Saba v. Italy, cit., § 80; Gafgen v. Germany 
[GC], cit., § 123. See also, A. BALSAMO, L’art. 3 della CEDU e il sistema italiano – The statute of 
limitation in the Italian system, cit., p. 3925. 
539 See, Rasman and Veliscek v. Italy (dec.), no. 55744/09, 26 January 2016; Dolek v. Turkey, § 79. 
540 See, F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights, cit., p. 
587. 
541 See, F. TULKENS, S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, La clémence pénale et les droits de l’homme, cit., p. 
132. 
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and that result in a form of “pardon” of the offence which therefore are, in principle, not 
tolerated; they include both measures that preclude the imposition of a sentence and others 
that hinder its execution.  
 
i. Statute of limitation periods 
 
The first measure that may pose an insurmountable obstacle in practice to an effective 
punishment of those responsible of a human rights violation is the expiration of limitation 
periods which have the effect of precluding the pronouncement of a decision on the merits 
of the charges when the offence has become time-barred. Statute of limitations rules, 
admittedly, prescribe the maximum period within which a criminal action can be brought 
against a particular crime542, and may therefore consitute obstacles in the prosecution of 
offences for they typically include also the investigation and prosecution phase and, as a 
consequence, the proceedings may end due to the limitation period even if charges had 
been brought543. 
The Court has found that the application of limitation periods falls within those measures 
that are «inadmissible» according to its case-law on the procedural obligations under 
Article 3 «because it has the effect of precluding a conviction544». In particular, it held that: 
 
«in cases concerning torture or ill- treatment inflicted by State agents, criminal 
proceedings ought not to be discontinued on account of a limitation period. (…) 
Furthermore, the manner in which the limitation period is applied must be 
compatible with the requirements of the Convention. It is therefore difficult to 
accept inflexible limitation periods admitting of no exceptions545». 
 
Accordingly, discontinuation of the proceedings solely on the grounds that time-limit has 
expired is contrary to the procedural obligations under Article 2 and 3 where State agents 
are involved as suspects. In other words, those proceedings should always lead to a 
decision on the merits of the case, establishing the criminal liability or not of the defendants, 
																																																						
542 See, G. FLETCHER, Basic concepts of criminal law, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 7. 
543 In this sense also, J. PRADEL, Droit pénal comparé, Dalloz, 2016, p. 427. 
544 See, Alikaj and others v. Italy, cit., § 108. See also, A. A. BALSAMO, L’art. 3 della CEDU e il sistema 
italiano – The statute of limitation in the Italian system, cit., p. 3925. According to V. GREVI, 
Prescrizione del reato ed effettività del processo tra sistema delle impugnazioni e prospettive di 
riforma, in Sistema sanzionatorio: effettività e certezza della pena. In ricordo di Adolfo Beria 
Argentine, Giuffrè, 2002, p. 189, statute of limitation periods are a cause of ineffectiveness of the 
criminal proceedings («causa impeditiva dell’effettività del processo») which bring about a sort of 
«denial of justice». 
545 Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 326; Cestaro and others v. Italy, cit., § 208; Turan 
Cakir v. Belgium, no. 44256/06, 10 March 2009, § 69. 
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and not be terminated by a procedural decision discontinuing the case on the ground of 
the offence being statute-barred546. The Court indeed considers that, even many years after 
the events the public interest in obtaining the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators 
of unlawful killings or ill-treatments is firmly recognized, particularly in the context of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity547.  
A very significant case in this sense is Cestaro and others v. Italy548, concerning the ill-
treatment and torture inflicted by police agents on occasion of the G8 in Genova in 2001. 
Due to the absence of a specific offence criminalizing torture in the Italian legal order549, the 
suspects were tried at national level on less severe charges, such as grievously body harm, 
which were subject to shorter limitation periods. Notwithstanding the diligence of the 
prosecuting authorities and of the courts assessed in light of the particular complexity of 
the case, the offences had become statute-barred before a final decision could be adopted. 
The Court thus found that it was the Italian legislation which, by failing to criminalize torture 
and by laying down inflexible and too short limitation periods for the other crimes which 
could cover those acts, is structurally flawed as it prevents in practice any possibility of 
punishing the persons responsible for committing torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatments, albeit all the efforts undertaken by the judicial authorities550. 
 
The principle according to which inflexible limitation periods are never compatible with the 
procedural obligation to investigate, however, is currently confined to offences committed 
by law enforcement authorities and has not yet been extended also to crimes committed 
by other private individuals. This different treatment may be rooted in the higher gravity of 
the offences committed by representatives of the State in comparison to those at the hands 
of other private individuals, which corresponds also to a stronger public interest in the 
																																																						
546 In this sense, A. BALSAMO, L’art. 3 della CEDU e il sistema italiano – The statute of limitation in 
the Italian system, cit., p. 3925. 
547 See, Aslakhanova and others v. Russia, cit., § 237. 
548 Cestaro and others v. Italy, cit. See comments by F. VIGANÒ, La difficile battaglia contro l’impunità 
dei responsabilii di tortura: la sentenza della Corte di Strasburgo sui fatti della scuola Diaz e i tormenti 
del legislatore italiano, in dirittopenalecontemporaneo.it, 9 April 2015; F. CASSIBBA, Violato il divieto 
di tortura: condannata l’Italia per i fatti della scuola ‘Diaz-Pertini’, ivi, 27 April 2015.  
549 For more on this topic see, A. PUGIOTTO, Repressione penale della tortura e Costituzione: 
anatomia di un reato che non c’è, in Rivista Trimestrale Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, 2014, 2, p. 
129. See also, A. VALENTINO, Le violenze del G8 di Genova sono tortura ai sensi della CEDU: ragioni 
della pronuncia e ripercussioni sull’ordinamento, in Osservatorio Costituzionale, 2015, 7, p. 1. 
550 Cestaro and others v. Italy, cit., § 241. That the limitation periods laid down in the italian 
legislation were a structural shortcoming at variance with the positive obligation to effectively 
punish infringements of Article 3 was already held by A. BALSAMO, L’art. 3 della CEDU e il sistema 
italiano – The statute of limitation in the Italian system, cit., p. 3925. On the opportunity of adopting 
flexible limitation periods, see M. CAIANIELLO, Processo penale e prescrizione nel quadro della 
giurisprudenza europea. Dialogo tra sistemi o conflitto identitario?, in dirittopenalcontemporaneo.it, 
24 February 2017. 
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punishment of those conducts that cannot be confined within a specific time-limit.  
Therefore, when discussing the issue of statute of limitation periods and their compatibility 
with the procedural obligations to investigate and punish, a fundamental distinction should 
be drawn. The discontinuation of criminal proceedings without any examination of the 
merits owing to the expiration of limitation periods is never, at any event, compatible with 
such obligations where the defendants are State agents; conversely, where the suspects 
are private individuals, such outcome is not tolerated to a much more limited degree, 
namely only where it has been caused by the inactivity of the authorities and therefore is 
linked to a lack of diligence in dealing with the case, in violation of the promptness and 
reasonable expedition requirement551. 
 
ii. Other clemency measures 
 
Besides the discontinuation of criminal proceedings owing to the expiration of limitation 
periods, there are other measures which can be regarded as expression of State’s “criminal 
clemency552” and which preclude the execution of the penalty imposed that should not be 
tolerated in the context of the procedural obligation to effectively investigate and punish 
serious human rights violations. The general principle to be found in the case-law in this 
respect is: 
 
«in cases concerning torture or ill- treatment inflicted by State agents, criminal 
proceedings ought not to be discontinued on account of a limitation period, and 
also that amnesties and pardons should not be tolerated in such cases553» 
 
The first of these inacceptable “clemency measures” is the general or partial remission of 
the sentence, which results in a reduction or a total cancellation by law of the sanction 
imposed554. 
																																																						
551 See, supra §… 
552 In this sense, F. TULKENS, S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, La clémence pénale et les droits de l’homme, 
cit., p. 130. 
553 Mocanu and others v. Romania [GC], cit., § 326; Margus v. Croatia [GC], cit., § 126. 
554 For an example, see Cestaro and others v. Italy, cit., § 221, where some offenders benefitted 
from a law of partial remission of the sentence which resulted in a reduction of the penalty imposed 
on them. For the statement of principle see, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, cit., § 265.  
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Secondly, also individual pardon, granted for instance by the Head of State following a 
conviction, is regarded as a measure that is not reconcilable with the procedural obligations 
at hand555. 
The last “clemency measures” censured by the Court in this context are amnesty laws. In 
particular, the Court held that «granting an amnesty would run counter the State’s 
obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention since it would hamper the 
investigations of such acts and necessarily lead to impunity for those responsible556». The 
approach taken by the Court in this respect is in line with the general tendency in 
international law to consider amnesties as unacceptable in connection with grave breaches 
of fundamental human rights557, especially where these are intended to shield offenders 
from accountability. However, a door has been left in principle open with respect to the 
sole case of the granting of amnesties under some particular circumstances, such as a 
reconciliation process and/or a form of compensation of the victims, where there is the 
possibility of a conflict arising between, on the one hand, the need to prosecute criminals 
and, on the other hand, a country’s determination to promote reconciliation in society558. 
 
 
iii. State secret privilege 
 
Among the measures capable of precluding the examination of the merits of the case and 
the imposition of the sentence there is also the so-called “State secret privilege”, a doctrine 
according to which certain evidence is to be excluded from the cognisance of the judge on 
the ground that it constitutes a State secret, since its knowledge would jeopardize national 
security. Admittedly, such doctrine prevents the courts from using that evidence with the 
																																																						
555 For an example see, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, cit., § 271, in which the convicted C.I.A. agents were 
then pardoned by the Head of State. See also, T. SCOVAZZI, Segreto di Stato e diritti umani, cit., p. 
179. 
556 Margus v. Croatia [GC], cit., § 127. See also Ould Dah v. France. On the issue of amnesty see, 
F. TULKENS, S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, La clémence pénale et les droits de l’homme, cit., p. 134. 
557 See, A. PETROPOULOU, Les mesures d’amnistie, le principe ne bis in idem et l’évolution du droit 
international, in Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, 2015, 102, p. 437; G. DELLA MORTE, Le 
amnistie nel diritto internazionale, Cedam, 2011. 
558 See, Margus v. Croatia, § 139 and Ould Dah v. France (dec.), no. 13113/03, 17 March 2009; and, 
Dujardin and others v. France (dec.), 2 September 1991, § 243-244. According to A. PETROPOULOU, 
Les mesures d’amnistie, le principe ne bis in idem et l’évolution du droit international, cit., p. 457, 
this is to be interpreted to the effect that only the abusive application of amnesties is prohibited. 
The Author also complains about the failure of the Court to indicate more precise criteria of 
compatibility of the amnesties witht the obligations to prosecute and punish. See also, A. SEIBERT-
FOHR, Prosecuting serious human rights offences, cit., p. 142, according to whom providing for 
reconciliation is a legitimate aim which justifies certain restrictions regarding the punishment of the 
offenders. 
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consequence that, where the evidence is decisive, this leads to the impossibility of 
establishing the facts and punishing those responsible of the offences under trial. 
By contrast to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has 
expressly stated that in case of human rights violations the authorities cannot rely on the 
State secret privilege in order to withhold evidence from the investigating authorities559, the 
Court of Strasbourg has never expressly found that the State secret privilege is 
incompatible with the procedural obligation to effectively investigate and punish.  
The issue was address for the first time, indeed, only in the recent case Nasr and Ghali v. 
Italy560, which according to some authors has been «a missed opportunity» for the Court in 
that sense561. The case concerned the extraordinary rendition to Egypt of the imam of Milan, 
carried out by C.I.A. agents and Italian intelligence officers. The investigating authorities 
and the national courts were particularly diligent and efficient in gathering all the necessary 
evidence, in establishing the facts and identifying those responsible, however the 
conviction of the secret service agents involved was ultimately annulled by the Supreme 
Court following the Prime Minister’s decision, upheld by the Constitutional Court, to invoke 
the State secret privilege in respect of certain evidence which was decisive for the 
establishment of the facts and could not anymore be validly used for the finding of guilt of 
the perpetrators562. However, the Court observed that the State secret privilege was 
																																																						
559 See, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, judgment of 26 November 
2008, § 77. 
560 Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, cit., commented by T. SCOVAZZI, Segreto di Stato e diritti umani, cit., p. 
164; P. BONETTI, Il caso Abu Omar a Strasburgo: l’obbligo di punire e le extraordinary renditions, in 
Quaderni Costituzionali, 2016, 2, p. 390. For a reconstruction of the case see also, C. DANISI, State 
Secrets, Impunity and Human Rights Violations: Restrictions of Evidence in the Abu Omar Case, in 
Essex Human Right Law Review, 2011, 8, p.1; F. MESSINEO, Extraordinary Renditions and State 
obligations to criminalize and prosecute torture in the light of the Abu Omar case in Italy, in Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, 2009, 7, p. 1023. 
561 See, T. SCOVAZZI, Segreto di Stato e diritti umani, cit., p. 164. 
562 In the Italian system, the State secret privilege is regulated under Law no. 124 of 2007 which 
provides that the Prime Minister is the only authority entitled to invoke such privilege on information 
«whose knowledge or circulation could damage the integrity of the Republic», that is national 
security, and that the classification of those information «inhibits judicial inquiry», in the sense that 
judicial authorities are prevented to use it as evidence. However, where a judge is dissatisfied with 
the classification, it may formally request the Prime Minister to remove the privilege, failing which it 
may then bring a claim before the Constitutional Court for an allocation of powers. The 
Constitutional Court, however, does not carry out a judicial review of the decision to invoke the 
State secret privilege, rather it merely verifies whether the conditions that justify the invocation of 
such privilege were met, without being entitled to judge on the merits of the reasons of such 
decision (see Constitutional Court, judgment no. 106 of 11 March 2009, § 12). For more on this 
topic see, G. ILLUMINATI (ed.), Nuovi profili del segreto di stato e  dell’attività di intelligence, 
Giappichelli, 2010; C. BONZANO, Il segreto di Stato nel processo penale, Cedam, 2010; F. FABBRINI, 
Extraordinary renditions and the State secret privilege: Italy and the United States compared, in 
Italian Journal of Public Law, 2011, 2, p. 255; G. ARCONZO, I. PELLIZZONE, Il segreto di stato nella 
giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale e della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in Rivista 
dell’Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti, 2012, 1, p. 1; A. VEDASCHI, Aracana Imperii and Salus 
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invoked by the Italian executive only very late in the proceedings, when the information 
subsequently classified had already been reported in the press and was in the public 
domain, so that the invocation of the State secret privilege could no more be justified by 
the need to preserve its confidentiality. The Court concluded therefore that «the legitimate 
principle of State secret has been clearly applied in order to prevent those responsible from 
answering of their acts», with the consequence that «the investigations, albeit effective and 
thorough, and the trial, which has led to the identification of those responsible and to the 
conviction of some of them, have not attained their natural outcome, which, in the present 
case, was the punishment of those responsible563». 
What the Court seems to criticize, admittedly, is not the State secret privilege per se, which 
is defined as a «legitimate principle», but the distorted use of that doctrine made by the 
Italian executive in the present case, amounting to a sort of «abuse of the right564»: due to 
its late assertion, the classification of the evidence could not be meant anymore to protect 
the confidentiality of the information, but its only purpose was ensuring the impunity of the 
offenders565.  
In view of this finding, it is arguable that the State secret privilege is not incompatible in 
absolute terms with the procedural obligation to effectively investigate and punish under 
Article 2 and the other relevant Convention provisions. However, the Court seems to 
require, and correspondingly scrutinizes, the necessity and proportionality of the choice to 
recur to such instrument, which undoubtedly reduces the possibility to effectively 
prosecute and punish authors of serious human rights violations. In cases like the one at 
hand, were the legitimate aim which it pursued - i.e. the confidentiality of information which 
could pose a risk for national security - could not be attained by invoking the State secret 
privilege, as the information was already public, the interference it entailed on the 
procedural obligation to effectively prosecute and punish cannot be justified.  
This interpretation of the relationship between the procedural obligations to investigate and 
the State secret privilege is supported also by the Court’s case-law on the issue of State 
secret privileges in other fields, which may be nonetheless relevant also for the 
																																																						
Rei Publicae: state secret privilege and the Italian legal framework, in D. COLE, F. FABBRINI, A. 
VEDASCHI (eds.), Secrecy, national security and the vindication of constitutional law, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013, p. 95. 
563 See, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, cit., § 272. 
564 In this sense also, T. SCOVAZZI, Segreto di Stato e diritti umani, cit., p. 164. 
565 G. ARCONZO, I. PELLIZZONE, Il segreto di stato nella giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale e 
della Corte europea, cit., p. 12, also noted that the Italian Constitutional Court’s decision to allow 
the effects of a late invocation of the State secret on evidence that was already collected posed 
delicate problems to the effect that it could not prevent the publication of that information by the 
media and thus it would raise the question of whether State secret is invoked only to ensure 
impunity. 
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interpretation of the obligations at hand, on account of the partly parallel problems that are 
to be addressed owing to their common procedural nature.  
In particular, in the context of the right of access to a court under Article 6 with reference 
to civil proceedings involving acts or documents covered by State secret which are 
conclusive for the determination of the rights at stake, it has been held that «it is true that 
legitimate national security considerations may justify limitations on the rights enshrined in 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, but [at the same time] they should not have the effect of 
preventing a judicial determination of the merits of applicants’ complaints, thus amounting 
to a disproportionate restriction on their right of access to a court566». In such cases, the 
Court considered that it should be assessed whether there existed «a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the concerns for the protection of national security 
invoked by the authorities and the impact which the means they employed to this end had 
had on the applicant’s right of access to a court567». Where the assertion of State secret on 
those acts entailed that there could be no independent judicial scrutiny whatsoever on the 
plaintiff’s claim and therefore a judicial determination on the merits of the applicant’s claims 
was prevented, the Court concluded that the restriction on the right of access to a court 
was disproportionate and accordingly in violation of Article 6. 
A very similar approach is adopted also in relation to the procedural safeguards required 
under Article 8 for interferences with the right to respect of private and family life, such as 
expulsions of individuals on grounds of national security. In such context the Court held 
that «even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of 
law in a democratic society require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must 
be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body 
competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence, if need be with 
appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information»568. However, it found 
that where the applicant and the courts are completely prevented from knowing the 
reasons why the individual poses a risks to national security on the ground that the 
supporting documents are classified as secret, judicial review is not effective and the 
individual does not enjoy the minimum degree of protection against arbitrariness on the 
part of the authorities569. 
																																																						
566 Miryana Petrova v. Bulgaria, no. 57148/08, 21 July 2016, § 41; Devenney v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 24265/94, 19 March 2002, § 26; Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and others v. the United Kingdom, no. 
20390/92, 10 July 1998, § 76. 
567 Id. 
568 See, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002, § 123; C.G. and others v. Bulgaria, no. 
1365/07, 24 April 2008, § 40. 
569 Id. 
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In conclusion, the analysis of these two straws of case-law shows that in any event State 
secret cannot bar completely an individual’s access to justice in order to assert his rights570. 
This proportionality test could therefore easily be transposed by analogy to the procedural 
obligations to investigate, given that also in that context the State secret privilege may 
entail the same effect of preventing any judicial determination whatsoever on the merits of 
the case, only in that case a criminal one571. 
 
It is argued therefore that the State secret privilege is a measure that may be compatible 
with the procedural obligations to effectively investigate and punish under Articles 2 and 3 
only in so far as its use is necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Such 
proportionality is excluded when it prevents completely the examinations of the merits of 
the cases and leads to the discontinuation of the proceedings on that ground. 
 
 
C. Timely enforcement of the sentence 
 
As discussed above, the actual execution of the sentence imposed is relevant in 
determining whether the State has discharged its obligation to effectively punish serious 
human rights violations. Aside from the cases in which the national authorities adopted 
measures that hamper the execution of the sentence such as the one previously discussed, 
the effectiveness of the punishment is also tainted when the sentence is not promptly 
executed for whatever reason. 
In the case Kitanovska Stanojkovic and others v. the former Jugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, the Court held that: 
 
«The requirement of effectiveness of the criminal investigation under Article 2 of 
the Convention can be also interpreted as imposing a duty on States to execute 
their final judgments without undue delay. It is so since the enforcement of a 
sentence imposed in the context of the right to life must be regarded as an 
integral part of the procedural obligation of the State under this Article572». 
 
In that case, which is the only one addressing this specific issue so far, the delays in the 
enforcement of the sentence amounted to a period of 18 months from the date in which 
																																																						
570 In this sense also, G. ARCONZO, I. PELLIZZONE, Il segreto di stato nella giurisprudenza della Corte 
Costituzionale e della Corte europea, cit., p. 22. 
571 For a similar conclusion see also, F. FABBRINI, Extraordinary renditions and the State secret 
privilege, cit., p. 299. 
572 Kitanovska Stanojkovic and others v. the former Jugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 2319/14, 
13 October 2016, § 32. 
	 115	
the conviction became final, and were entirely attributable to the lack of diligence of the 
authorities. 
 
 
9. Implications of a non-effective punishment: limits to the ne bis in idem 
principle? 
 
In the previous section it has been discussed that the procedural obligations to investigate 
and punish serious human rights violations mandate also an effective punishment, where 
warranted, and that in this connection there are several measures, such as for instance 
amnesties and the discontinuation of the proceedings for expiration of statute of limitation 
periods, that are incompatible with those obligations in that they prevent an effective 
punishment and, to the contrary, bring about a situation of impunity. 
It is necessary, therefore, to assess if and what implications a non-effective punishment in 
violation of the procedural obligations under Article 2 and 3 may have on other Convention 
rights relating to criminal proceedings. In particular, the right not to be prosecuted or 
punished twice for the same facts under Article 4 of Protocol 7 comes into play, as its 
guarantees are triggered when a person «has been finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State». 
The question that needs to be answered therefore is the following: does a final decision 
taken in violation of the obligations to effectively punish serious human rights offences 
trigger the protection of the ne bis in idem principle or not? 
The issue was dealt with for the first time in the case Margus v. Croatia573, in which the 
applicant, an army officer, complained that his conviction on charges of war crimes against 
the civilian population in spite of the fact that ten years before he had, for the same facts, 
benefitted of a general amnesty law, was in violation of Article 4 of Protocol 7.  
The Court, recalling its jurisprudence according to which amnesties are a measure that is 
incompatible with the State’s duty to effectively investigate and punish gross human rights 
violations, adopted its interpretative practice of «harmonious interpretation574» whereby the 
Convention’s provisions «must be read as a whole», meaning that the right to ne bis in idem 
should be read in the light also of the procedural obligations under Articles 2 and 3. 
Therefore, noting also that there is a growing tendency in international law in general in 
excluding the admissibility of the grant of amnesties for acts which constitute grave 
breaches of fundamental human rights575, it held that the amnesty granted to the applicant 
																																																						
573 Margus v. Croatia [GC], cit., commented by A. PETROPOULOU, Les mesures d’amnistie, le principe 
ne bis in idem et l’évolution du droit international, cit., p. 437. 
574 See, L. LAVRYSENS, Human rights in a positive State, cit., p. 16. 
575 See supra … Such tendency is reflected also in Article 20 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which lais down an exception to the ne bis in idem principle where a person has 
	 116	
in that case was unacceptable from the viewpoint of Articles 2 and 3 and that, accordingly, 
«by bringing a fresh indictment against the applicant and convicting him of war crimes 
against the civilian population, the Croatian authorities acted in compliance with the 
requirements of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and in a manner consistent with the 
requirements576». It thus concluded that Article 4 of Protocol 7 is not applicable in such 
circumstances. 
In other words, the Court has clearly ruled that non-compliance with the procedural 
obligations of effective punishment under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention due to the 
granting of an amnesty for serious human rights offences constitutes a limit to the scope 
of the ne bis in idem guarantee, which cannot be invoked any longer.577 To the contrary, in 
such cases the reopening of the proceedings seems to be not only a viable possibility for 
the State that does not amount to a breach of the defendant’s rights, but a true and genuine 
duty stemming from the procedural obligations under Articles 2 and 3. 
The question remains open, however, as to whether forms of non-effective punishment 
other than amnesties, such as for example the discontinuation of the proceedings owing 
to expiration of the statute of limitation periods, may also entail such a limiting effect on the 
ne bis in idem principle. A positive answer seems to be most likely, if one considers that in 
the case-law analysed above no distinction is ever made between the different cases of 
non-effective punishment, which are all equally considered inadmissible578. 
	 	
																																																						
already been acquitted if the purpose of the proceedings before the other court was to shield the 
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court. 
576 Margus v. Croatia [GC], cit., § 140. 
577 According to the Italian Constitutional Court, in judgment no. 200 of 31 May 2016, such limitation 
of the ne bis in idem principle in view of substantive reasons relating to the duties of criminal 
protection testifies that the guarantee afforded to the principle is a relative rather than absolute one, 
see § 6. 
578 In this sense see also, G. DELLA MONICA, Ne bis in idem, in A. GAITO (ed.) I princìpi europei del 
processo penale, cit., p. 340-341. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN CRIMINAL MATTERS: VALUABLE TOOLS FOR 
ATTAINING THE OBJECTIVE OF EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS INTO 
SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES 
 
 
5. Positive obligations of criminal law enforcement in EU law 
 
The concept of positive obligations of criminal protection is not by any means unknown to 
the EU legal framework579. Admittedly, positive duties obliging Member States to make use 
of their criminal law systems in order to protect different EU interests are to be found both 
at the level of primary law and of secondary legislation, and surprisingly they are not 
confined to the areas in which the European Union has a criminal law competence, but 
rather arise also in other fields thanks to the general principles of EU law. The peculiarity of 
such obligations, similarly to those arising under the ECHR, is that they encompass not 
only the duty to criminalise specific conducts, but also an obligation to prosecute and 
effectively punish.  
This chapter will analyse the Member State’s duties to recur to criminal law flowing from 
the EU legal framework, focusing mainly on those aspects that touch upon procedural 
issues and not much to the related substantive obligations to criminalize580. The purpose is 
to understand when and how EU law seeks to ensure the objective of effective criminal 
proceedings, in particular what constraints it places on national criminal procedures and 
through what legal techniques these have been developed, in order to assess if there are 
any similarities with the doctrine of effective investigations elaborated under the ECHR and 
whether these obligations under EU law could constitute a useful tool to enhance the 
protection of the right to effective investigations under the ECHR. 
To this end, this Chapter will assess primarily on the general obligation resting upon 
Member States to enforce EU law descending from the Treaties and the general principles 
of EU law (Paragraph A) and then it will focus more specifically on duties to effectively 
investigate and punish serious human rights violations that can be found in secondary 
legislation (Paragraph B). 
																																																						
579 For an overview of the topic see P. ASP, European criminal law and national criminal law, in V. 
MITSILEGAS, M. BERGSTRÖM, T. KONSTADINIDES (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p. 315. 
580 On this topic see, C. PAONESSA, Gli obblighi di tutela penale: la discrezionalità legislativa nella 
cornice dei vincoli costituzionali e comunitari, cit., p, 193 ff.; J. TRICOT, Les obligations 
internationales de protection pénale du droit à la vie. Variations sur un meme thème? Le point de 
vue de l’Union Européenne, in S. MANACORDA, J. TRICOT (eds.) «Devoir de punir»?, cit., p. 113 ff. 
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A. The primary obligation to enforce EU law: The Member States’ duty to 
establish an effective criminal law system 
 
Even before the European Communities were conferred an explicit competence in criminal 
law581, the dynamics of European integration had a significant impact on the Member 
States’ discretion in shaping their national criminal law systems. The absence in the original 
Treaties of any provision regarding the enforcement of Community legislation in the field of 
internal market in case of violation meant that Community law enforcement was only 
indirect and completely left to the autonomy and discretion of the Member States582. This 
could not, however, mean that Member States were free to leave violations of EC law 
without any negative consequence for the offender, nor that they enjoyed an unfettered 
discretion when deciding what sanctions to apply.  
Admittedly, in order to fill the so-called «enforcement gap583», the European Court of Justice 
found that the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 10 EC Treaty (now Article 4 
par. 3 TFUE584) entailed a true obligation for Member States to enforce Community law. In 
its leading «Greek maize case», the Court established that:  
 
«where Community legislation does not specifically provide any penalty for an 
infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions, Article 5 of the Treaty requires the Member States to 
take all necessary measures to guarantee the application and effectiveness of 
Community law.585» 
 
																																																						
581 The EC were firstly formally conferred a limited competence in criminal law by the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, thanks to the compromise of the so-called «Three Pillar Structure». The Third Pillar, 
concerning the field of cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs was however based on a 
semi-intergovernmental method. 
582 See, R. SICURELLA, EU competence in criminal matters, in V. MITSILEGAS, M. BERGSTRÖM, T. 
KONSTADINIDES (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law, cit., p. 49 
583 See, J. VERVAELE, The European Union and Harmonization of the Criminal Law Enforcement of 
Union Policies: in search of a Criminal Law Policy?, in ID., European Criminal Justice in the Post-
Lisbon Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, cit., p. 11. 
584 Art. 4 par. 3 TUE: «Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member 
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions 
of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives». 
585 CJEU, Case C-68/88 Commission v. Greece, 21 September 1989, par. 23, with comment by L. 
SALAZAR, Diritto penale e diritto comunitario: la strana coppia, in Cassazione Penale, 1992, p. 1654. 
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In that case, furthermore, albeit acknowledging that the choice of penalties to be imposed 
remains within the Member States’ discretion, the Court at the same time set forth the 
requirements that Member States’ enforcement should respect in order to be considered 
adequate to guarantee the effectiveness of EC law, together with the standards against 
which their efforts will be measured.  
The first criterion that enforcement of EC law must comply with is the «principle of 
assimilation or equivalence»586, according to which: 
 
«[Member States] must ensure in particular that infringements of Community law 
are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are 
analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature 
and importance587». 
 
In other words, when penalizing infringements of EC law, Member States must use the 
same means of legislation – be it administrative or criminal - that they use with regard to 
similar violations of national law588. Therefore, in a situation where for instance national law 
criminalizes frauds, the provision of solely an administrative fine for EU frauds would be at 
variance with the assimilation principle which would require the provision of a criminal 
offence also for EU frauds.  
Such equivalence or assimilation, moreover, is not limited to the substantive provisions of 
criminal or administrative law (else said, the law-in-books), but clearly extends also to the 
procedural ones and must be taken into account when investigating and prosecuting 
cases589: this means that, for instance, the prosecution of a EC law infringement cannot be 
subject to the bringing of a formal complaint where such procedural condition is not set 
forth for a similar infringement of national law. 
In this connection, and with regards specifically to the procedural aspects of enforcement, 
the Court established also the «same diligence principle», according to which:  
 
																																																						
586 See, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 75-76; R. SICURELLA, EU competence in criminal 
matters, cit., p. 49; M. DOUGAN, From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist: Sanctions and Penalties for 
the Enforcement of Community Law, in M. CREMONA (ed.), Compliance and the Enforcement of EU 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 79-80. 
587 CJEU, Case C-68/88 Commission v. Greece, 21 September 1989, par. 24. 
588 According to J. TRICOT, Les obligations internationales de protection pénale du droit à la vie. 
Variations sur un meme thème?, cit., p. 119 this obligation therefore is not yet a «devoir de punir 
tout court» but only a «devoir de punir comme». 
589 See, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 75-76; P. ASP, European criminal law and national 
criminal law, cit., p. 317-318. 
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«national authorities must proceed, with respect to infringements of Community 
law, with the same diligence as that which they bring to bear in implementing 
corresponding national laws590». 
 
Accordingly, national authorities are expected to take the same efforts in investigating and 
prosecuting infringements of EU law to those undertaken to bring to justice offenders of 
merely national provisions. For instance, such principle would not be complied with in a 
situation where the prosecution decides to end the proceedings without carrying out further 
investigations for these would involve difficult and lengthy international assistance 
requests591. 
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the Court elaborated a final general requirement whereby in 
any event penalties set forth by national laws against infringements of EC law must be 
«effective, proportionate and dissuasive592». Such formula has thereupon proven so 
successful, to the point that it was subsequently codified not only in several legislative 
instruments593, but also in the Treaties594.  
While the proportionality requirement refers to a relationship between the gravity of the 
offence and the sanction provided, the criterion of dissuasiveness must be interpreted as 
having the potential to deter persons from committing such offences in the future595. 
Effectiveness, on the other hand, has been interpreted as meaning that «if infringements 
																																																						
590 CJEU, Case C-68/88 Commission v. Greece, 21 September 1989, par. 25. 
591 See, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 80-81. 
592 CJEU, Case C-68/88 Commission v. Greece, 21 September 1989, par. 24. It has been remarked 
how these properties of penalties condensate all the different theories of punishment, the retributive 
and the utilitarians ones, M. DELMAS-MARTY, Harmonisation des sanctions et valeurs communs: la 
réchèrche d’indicateurs de gravité et d’efficacité, in (eds.) M. DELMAS-MARTY, G. GIUDICELLI-
DÉLANGE, E. LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, L’harmonisation de sanctions pénales en Europe, Société de 
législation comparée, 2003, p. 585. For the development of certain theoretical parameters to 
implement these requirmente see, M. FAURE, Effective, proportional and dissuasive penalties in the 
implementation of the environmental crime and ship-source pollution directives: questions and 
challenges, in European Energy and Environmental Law Review, 2010, p. 256. 
593 See, inter alia, Article 4 of Directive 2001/36/EU on trafficking on human beings; Article 5 of 
Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law; Article 7 of 
Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions for market abuse; Article 5 of Directive 2014/62/EU on 
the protection of the euro and other currencies from counterfeiting by criminal law. 
594 Art. 325 TFUE stipulates that: «The Union and the Member States shall counter fraud and any 
other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union through measures to be taken in 
accordance with this Article, which shall act as a deterrent and be such as to afford effective 
protection in the Member States, and in all the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agancies».  
595 See, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 78-80. According to Advocate General Kokott in 
Case C-418/11 Texdata Software GmbH, 26 September 2013, par. 51-52, a penalty is dissuasive 
when it prevents an individual from infringing the objective pursued and the rules laid down by 
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occur, the system is capable of responding to it596» or similarly that «rules laying down 
penalties are effective where they are framed in such a way that they do not make it 
practically impossible or excessively difficult to impose the penalty provided for597», or also 
that infringements of EU law «should not be subject to penalties in theory alone», but «the 
system of penalties must rather be framed in such a way as to ensure that anyone (…) 
fears, in fact also, that penalties will be imposed on him598». The requirement of 
effectiveness therefore relates primarily to the enactment and enforcement of substantive 
criminal law provisions through effective criminal proceedings, for it implies not a mere 
abstract assessment of the sanction provided but also of the likelihood of its actual 
imposition. In other words, it becomes the source of an obligation to concretely punish599. 
It becomes thus clear that the obligation to enforce EU law constitutes a true obligation of 
result, defined by the Court of Justice as «a precise obligation as to the result to be 
achieved600», whose attainment has to be assessed in relation to the mentioned standards 
and in respect of which Member States enjoy procedural autonomy in deciding how to 
comply with it: what is relevant are not the abstract legal provisions per se but rather their 
practical and effective application601. 
 
It is apparent, thus, how the traditional principle of the Member States’ procedural 
autonomy602, all the more in criminal matters, is significantly restrained by the general 
obligation to enforce EU law and its conditions of equivalence and effectiveness, and this 
even before the EU acquired competence for the harmonisation of criminal procedures 
thanks to the Treaty of Lisbon. Such deep implications of EU law were acknowledged also 
by the Court of Justice, which noted that «although in principle criminal law and the laws 
of criminal procedure are matters for which the Member States are responsible, it does not 
follow that this branch of the law cannot be affected by Community law603».  
																																																						
596 A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 76. 
597 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 14 October 2004 in Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 
and C-403/02 Berlusconi and others, par. 88. 
598 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 30 April 2015 in Case C-105/14 Taricco, par. 88 
599 See, J. TRICOT, Les obligations internationales de protection pénale du droit à la vie. Variations 
sur un meme thème?, cit., p. 120-21. 
600 CJEU, 8 September 2015, Case C-105/14 Taricco, par. 51. 
601 In this sense see, L. PICOTTI, Riflessioni sul caso Taricco. Dalla “virtuosa indignazione” al rilancio 
del diritto penale europeo, in Dirittopenalecontemporaneo.it, 24 October 2016, p. 3. According to 
R. SICURELLA, EU competence in criminal matters, cit., p. 51, the Court of Justice adopts a «result-
oriented approach». See also, , C. PAONESSA, Gli obblighi di tutela penale: la discrezionalità 
legislativa nella cornice dei vincoli costituzionali e comunitari, cit., p. 204. 
602 See, CJEU, Case C-33/76 Rewe, judgment of 16 December 1976, par. 5. 
603 CJEU, Case C-226/97 Lemmens, judgment of 16 June 1998, par. 19. See also, CJEU Case C-
61/11 PPU El Dridi, judgment of 28 April 2011, par. 53. See also, J. VERVAELE, The European Union 
and Harmonization of the Criminal Law Enforcement of Union Policies, cit., p. 14. 
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The general EU law enforcement obligation, therefore, unmistakeably establishes 
requirements which national criminal procedure must fulfil if it is the tool chosen to enforce 
EU law, and these include several aspects which are scarcely foreseeable in advance, but 
become relevant on a case by case basis, such as for instance the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in deciding whether to dismiss a case that is relevant from a EU perspective. 
 
An interesting case with respect to the existence of an obligation to prosecute EC law 
infringements is the «French strawberries case604», which concerned the French authorities’ 
failure to investigate and prosecute on repetitive episodes of blockades of Spanish fruits 
and vegetables through France despite the fact that criminal offences had been committed. 
The Court in that case took the view that although under the general obligation to enforce 
EU law Member States enjoy a margin of discretion in determining what are the necessary 
and appropriate measures to counter such infringement of the free movement of goods, 
the French authorities had in the instant case «manifestly and persistently abstained from 
adopting appropriate and adequate measures to put an end to the acts of vandalism605». 
The Court pointed in particular to the circumstance that, even though it was undisputed 
that such acts of vandalism took place as they were filmed by cameras and the authors 
were known to the police, «only a very small number of the persons who participated in 
those serious breaches of public order has been identified and prosecuted606».  
Even if only implicitly, the Court thus made clear that Member States cannot just remain 
passive in front of infringements of EU law, but have an obligation to make a serious effort 
in investigating and then prosecuting, where warranted according to the same criteria used 
for deciding whether to prosecute or not in other national cases607. 
 
Another case in which the general obligation to effectively enforce EU law has revealed the 
significant repercussions it can exert on national criminal procedures, and in particular on 
statute of limitation periods, is the recent and famous Taricco case608. The case concerned 
																																																						
604 CJEU, Case C-265/95 Commission v. France, judgment of 9 December 1997. 
605 Ibidem, par. 32-34 and 65. 
606 Ibidem, par. 49-50. 
607 In this sense, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 304-306. See also the Opinion of the 
Advocate General Lenz of July 1997 in that case, par. 76, who stated that «the French authorities 
failed to prosecute those offences with the necessary vigour». See also, CJUE, Case-189/07 
Commission v. Spain, 22 December 2008, concerning the lack of effectiveness of the Spanish 
system of control and inspection of fisheries, where Spain was found to have disregarded its 
obligations as «ne veillant pas avec la fermeté nécessaire à l’adoption et à l’exécution des mesures 
appropriées à l’encontre des responsables d’infractions à la réglementation communautaire relative 
à la pèche, principalement par l’ouverture de procédures administratives ou pénales et l’infliction 
de sanctions dissuasives à ces responsables». 
608 CJEU, Case C-105/14 Taricco, judgment of 8 September 2015, with comment, among many, by 
M. CAIANIELLO, Dum Romae (et Brucsellae) Consolitur… Some Considerations on the Taricco 
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criminal proceedings brought on charges of serious VAT frauds, which have been found to 
affect the financial interests of the EU since VAT revenue forms part of the Union’s own 
resources609.  
The Court, for what is relevant for our purposes, firstly found that, notwithstanding the 
freedom that Member States in principle enjoy when choosing the penalties applicable to 
VAT frauds, «criminal penalties may nevertheless be essential to combat certain serious 
cases of VAT evasion in an effective and dissuasive manner610». Thereby, the Court made 
clear that the two «Greek maize» criteria can independently oblige Member States to 
provide for criminal sanctions, even without necessarily relying on the assimilation 
principle611.  
Furthermore, it took the view that if the application of a rule which lays down an absolute 
limitation period has the effect that the imposition of the sanction, given the complexity and 
duration of criminal proceedings, becomes impossible in a considerable number of cases 
since the offences will usually be time-barred before the criminal penalty can be imposed 
by a final judicial decision, then it cannot be said that the measures laid down in national 
law to combat frauds are effective nor dissuasive. Accordingly, the application of such a 
national rule on the statute of limitation would be incompatible with the obligation to provide 
for effective and dissuasive sanctions against infringements of EU law612, and a national 
court would be obliged to give full effect to such EU law obligation by setting aside the 
contrasting provision. It should be noted, however, that it is not the application of a 
limitation period as such that is incompatible with the requirement of effective enforcement 
of criminal sanctions, but rather only an absolute period, which does not allow for flexible 
application in so far as it lead to a de facto impunity613. 
It is therefore on the basis of the obligation arising from Article 325 TFUE in conjunction 
with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4 par. 3 TUE, which have been 
defined as «two coexisting duties with the same content614», namely to provide for effective 
criminal sanctions of EU law infringements, that the Court has placed a restraint on the 
Member States’ procedural autonomy in shaping their criminal justice system.  
 
																																																						
Judgement and its Consequences at National and European Level, in European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2016, 1, p. 1-17. 
609 See, CJEU, Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson, judgment of 26 February 2013, par. 26-27. 
610 CJEU, Case C-105/14 Taricco, judgment of 8 September 2015, par. 39. 
611 In this sense, M. TIMMERMAN, Balancing effective criminal sanctions with effective fundamental 
rights protection in cases of VAT fraud: Taricco, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, 3, p. 788. 
612 Ibidem, par. 47. 
613 In this sense also, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 77-78; M. CAIANIELLO, Processo penale 
e prescrizione nel quadro della giurisprudenza europea. Dialogo tra sistemi o conflitto identitario?, 
cit., p. 11. 
614 M. TIMMERMAN, Balancing effective criminal sanctions with effective fundamental rights 
protection in cases of VAT fraud: Taricco, cit., p. 789. 
	 124	
In conclusion, also the EU legal framework, just like the doctrine of the positive obligation 
to effectively investigate serious human rights offences under the ECHR, imposes certain 
duties of effectiveness on national criminal procedures in order to ensure the protection of 
its own interests. This occurs in particular thanks to the assimilation principle in relation to 
procedural conditions, the same diligence principle and, above all, the obligation to provide 
for effective penalties which is to be read as a duty to concretely punish. 
It becomes thus apparent that, though the protected interests are not the same, in both 
contexts, as if they were variations on the same theme,  the aspiration for their effectiveness 
has become the source of several restraints on the procedural autonomy of national 
criminal procedure615.  
In the EU legal framework, however, such obligation has even deeper and amplified 
practical repercussions in that, as seen above, thanks to the essential attributes of the EU 
legal order such as the principle of primauté, its judicial enforceability is stronger and may 
thus lead to the duty for national courts to set aside national provisions which, on a case 
by case basis, represent an obstacle to the effectiveness of the criminal law’s enforcement 
in pending proceedings616. 
 
 
a. Duties to effectively investigate and punish serious human rights offences 
in EU law: Article 83 TFUE and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
 
The duties to effectively punish which are to be found in the EU legal framework do not 
always rest on the thirst for safeguarding a fundamental right, but rather on the objective 
of ensuring the effectiveness of the law of the Union in general. However, nothing rules out 
the possibility that the interest of effectively protecting a fundamental right might activate 
the same mechanisms. Admittedly, the link human rights-effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system is not at all unfamiliar in EU law, where certain specific duties to punish 
human rights violations are also present and, similarly to the parallel ones under the ECHR, 
they bear upon procedural aspects of the criminal law enforcement rather than focusing 
only on the abstract incrimination of the prohibited conducts. Yet their scope is narrower, 
and limited to certain very specific aspects. 
 
																																																						
615 In this sense also, M. CAIANIELLO, Processo penale e prescrizione nel quadro della giurisprudenza 
europea. Dialogo tra sistemi o conflitto identitario?, cit., p. 11 
616 On the stronger enforceability of EU duties to punish see also, J. TRICOT, Les obligations 
internationales de protection pénale du droit à la vie. Variations sur un meme thème?, cit., p. 117 
and 130-134. 
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Preliminarily, account should be given of Articles 83 TFUE, which sets forth the criminal law 
competence of the Union617. In particular, paragraph 1 of that provision states that the 
Union may, by means of Directives, «establish minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the area of particularly serious crime with a cross-border 
dimension. Such areas of crime are: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised 
crime». Yet, this list in not exhaustive as it is also provided that other types of offences may 
be added «on the basis of developments in crime». Secondly, paragraph 2 introduces the 
so-called «annexed competence618» by stating that minimum rules on the definition of 
offences and criminal sanction may be provided if they are essential for ensuring the 
effectiveness of an harmonized Union policy.  
These provisions, thus, form the legal basis for the adoption of EU secondary legislation 
containing the obligation for Member States to criminalize and punish the respective crimes 
through the transposition of the minimum rules contained in it in the national systems. As 
to the relationship between such criminal law competence of the EU and human rights, it 
is interesting to note firstly that some of the «Euro crimes», such as trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, represent human rights offences 
which under the ECHR give rise to similar duties to criminalize and punish. Therefore, 
criminal law instruments at EU level in this context are a source of positive obligations of 
criminal protection of human rights for Member States. Furthermore, and from a partly 
different perspective, it has been suggested that these provisions of primary law, especially 
the annexed competence of Article 83 (2) TFUE might be read as implying also positive 
obligations weighing on the Union’s itself to adopt criminal law instruments and to 
effectively punish which flow specifically from fundamental rights619.  
This possibility seems less unlikely especially if taking into consideration the existence of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, which protects the same rights of EHCR, 
																																																						
617 It is nevertheless an «indirect compentece», in the sense that EU provision always required 
transposition in the national legal systems, without which a provision from a Directive may not form 
the basis on which criminal liability is founded. For more on this topic see, P. ASP, The substantive 
criminal law competence of the EU, Towards an area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Stockholm 
Universitet, 2012, p. 70-139; R. SICURELLA, EU competence in criminal matters, cit., p ?; A. KLIP, 
European Criminal Law, cit., p. 180-185; , C. PAONESSA, Gli obblighi di tutela penale: la 
discrezionalità legislativa nella cornice dei vincoli costituzionali e comunitari, cit., p. 237-242. 
618 On this notion see, A. BERNARDI, L’harmonisation pénale accessoire, in G. GIUDICELLI-DELAGE, C. 
LAZERGER (eds.), Le droit pénal de l’Union européenne au lendemain du Traité de Lisbonne, Société 
de législation comparée, 2012, p. 153-183. 
619 In this sense, J. VERVAELE, The European Union and Harmonization of the Criminal Law 
Enforcement of Union Policies: in search of a Criminal Law Policy?, cit., p. 41. 
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though expressed in more modern terms and much less negatively phrased620. The 
adoption of the Charter, in this connection, should lead to envisaging the perspective of 
positive obligations of criminal protection of human rights resting upon the Member States 
but also upon the Union621.  
In favour of such reading comes also Article 52(3) of the Charter, for it provides that the 
meaning and scope of Charter rights shall be the same as those of the corresponding rights 
laid down in the ECHR. In this sense, where the ECHR rights imply a positive obligation to 
effectively investigate and punish their infringements, it could be arguable that a parallel 
duty should also arise from the correspondent right under the Charter.  
On the other hand, however, Article 51(2) of the Charter introduces a significant limit to the 
scope of Charter rights, casting some doubts over whether there is room for developing 
such positive obligations on the basis of the Charter622. Indeed, it provides that «this Charter 
does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks defined by the Treaty», thus reflecting the content of Article 6(1) TUE 
stating that «The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of 
the Union as defined in the Treaties».  
Nonetheless, the European Court of Justice has started to formulate positive obligations of 
protection of human rights, even of procedural nature, under EU law resting on EU 
institutions623 and Member States624, though not yet of criminal protection. Admittedly, in 
so far as these are developed in a context in which the EU enjoys formal competence, the 
assertion of such positive obligations of protection of fundamental rights, even of criminal 
nature, would not run counter the limitations laid down in Article 51 of the Charter as the 
principle of attributed powers will be respected. 
 
																																																						
620 See, M. BEIJER, Positive obligations to protect fundamental rights: any role to be played by the 
European Court of Justice?, in strasbourgobservers.com, 10 October 2016. 
621 In this sense, J. TRICOT, Les obligations internationales de protection pénale du droit à la vie. 
Variations sur un meme thème?, cit., p. 127-128. 
622 See also, J. TRICOT, Les obligations internationales de protection pénale du droit à la vie. 
Variations sur un meme thème?, cit., p. 129; M. BEIJER, Positive obligations to protect fundamental 
rights: any role to be played by the European Court of Justice?, cit. 
623 See, CJEU, C-362/14 Schrems, judgment of 6 October 2015, where the Court found that the 
Commission must engage in a periodical monitoring of the compliance of the right to privacy and 
protection of personal data in the United States in the context of an agreement of the international 
transfer of personal data (so-called Safe Harbour Decision), see M. BEIJER, Positive obligations to 
protect fundamental rights: any role to be played by the European Court of Justice?, cit.. 
624 See, M. BEIJER, Active guidance of fundamental rights protection by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: exploring the possibilities of a positive obligations doctrine, in Review of European 
Administrative Law, 2015, no. 2, p. 127-150. Specifically on positive procedural obligations flowing 
from the principle of effective judicial protection see, P. VAN CLEYNENBREUGEL, The confusing 
constitutional status of positive procedural obligations in EU law, in ivi, 2012, no. 1, p. 91-114. 
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i. (…) and in secondary legislation: The Trafficking Directive, the Children Abuse 
Directive, the Framework Decision against Racism and Xenophobia and the 
Terrorism Directive 
 
The development of positive obligations to effectively investigate and punish human rights 
violations under the provisions of the Charter, however, represents only a theoretical 
possibility that might be deployed in the future. For the moment, most part of such 
obligations in EU law are instead to be found in secondary legislation.  
Indeed, the Directives adopted pursuant to Article 82 TFUE demonstrate that the 
establishment of minimum rules to harmonize national criminal laws is not limited to the 
mere definition of offences and sanctions but that these may go beyond providing for the 
mere abstract duty to incriminate, by regulating also other procedural aspects linked to 
jurisdiction, investigation and prosecution, inasmuch as they are an essential part for the 
effective application of those legal provisions625. 
 
Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human 
beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA («Trafficking Directive») is the first directive that has been adopted under 
Article 83 TFUE626, and establishes a duty to criminalize trafficking, which is qualified as a 
serious crime and a gross violation of fundamental rights627. It may thus be regarded as a 
source of positive obligations of criminal protection of human rights. 
In addition to the minimum rules concerning the definition of the offences and the sanctions 
to be imposed628, the Directive also contains provisions that touch upon the investigations 
and criminal proceedings, with a view of ensuring the effectiveness of the fight against 
trafficking offences, to the extent that reinforcing prosecution of such offences seems to 
be the main focus of the instrument629. 
																																																						
625 See in particular the Commission’s Communication «Towards an EU Criminal Policy – Ensuring 
the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law» (COM(2011)573) of September 
2011; see also, J. VERVAELE, The European Union and Harmonization of the Criminal Law 
Enforcement of Union Policies, cit., p. 42 and 53-54.  
626 The Trafficking Directive has a double legal basis under Articles 83(1) and 82(2), which shows it 
includes not only substantive criminal provisions, but also procedural ones. See also, R. LETSCHERT, 
C. RIJKEN, Rights of victims of crime: tensions between an integrated approach and a limited legal 
basis for harmonisation, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 2013, no. 3, p. 249. 
627 Recital 1 of Directive 2011/36/EU. In this sense also, F. SPIEZIA, M. SIMONATO, La prima direttiva 
UE di diritto penale sulla tratta di esseri umani, in Cassazione Penale, 2011, no. 9, p. 3197. 
628 Articles 2, 3, 4 of Directive 2011/36/EU. 
629 See, A. BOSMA, C. RIJKEN, Key challenges in the combat of human trafficking. Evaluating the EU 
trafficking strategy and the EU trafficking directive, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 2016, 
no. 3, p. 317. 
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In particular, Article 9 on «Investigation and prosecution» contains a number of provisions 
enhancing criminal prosecution mechanisms. Firstly, it sets the principle of ex officio 
initiation of the criminal proceedings, by stating that investigation into or prosecution of 
trafficking offences shall not be dependent on reporting or accusation by the victim and 
that criminal proceedings may continue even if the victim has withdrawn its consent630. 
Such provision not only is in line with the case-law of the ECtHR on the requirement of ex 
officio initiation of criminal investigations under Article 4 ECHR discussed previously631, but 
it appears to reinforce it even further by excluding any effect of the victim’s non-consent 
on the fate of the proceedings. 
Secondly, paragraph 2 of that provision also confines the discretion of Member State in 
setting limitation periods for the prosecution of trafficking offences against minors, by 
stating that these should take all the necessary measures to enable the prosecution of such 
offences for a sufficient period of time after the victim has reached the age of majority. Here 
again, the EU rules address another issue which constitutes a reason restricting a State’s 
right to prosecute632 and therefore, as seen, is relevant also for the Strasbourg’s case-law 
on effective investigations, namely the existence of adequate statute of limitation 
periods633. Such rule, in particular, lead to an extension of the period during which a 
prosecution can proceed. 
Finally, paragraph 3 and 4 state that the investigating and prosecuting authorities should 
be adequately trained and be able to recur to the same «effective investigations tools» used 
for organized crime or other serious crimes. According to Recital 15 these could include 
interception of communications, covert surveillance including electronic surveillance, 
monitoring of bank account or other financial investigations634. Moreover, according to 
Recital 5, cross-border cooperation among the law enforcement authorities of the Member 
States should be facilitated, through the exchange of information and the coordination of 
investigations and prosecutions. The objective pursued by this provision, namely the 
availability of all possible investigating means, seeks to ensure what on the ECtHR’s side 
is called the adequacy of the investigation, whereby the authorities should take all 
																																																						
630 According to E. SYMEONIDOU-KASTANIDOU, Directive 2001/36/EU on combating trafficking of 
human beings. Fundamental choices and problems of implementation, in New Journal of European 
Criminal Law, 2016, n. 4, p. 468, the ex officio initiation of proceedings is made compulsury under 
the Directive. See also, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 301. 
631 Supra, par… 
632 A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 297. 
633 Supra, …. 
634 The importance of financial investigations is to be explained by the business-like nature of the 
phenomenon of trafficking, see A. BOSMA, C. RIJKEN, Key challenges in the combat of human 
trafficking, cit., p. 321. F. SPIEZIA, M. SIMONATO, La prima direttiva UE di diritto penale sulla tratta di 
esseri umani, cit., observes that the Directive fails to include other effective transnational means of 
investigations such as the joint investigation teams and the spontaneous exchange of information 
among judicial authorities which may prove very useful in this context. 
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reasonable efforts to collect the evidence, included by resorting to international 
cooperation635. 
Article 10, furthermore, deals with aspects of jurisdiction, extending the obligation to 
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to ensure a more effective prosecution of 
international crime groups636. Indeed, it provides that Member States shall establish their 
jurisdiction not only where the offence has been committed in whole or in part in their 
territory, but also where the offender is one of their national even if the act does not 
constitute a crime where it is committed or is subject to the filing of a complaint by the 
victim. Furthermore, although there is no obligation to do so, Member States may establish 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes also where the victim is one of their nationals or a 
habitual resident in their territory or also the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal 
person established in their territory. These rules on extraterritorial jurisdiction represents a 
significant step forward compared to the findings of the ECtHR in relation to the same 
issue, which, as mentioned previously, has ruled out the existence of a duty on States to 
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over trafficking offences637. 
Finally, a number of provision address victim’s information and participation rights in the 
criminal proceedings, but these will be dealt with more thoroughly hereinafter638. 
 
The same pattern of the Trafficking Directive is adopted also by the Directive 2011/92/EU 
of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA («Children 
Abuse Directive»)639. Admittedly, this instrument also defines sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children as a serious violation of fundamental rights640 and serves the 
declared objective of seeking to ensure full respect of the fundamental rights641. The duty 
to criminalize such conduct and to provide for effective, dissuasive and proportionate 
sanctions can therefore be regarded as a positive obligation to punish a specific human 
right offence.  
As to the measures relating to the investigation and prosecution of those offences, affecting 
the procedural autonomy of Member States in criminal law, this Directive contains identical 
rules to those of the Trafficking Directive on ex officio opening of the proceedings, on the 
																																																						
635 Supra. 
636 Recital 16 of Directive 2011/36/EU. 
637 Supra. 
638 Infra. 
639 Admittedly, Recital 7 states that this instrument should be fully complementary to the Trafficking 
Directive. 
640 Recital 1 of Directive 2011/92/EU. 
641 Recital 50 of Directive 2011/92/EU. 
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extension of statute of limitation periods and on the investigation measures to be made 
available642 and to jurisdiction643. 
 
By the same token, the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 
on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of 
criminal law (“Racism Framework Decision”) is an example of the imposition of a duty of 
criminal protection of human rights, which is not limited to the mere criminalisation but 
serves towards the express purpose of allowing effective investigation, prosecution and 
punishments of those offences. This Framework Decision, indeed, lays down a duty on 
Member States to criminalize certain forms of racism and xenophobia, qualified as «direct 
violations of the principle of respect for human rights644», with the objective of ensuring an 
effective implementation of legislation combating such practices and in order to «lead to 
combating racism and xenophobia offences more effectively by promoting a full and 
effective judicial cooperation between Member States645». 
The only procedural provisions therein, however, concern jurisdiction646 and the duty to 
launch an investigation or prosecution ex officio which is not dependent on an accusation 
made by the victim, this at least in respect of the most serious forms of cases where the 
offence has been committed on the territory of the State647. 
 
Finally, obligations relating to the criminalization and effective investigation, prosecution 
and punishment of other forms of human rights offences are laid down by the recent 
Directive 2017/.../EU of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA («Terrorism Directive»). Acts of terrorism are indeed 
qualified as «one of the most serious violations of the universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity, and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
on which the Union is founded648». 
Similarly to the other legal instruments discussed above, the Terrorism Directive provides 
for the definition of different types of terrorist offences and obliges Member States to 
criminalize those conducts649. In this connection, it is acknowledged that a harmonized 
definition of terrorist offences is necessary to facilitate the information exchange and 
																																																						
642 Article 15 of Directive 2011/92/EU. 
643 Article 17 of Directive 2011/92/EU. 
644 Recital 1 of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. 
645 Recital 4 and 12 of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. 
646 Article 9 of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. 
647 Article 8 of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. A definition of «serious cases» is not 
provided. 
648 Recital 2 of Directive 2017/… 
649 Articles 3 to 18 of Directive 2017/… 
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cooperation between the competent law enforcement authorities650. As a consequence, the 
Directive regulates also certain specific procedural aspects for the purpose of enhancing 
the effectiveness of criminal proceedings into such offences, pursuant to a pattern which 
is similar to that adopted by the Trafficking and the Children Abuse Directive, but has some 
peculiarities651. 
Firstly, Article 24 sets out the already seen principle of ex officio initiation of criminal 
proceedings into terrorist offences, but it confines it to those offences on which State have 
territorial jurisdiction. This might be explained by the fact that, in comparison to the other 
legal instruments, Article 19 of the Terrorism Directive extends significantly the Member 
States’ duty to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist offences. A part from the 
case of offences committed outside the State’s territory by one of their nationals, which 
was already contemplated also in the Trafficking and Children Abuse Directives, it adds 
also the cases whereby the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person 
established in its territory or against the institutions and people of the State in question or 
against an institution, body, office or agency of the Union based in that State, and finally, 
though in relation to only certain offences, where the State refuses to surrender or extradite 
the person suspected or convicted of such an offence to another Member State or to a 
third country. Beside these obligatory cases, moreover, other optional cases of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction are provided652. Clearly, strong cooperation is finally mandated 
between the judicial authorities where, in view of these very wide criteria for the 
establishment of jurisdiction, more Member States could validly prosecute on the basis of 
the same facts. However, the failure by the Directive to establishing clear and uniform 
criteria to this end risks falling foul of the objective of ensuring an effective centralised 
prosecution of terrorist offences in a single Member State. 
Thirdly, also the Terrorism Directive addresses the issue of the effective investigation 
measures to be made available to the authorities inquiring into terrorism offences. In 
addition to those already mentioned in the legal instruments previously examined, Recital 
21 takes into consideration also personal searches, the taking and keeping of audio 
recordings in public or private vehicles and places and of visual images but only in public 
vehicles and places. 
Finally, the Terrorism Directive, through the amendment of Framework Decision 
2005/671/JHA, lays down some cooperation duties between the judicial and investigating 
authorities of the Member States. In particular, pursuant to Article 22(2) the information 
gathered in criminal proceedings concerning terrorist offences should be made available 
																																																						
650 Recital 3 of Directive 2017/… 
651 In particular, the issue of limitation periods is not addressed, probably due to the fact that 
terrorism offences do not necessarily affect minors. 
652 Article 19 (2) of Directive… 
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as soon as possible in accordance with national law to the law enforcement authorities of 
another Member State upon request or spontaneously where it could be useful for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences in that Member 
State. However, the effectiveness of this duty is significantly affected by the provision of 
three ground of refusal of a possibly very wide application: the sharing of the information 
may be refused when it would jeopardize current investigations or the safety of an individual 
or would be contrary to essential interest of security. 
 
 
6. Procedural requirements concerning effective criminal proceedings in EU law 
 
After having discussed the existence in EU law of positive duties to effectively investigate 
and punish human rights offences but also, more generally, infringements of EU legislation, 
the present section will assess whether in the EU legal framework there are provisions 
bearing on national criminal procedures that, although being of more general application 
and not having any particular link with the duties to punish examined previously, 
nevertheless pursue the same objective of ensuring the effectiveness of criminal 
proceedings. In particular, the main focus will be on those specific aspects that have been 
identified as minimum requirements of effectiveness in the ECtHR case-law on the right to 
effective criminal investigations in order to assess whether EU law has assimilated those 
standards and whether it even provides for higher ones. If this was the case, the implication 
that would follow is that the requirements of effectiveness of criminal investigations 
developed by the ECtHR would acquire more strength thanks to the peculiar characteristics 
of EU law. 
 
 
A. Rights of victims of crime in criminal proceedings 
 
Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 82 TFUE confers to the EU 
formal competence to legislate in criminal procedural law. In particular, Article 82(2) TFUE 
envisages the possibility for the adoption of directives in order to establish minimum rules 
in specific fields, among which appear the rights of victims of crime653. 
																																																						
653 Article 82 (2) TFUE reads: “To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments 
and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border 
dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take 
into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States. They 
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The most prominent legal instrument adopted in this field is Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 
October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (“Victims 
Directive”). Such directive represents a “Bill of rights” of victims at European level, as it sets 
out a horizontal framework for addressing the needs of all victims of crime, irrespective of 
the type of crime or the circumstances or place in which it was committed654. Nonetheless, 
special provisions dedicated only to victims of specific crimes still exists in other legal 
instruments, such as the Trafficking and the Child Abuse Directive. 
Despite the integrated approach adopted by the Victims Directive, aimed at improving the 
position of victims of crime in general and thus pursuing a twofold objective of ensuring 
both the support, information and protection of victims even outside criminal proceedings 
and their participation in criminal proceedings655, account will be given here only of those 
provisions relevant to procedural criminal law, namely on the information, protection and 
participation rights conferred to victims of crime during the criminal investigation phase. 
Such rights can indeed be compared to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the involvement of 
victims in criminal investigations on serious human rights violations, primarily because 
these from a temporal perspective become applicable from the moment when a complaint 
is brought or from the moment when the authorities initiate criminal investigations on their 
own motion656.  
The rights established by the Victims Directive can be distinguished into the right to 
information, to interpretation, to legal assistance, to provide evidence and to be heard, and 
the right to a judicial review of a decision not to prosecute. 
 
 
																																																						
shall concern: (a)  mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; (b)  the rights of 
individuals in criminal procedure; (c)  the rights of victims of crime; (d)  any other specific aspects 
of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption of 
such a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. Adoption of the minimum rules referred to in this paragraph shall not prevent Member 
States from maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection for individuals”.  
 
654 A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, cit., p. 333, however, notes that the need for victim’s rights in 
criminal proceedings is regarded as self-evident in the Directive for no explanation or rationale is 
given for such rights apart from it being a Union priority. 
655 See, S. ALLEGREZZA, Il ruolo della vittima nella direttiva 2012/29/EU, in L. LUPARIA (ed.), Lo statuto 
europeo delle vittime di reato. Modelli di tutela tra diritto dell’Unione e buone pratiche nazionali, 
Wolters Kluwer, 2015, p. 5. 
656 Recital 22 of Directive 2012/29/EU. The pre-trial phase is clearly the most delicate from a victim’s 
perspective and thus it is highly significative that the rights conferred by the Victims Directive are 
applicable to that phase, see S. ALLEGREZZA, Il ruolo della vittima nella direttiva 2012/29/EU, cit., p. 
6; H. BELLUTA, Participation of the victim in criminal investigations: the right to receive information 
and to investigate, in dirittopenalecontemporaneo.it, 16 November 2015, p. 2. 
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i. The right to information 
 
The right to information and to understand and be understood is an essential prerequisite 
for the effective exercise of any other right of participation or protection, as conscious 
decisions may be taken only when one is properly aware of the existing possibilities. 
Therefore, victim’s information rights in the investigations phase are numerous and very 
detailed, as the Directive specifically sets both the timing, modalities and content of the 
requisite information.  
Article 4 imposes a positive obligation to provide information to victims about their rights, 
requiring the criminal justice authorities to give extensive information proactively ex officio 
and without undue delay from their first contact with the victim. In particular, as regards 
specifically criminal justice, victims should be informed of: the procedures for making 
complaints with regard to a criminal offence; the procedures for making complaints with 
regard to a criminal offence and their role in connection with such procedures; how and 
under what conditions they can obtain protection, including protection measures; how and 
under what conditions they can access legal advice, legal aid and any other sort of advice; 
how and under what conditions they can access compensation; how and under what 
conditions they are entitled to interpretation and translation; if they are resident in a Member 
State other than that where the criminal offence was committed, any special measures, 
procedures or arrangements, which are available to protect their interests in the Member 
State where the first contact with the competent authority is made; the available 
procedures for making complaints where their rights are not respected by the competent 
authority operating within the context of criminal proceedings; the contact details for 
communications about their case; the available restorative justice services; how and under 
what conditions expenses incurred as a result of their participation in the criminal 
proceedings can be reimbursed. Finally they should also be informed without delay of their 
right to receive sufficient information in order to decide whether to seek review of a decision 
not to prosecute657.  
Beside these general information, that are due in any case of contact between the victims 
and the criminal enforcement authorities, Article 5 establishes that where a formal 
complaint of an offence having been committed is brought to the competent authorities, 
the victims are also to be provided with a written acknowledgment of the formal complaint 
brought them, stating also the basic elements of the criminal offence concerned, such as 
the type of crime, the time and place, and any damage or harm caused by the crime, in 
order for them to be able to prove the crime has been actually reported658. 
Furthermore, Article 6 confers to victims the right to be afforded information and updates 
																																																						
657 See Article 11 (3) of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
658 See Recital 24 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
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about the progress of their case, during the investigation stage and until the conclusion of 
the proceedings. It is stated that in all Member States, upon request of the victim, 
information must be given regarding any decision to end an investigation or not to 
prosecute along with the reasons for it or, in the alternative, the time and place of the trial 
and the nature of the charges brought against the offender, as well of the subsequent 
appeal proceedings659. Moreover, only in those Member States where the victim has a role 
in criminal proceedings then additional information should also be provided upon its 
request. In particular, they should be made aware of any final judgment in the trial, together 
with the reasons on which it is based, and of all other information enabling the victim to 
know about the state of the criminal proceedings, unless in exceptional cases the proper 
handling of the case may be adversely affected by such notification660.   
It appears, indeed, that the right of victims to be informed of the progress of the criminal 
proceedings suffers from an important limit, as Member States should not be obliged to 
provide information where disclosure of that information could affect the proper handling 
of a case or harm a given case or person, or also if they consider it contrary to the essential 
interests of their security661.   
Special attention is dedicated also to the evolution of detention measures against the 
offender and its status libertatis662: always upon request, victims are indeed offered the 
opportunity to be notified, without unnecessary delay, when the offender is released from 
or has escaped detention at least where there might be a danger of harm to the victim, 
flowing from the seriousness of the crime or the risk of retaliation. Only where there is an 
identified risk of harm to the offender which would result from the notification, such 
information could be refused, but only following a global assessment by the competent 
authority of all the circumstances of the case in order to adopt the most appropriate 
action663. 
 
																																																						
659 See Recital 31 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
660 The extent of information due to victims thus will vary widely depending on whether, in the 
national systems, these are regarded as parties to the proceedings or as mere witnesses, see H. 
BELLUTA, Participation of the victim in criminal investigations: the right to receive information and to 
investigate, cit., p. 4. 
661 See Recital 32 of Directive 2012/29/EU. G. ALVARO, A. D’ANDREA, The impact of Directive 
2012/29/EU on the Italian system for protecting victims of crime in criminal proceedings, in S. 
RUGGERI (ed.), Human Rights in European Criminal Law, Springer, 2015, p. 312 highlight the need 
to balance the right to information against the investigative requirements for confidentiality 
especially during the preliminary investigation stage. 
662 See Article 6 (5) and (6) of Directive 2012/29/EU. See, H. BELLUTA, Participation of the victim in 
criminal investigations: the right to receive information and to investigate, cit., p. 4, remarking that 
in this case information to the victim is not functional to its participation to the proceedings, but 
rather to its protection. 
663 See Recital 32 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
	 136	
ii. The right to interpretation and translation 
In order to ensure the effective information and participation of victims who do not 
understand the language of the criminal proceedings664, the Directive grants them, but only 
upon their request, a limited right to interpretation and translation665. 
Firstly, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Directive, such victims are enabled to submit the 
formal complaint to the competent authorities with regard to a criminal offence in a 
language they understand or by receiving the requisite linguistic assistance. 
Secondly, under Article 7(1) of the Directive, those victims have a right to free interpretation 
at least during their interviews or questionings by police or judicial authorities and when it 
is necessary for their active participation in court hearing and to exercise their rights, 
according to the role granted to victims in national criminal procedure666.  
As to the right of translation, under Article 7(3) and (4) this is confined to the translation of 
«information essential to the exercise of their rights in criminal proceedings», a notion which 
should include at least the decision concluding the proceedings and its reasons as well as 
the information regarding the time and place of the trial. However, victims may also submit 
a reasoned request to consider a document as essential for the purposes of it translation. 
In such cases, however, an oral translation or even an oral summary of the documents is 
deemed to be sufficient, provided that it does not prejudice the fairness of the proceedings. 
 
 
iii. The right to legal aid 
 
As to the possibility of access to a lawyer, the Victims Directive does not confer a general 
right to legal representation and assistance during criminal proceedings to all victims of 
crime. To the contrary, Article 13 lays down an obligation to grant legal aid, to be interpreted 
as including at least legal representation and legal advice free of charge667, only to victims 
that already have the status of parties to criminal proceedings and in accordance to the 
conditions and procedural rules determined by national law. 
A very similar, though partly more generous, solution is adopted also in the Trafficking 
Directive and in the Child Abuse Directive, where it is expressly stated that Member States 
shall ensure that victims have access without delay to legal counselling and, in accordance 
																																																						
664 Pursuant to Article 7 (7) it is for the competent authority to assess whether the victim needs 
interpretation and translation, but victims should be entitled to challeng a decision refusing them 
such service, in accordance with the national rules. 
665 See, L. LUPARIA, Vittime dei reati e diritto all’assistenza linguistica, in C. FALBO, M. VIEZZI (eds.), 
Traduzione e interpretazione per la società e le istituzioni, 2014, p. 97. 
666 See Recital 34 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
667 See, DG Justice Guidance Document on Directive 2012/29/EU of December 2013 
(http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/victims/guidance_victims_rights_directive_en.pdf), p. 34. 
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with their role in the national justice system, to legal representation which representation 
shall be free of charge where the victim does not have sufficient financial resources 668. 
Nothing precludes the possibility, however, for Member States to ensure a higher level of 
protection than that and extend access to legal aid also to victims that do not have such a 
role in criminal proceedings. 
 
 
iv. The right to provide evidence and to be heard 
 
With regards to the actual participation in the proceedings, the Victims Directive appears 
to underpin, although in cautious terms, a right of victims to investigate669. Indeed, Article 
10 establishes both the right of victims to be heard and to provide evidence. Admittedly, 
testimony is clearly the most important piece of evidence that a victim mat offer, but not 
necessarily the only one.  
The procedural rules under which such rights are to be exercised are however left to 
national laws. Thus, the scope of this right may vary significantly among Member States: it 
may range from very basic rights to communicate with and supply evidence to a competent 
authority to more extensive ones such as a right to have evidence taken into account or 
the right to give evidence during the trial670. However, at least for the right to be heard, it is 
arguable that the latter standard applies, as is has been found by the Court already before 
the entry into force of the Victims Directive that «it must be made possible for the victim to 
be permitted to give testimony which can be taken into account as evidence671». In this 
logic of respecting the procedural autonomy of Member States, the Directive does not 
specify neither in which stage of the criminal proceedings these rights should be ensured, 
if during the investigation, at trial or in both phases, nor before which authority, whether 
judicial or not, nor the modalities according to which they are to be exercised672. The only 
indication in this regard is provided by Recital 41, which explains that the right of victims 
to be heard should be considered fulfilled where they are permitted to make statements or 
explanations in writing. This suggest, therefore, that there is no right to an oral hearing 
under the Directive’s provisions673.  
																																																						
668 Article 12 (2) of Trafficking Directive and Article 20(2) Child Abuse Directive. 
669 In this sense also, H. BELLUTA, Participation of the victim in criminal investigations: the right to 
receive information and to investigate, cit., p. 5. 
670 See also, DG Justice Guidance Document on Directive 2012/29/EU of December 2013, cit., p. 
29. 
671 See, CJEU, Case C-404/07 Katz, 9 October 2008, interpreting the corresponding provisions of 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. 
672 In this sense also, S. ALLEGREZZA, Il ruolo della vittima nella direttiva 2012/29/EU, cit., p. 14. 
673 In this sense also, S. PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Volume II: EU Criminal law, 
policing, and civil law, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. ?? 
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The hearing of the victim within criminal proceedings, while being an important form of 
participation in them as a means of providing evidence, at the same time also gives rise to 
a need of protection, in order to avoid it becoming the source of further harm. This explains 
not only why it is established that victims should be able to renounce to be heard, but also 
the provision of particular measures of protection in the Directive. In this connection, Article 
20 seeks to prevent secondary victimization by establishing that, without prejudice to the 
rights of the defence, victims should be interviewed as early as possible during criminal 
investigations, while restricting the number of interviews to the minimum necessary and 
with the assistance of their legal representative or a person of their choice. By the same 
token, medical examinations of victims should also be kept to a minimum and carried out 
only when strictly necessary.  
Moreover, according to Article 21, further specific protection measures are in principle to 
be adopted for the hearing of victims «with specific protection needs» due to their particular 
vulnerability to secondary and repeat victimisation, intimidation, and retaliation674. As to the 
investigation phase, these measures include the carrying out of the interview in ad hoc 
premises through specifically trained professionals and possibly by the same person. As 
to the trial phase, it is foreseen that in such cases visual contact between the victim and 
the offender should be avoided during the giving of evidence also by using appropriate 
means of communication technologies, which should be used also to ensure the possibility 
of hearing the victim without her presence in the courtrooms. Also, measures should be 
taken to allow a hearing without the presence of the public and to ensure that unnecessary 
questioning concerning the private life of the victim not related to the criminal offence is 
avoided. 
In addition to such specific measures of protection, where the victim is a child, to whom a 
presumption of specific protection needs applies675, Article 24 provides that in the 
investigation phase all interviews may be audio visually recorded in accordance to national 
procedures in order for such recordings to be used as evidence at trial. 
Very similar protection measures to be granted to victims in order to prevent their further 
victimization when being heard within criminal proceedings are provided by also in the 
Trafficking Directive and the Child Abuse Directive676. 
 
 
 
																																																						
674 In order to identify the specific protection needs of victims in criminal proceedings, national 
authorities should proceed to an individual assessment taking into account the personal 
characteristics of the victim, the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to Article 22 of 
the Directive. 
675 Article 22 (4) of of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
676 See Article 12 (4) and 15 of the Trafficking Directive and Article 20 (3) of the Child Abuse Directive. 
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v. The right to a review of a decision not to prosecute 
 
Finally, Article 11 provides for the right of victims to a review of a decision not to prosecute, 
which is defined as any decision ending criminal proceedings by which a prosecutor, 
investigating judge or other law enforcement authority to the exclusion of courts decides 
to withdraw the charges or to discontinue the proceedings677, apart from decisions resulting 
in an out-of-court settlement imposing a warning or an obligation678. 
Such right, however, is not absolute but, in those national criminal justice systems where 
the role of victims is established only after a decision to prosecute has been taken, only the 
victims of «serious crimes» are entitled to it. In any case, the procedural rules according to 
which the right to review is to be exercised are left to national laws, the only exception 
being that review should be carried out by a different person or authority from the one who 
took the impugned decision, unless this was the highest prosecuting authority then it is 
enough if the same authority reviews the decision679. 
Furthermore, in order for the right to review to be effective it is also established that victims 
have the right to receive, upon request, sufficient information in order to be able to decide 
whether to seek review of a decision not to prosecute. In this connection, it seems that the 
mere notification to the victims of the decision not to prosecute is not sufficient to fulfil such 
obligation, which to the contrary implies also granting victims access to the case file. 
Admittedly, the notification of the decision not to prosecute is already ensured by another 
provision of the Directive, namely Article 4, and if this obligation were to be interpreted in 
such narrow sense it would be deprived of any independent scope and, therefore, of any 
practical effect680, as in order to effectively challenge a decision it is necessary to be 
acquainted with the materials of the case on which it is based. 
The importance of this new right681 of review as a mechanism to supervise the work of a 
potentially inactive prosecutor682 is apparent if one considers that its purpose is to enable 
the victim to verify that national rules on criminal investigations have been complied with 
																																																						
677 Recitals 43 and 44 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
678 Recital 45 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
679 Recital 43 of Directive 2012/29/EU. 
680 See, mutatis mutandis, CJEU, Case C-241/15 Bob Dogy, 1 June 2016, § 47 concerning the 
interpretation of Article 8 (1)(c) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on 
the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. 
681 S. PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Volume II: EU Criminal law, policing, and civil law, 
cit., p. ??, observes that the right to a review, unlike many other rights discussed above, has been 
introduced for the first time in Directive 29/20122/EU, as it was not provided under the old 
Framework Decision 2011/220/JHA on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings. 
682 In this sense, A. NOVOKMET, The right of a victim to a review of a decision not to prosecute as set 
out in Article 11 of Directive 29/2012/EU and an assessment of its transposition in Germany, Italy, 
France, and Croatia, in Utrecht Law Review, 2016, 12, p. 87, who observes that although being 
motived primarily by private interests, victims seeking review of a decision not to prosecute also 
realize the public interest in prosecuting the perpetrator of an offence. 
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and that a correct decision has been made, so that any discretion is exercised in 
accordance with the law683. However, a number of crucial issues remain open to question 
and limit the impact of such a breakthrough.  
Firstly, as to the scope of the right, it is not clear what are the «serious crimes» for which 
the right to a review is to be always provided, and if that is to be regarded as an autonomous 
notion of EU law or may be defined by the different Member States684. In any case, it is 
arguable that at least the so-called “Eurocrimes” listed in Article 83 (1) TFUE and defined 
by that provision as «particularly serious crimes» should be included in that notion685. 
Secondly, the scope of the review is not defined and arguably it is a choice left to national 
rules. Therefore, it might be that a review limited to issues of legality and not also on the 
merits would suffice686. 
Lastly, the authority that should be in charge of the review is also not defined by the 
Directive. As a consequence, Member States could legitimately implement such right by 
providing for a mere review by a higher prosecuting authority rather than a judge or a court, 
as long as it meets the necessary requirements of objectivity and impartiality inherent in 
the concept of review687.  
 
 
vi. Assessment of the Victims Directive in the light of the ECHR case-law 
 
It is definitely a venture to draw a comparison between the rights guaranteed to victims in 
criminal investigation by the Court under its case-law on the procedural obligation to 
investigate and punish serious human rights violations and those conferred by the Victims 
Directive, given the obvious differences existing in their scope and nature. While the EU 
instrument contains very detailed provisions and confers specific rights, the Court adopts 
a less formalistic approach, whereby what is determinative is the effectiveness of the overall 
																																																						
683 In this sense, R. LETSCHERT, C. RIJKEN, Rights of victims of crime: tensions between an integrated 
approach and a limited legal basis for harmonisation, cit., p. 246. 
684 According to DG Justice Guidance Document on Directive 2012/29/EU of December 2013, cit., 
p. 36, EU criminal law legislation and international criminal justice standards should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting such notion at national level. 
685 Among EU secondary legislation, however, other lists of serious crimes are to be found so that 
it cannot be concluded that it exists a single and uniform EU notion of serious crimes (see, for 
instance, Article 3 (9) of Directive 2016/681/EU on the use of passenger name record data for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorism or serious crime, Article 3 (4) of 
Directive 2015/849/EU on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, Article 3 (1) of Regulation 2016/794 on Europol). 
686 Of the opposite view, G. ALVARO, A. D’ANDREA, The impact of Directive 2012/29/EU on the Italian 
system for protecting victims of crime in criminal proceedings, cit., p. 313, for whom a right to review 
refers to «a proceduredesigned to reevaluate the facts and legal grounds that led to the decision». 
687 In this sense also, A. NOVOKMET, The right of a victim to a review of a decision not to prosecute 
as set out in Article 11 of Directive 29/2012/EU, cit., p. 91. 
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involvement of the victim during the proceedings as a whole and not the single different 
rights of information and involvement that may have been accorded or not. Moreover, the 
Court’s case-law is applicable only to victims of certain serious human rights offences, 
whereas the Directive confers rights to all victims of crime. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the provisions of the Victims Directive are substantially based 
on the same requirements of victim’s involvement in criminal proceedings developed under 
the procedural obligation to investigate previously discussed. Indeed, all the rights pointed 
out by the Court are guaranteed also by the Directive, and, what is more, to a nearly 
equivalent extent. 
This hold true, firstly, in respect of the right to information, the only difference being that 
the Directive ensures a higher protection by providing also for the right of victims to be 
informed under specific circumstances of the release from detention of the accused, which 
has been expressly ruled out by the Court688, and the right conferred only to victims that 
according to national laws have a role in criminal proceedings to be informed of the 
judgment against the defendant together with the reasons supporting it. 
Likewise, the right to legal aid has a very limited scope of application both under the 
Directive and the Court’s case-law. 
As to the right to provide evidence, both sources place it under wide limitations. Yet, an 
arguably higher protection is granted under the procedural obligations to investigate, in 
that thereby the authorities have a duty to address the victim’s request and give reasons 
for their refusal to allow them. In the Directive, instead, the issue is left to the national laws 
of the Member States. The same holds true for the right of victims to be heard, where the 
Court has stressed the importance of carrying out such activity as soon as possible already 
in the investigation stage, whereas the Directive leaves the choice to domestic rules. Also 
in this regard, however, the two sources require the adoption of protection measures for 
the hearing of the victim that largely overlap. 
The Victims Directive, nevertheless, seems to go further than the Court’s case-law on the 
involvement of victims in criminal proceedings on serious human rights violations in that it 
also ensures additional rights that the former has not considered or even expressly 
excluded, such as the right to interpretation and translation and the right to review of a 
decision not to prosecute. In particular, the establishment of such last right in EU 
legislation, which is guaranteed in absolute terms when «serious crimes» are involved, is 
very significant since the Court, quite interestingly after the adoption of the Directive, has 
ruled out the existence of a right to a judicial review of a decision not to prosecute under 
the procedural obligations to investigate based on the assumption that the practices of 
State parties in this regards are very different689.   
																																																						
688	See	supra	…	
689	See	supra..	
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In sum, notwithstanding the slight differences between the two sources, similar conclusions 
have in substance been reached at the ECHR and EU level. Through the acknowledgment 
of information and participation rights, they both converge to a rediscovery and valorisation 
of the role of victims in criminal proceedings. 
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